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ABSTRACT 
This thesis deals with the emergence of the modem criminal process in England 
between 1780 and 1910 . It seeks to investigate this period from a standpoint which 
regards this development of the criminal process ar.; intimately related to its internal 
structure and self-understanding. This is understood to occur through 
transformations in institutional structures produced by both the practices of the 
elements within it, and changes in the theoretical conceptualisation of the structure of 
the criminal process. The character of these developments, and the tendencies which 
they evince, are seen to be generally negative from the perspective of a theory of 
society which is intimately connected with an interest in emancipation. The relation 
between law, state and democracy is seen to be an essentially problematic one which 
does not conform to the ideas of progress, equality or liberty but to the maintenance 
of the survival of a social system which is seen as constantly at risk from a threatening 
environment of individuals whose obedience to the structure of the social order must 
be obtained continuously. 
The thesis is the result of original research which draws upon both original and 
secondary sources. The methodology used in writing the thesis is a combination of 
historical analysis and theoretical perspectives. There is a focus upon modem 
developments and it is hoped that the thesis will inform current debate on the future of 
the criminal process. 
The thesis is divided into four main chapters which concentrate upon 
particular parts of the criminal process in both their specificity and in their relation to 
the system and society as a whole. The fust deals with the development of the 
institutional autonomy of the "New Police If, during the nineteenth century, setting it 
in the context of the system of local governance. The second examines the system of 
prosecution describing the failure to institute a system of public prosecution and the 
predominance of the " New Police 11 as prosecutors in a system which remained 
private merely in form. The third deals with the position of the defendant during this 
process of transformation in the criminal process and presents its evolution as one 
which accorded with internal systemic considerations of the criminal process, and not 
as one which could be seen as the unfolding of the concept of freedom, equality or 
universality. The fourth deals with the creation of the Court of Appeal in 1907 which 
is seen, not ar.; the institutional embodiment of justice, but as the product of the 
internal concerns of the Home Office Criminal Department with the systemic 
coherence and legitimacy of the criminal process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Between 1780 and 1910 a gradual change was made in the existent criminal process 
producing the basis for the emergence of the modem system. The period marked a 
decisive transformation not merely in conceptions of the nature of crime, criminality 
and punishment, but also in the structure and operation of the element') of the criminal 
process itself. This period takes on an even greater c,entrality once attention is turned 
to the nature of its links with the present system - the conceptualisation of the history 
of the modem criminal process. 
This dual centrality shapes the configuration of the critical investigation of this 
period by this thesis. It conceives the interrogation of the conceptual and material 
foundations of, and developments within, the criminal process during this period a') a 
process which is intimately connected with an assessment of the importance of the 
past for the present. Therefore, underlying this investigation is an attempt to 
understand the truth of the past through an evaluation of the nature and character of 
the emergence of this criminal process. 
From this flows the attendant need to specify the conception of the relation 
between the person seeking to critically engage with the past, the process of 
interrogation and the form of the pa')t or tradition. Hence, in order to break with the 
notions of the spontaneous origin of social facts and the sealing off of the present 
from the past it is necessary to define the theoretical premises by which I common 
sense I understanding is to be replaced. The affirmation of the capacity of the past to 
shape the present in this thesis is founded on a form of hermeneutic philosophy of the 
social sciences. 
This philosophy of the social sciences is predicated upon the idea that 
understanding is always situated within history and is a process in which the individual 
or group is always oriented by and, therefore always part of the tradition, both as the 
repository of the past and as the medium through which the understanding of the past 
is transmitted. This transmission of the past is not one in which the interpreting 
subject(s) simply accept the tradition passively, for the search for the truth of the 
tradition leads to a modification of that tradition. It is the result of the t fusion of 
horizons t between the initial perceptions and assumptions flowing from the 
individual's or group's situation within history and the reformulation and redefinition 
of these as a result of an active interrogation or encounter with the object It is a 
process of 
It mediating its truth-claims with our changed historical circumstances and 
even assessing its values in the light of other norms and principles that we have 
inherited from it We need not agree with it in the substantive sense that we embrace 
its views but simply in the sense that those views are an integral part of our own self-
understanding whether we agree with them or not. It 1 
This t situated t nature of understanding is the foundation for the difference 
between the social sciences and the natural sciences. The object<; of study of the 
social sciences are not independent, self-contained objects in which a neutral language 
of observation, similar to that of the natural sciences, is capable of being generated 
which would, as a method, produce the capacity for objective judgement. Access to 
the social world cannot be one guided by controlled observation and a notion of its 
inherent reproducibility as this carries with it the presumption of the infinite 
interchangeability of the observing subject. Rather,. it is an engaged, participatory 
relation within a tradition: 
It a communication in which the understanding subject must invest a part of his 
subjectivity, no matter in what manner this may be controllable, in order to be able to 
1. G. Warnke, Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason (California: Stmlford University 
Press, 1987), p.106 
meet confronting subjects at all on the intersubjective level which makes 
understanding possible. " 2 
The essentially interpretative practice of the subject means that it cannot be reduced 
to, or adequately reflected in the observation of facts and the confirmation of 
theoretical hypotheses - the paradigm of the mea~urement of nature: . 
" [W]e cannot speak of an object of research in the human sciences in the 
sense appropriate to the natural sciences, where research penetrates more and more 
deeply into nature. Rather, in the human sciences the interest in tradition is motivated 
in a special way by the present and its interests. The theme and area of research are 
actually constituted by the motivation of the enquiry. Hence historical research is 
based on the historical movement in which life it~elf stands and cannot be understood 
teleologically in terms of the object into which it is enquiring. Such an object does 
not exist at all in itself. Precisely this is what distinguishes the human sciences from 
the natural sciences. " 3 
This distinction places the social(human)sciences on a foundation in which the 
past retains a surplus of meaning. The relation between past and present is a 
potentially fluid one in which the truth of the tradition is a product of the' fusion of 
horizons' of subject(s) and the tradition. The validity of the tradition rest., on a 
contingent consensus in which the truth of the past is never entirely fixed but is always 
capable of moving to a new integrated understanding. It is this' openness to history , 
which entails a constant mediation of past and present within understanding. An' 
openness to history' is at the same time the premise for the question of the relation to 
the past. It concerns the reflection upon history and hence the evaluation of that 
history as sedimented in tradition. 
2. J. Habermas, ' Some Difficulties of the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxis " in 17leory and 
Practice trans. J. Viertel (London:Heinemann, 1974), p.ll 
3. H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method (London:Sheed and Ward, 1975), p.253. Quotation from W. 
Outhwaite, New Philosophies of Social Science:Realism, Hermeneutics and Critical Theory 
(London:Macmillml, 1987), p.65-66 
The reflection upon and evaluation of the past of the modem criminal process 
as embodied in the developments and changes in the criminal process between 1780 
and 1910, undertaken here, flows from this hermeneutic approach to the philosophy 
of the social sciences. However, it seeks to go beyond a simple methodological 
broadening and elucidation of human historical consciousness by stressing that the 
process of evaluation is not a disinterested one for what is sedmented in the past and 
transmitted into the present in the form of the consensus as to its meaning is 
inextricably linked to the structure of society. In other words, a critical evaluation of 
the past is not motivated by merely technical or practical interest in knowledge for it 
cannot dissociate itself from a critical theory of society. 
As such, it represents a rupture with a concept of history in which events are 
connected together under a notion of progess4 conceived as 
11 the progress of mankind itself(and not just advances in men's ability and 
knowledge). Secondly, .. [as]something boundless, in keeping with the infinite 
perfectability of mankind. Thirdly, progress .. [as] something that was regarded a~ 
irresistible, something that automatically pursued a straight or spiral course .... The 
concept of historical progress of mankind cannot be sundered from the concept of it~ 
progreSSion through a homogeneous, empty time. A critique of the concept of such a 
progression must be the basis of any criticism of the concept of progress itself. " 5 
It seeks to disconnect this period from this form of interpretation which subsumes it 
under a concept of progress in which it is accorded the status of mere data. For, this 
effects a reduction in the capacity of the past to influence the present by confining it to 
a role in which it can only confirm the efficacy of the present structure and operation 
of the institutions of the criminal process. The past becomes an ordered succession of 
4. As examplified by L. Racinowicz and R. Hood in their four volume work A History of the English 
Criminal Law (London/Oxford: Stevens/Clarendon Press, 1958-1990) 
5. W. Benjmnin, 'Theses on the Philosophy of History' in H. Arendt ed. Illuminations 
(London:Fontana. 1973) 
events in which human relations within society become reified thereby blurring the 
distinction between them and the unfolding of things which compose the realm of 
nature. 
This thesis offers an interpretation of the period 1780 to 1910 which seeks to 
reveal that these understandings of the tradition rather than facilitating discussion and 
understanding of the past actually inhibit it by their failure to see that the direction of 
the past is guided within a context of social interaction in which domination and social 
power are its central determinants. It is this deeper level which this thesis attempts to 
penetrate in order to restore the I fullness I of the past. For, it views the interest in 
interpretation as one guided by an interest in emancipation whereby it breaks with the 
reduction of the 
11 meaning of complexes objectified within social systems to the contents of the 
cultural tradition. Critical of ideology, it a<;ks what lies behind the consensus, 
presented as a fact, that supports the dominant tradition of the time, and does so with 
a view to the relations of power surreptitiously incorporated in the symbolic 
structures of the systems of speech and interaction." 6 
This interpretation of the development of the criminal system between 1780 
and 1910, guided by a theory of society with practical aims, breaks it<; examination of 
this process of evolution into four chapters. It aims to elucidate both the dynamics 
which drove the transformation of the criminal process and the systemic values 
embedded within and reproduced by the institutions arising out of this transformation. 
The first chapter deals with the development of the 11 New Police 11 during the 
nineteenth century setting this development within the wider structure of governance 
of which they were a part. It does this to enable the question of control and 
6. J. Habennas, I Some Difficulties in the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxis I, in Theory and 
Practice trans. J. Viertel (London:Heinemann, 1974), p.12 
introduction of the " New Police" to be seen as one determined by the relations 
between the state and locality. The inability of the state to implement a system of 
direct, central control over the 11 New Police 11 during the period between 1835 and 
1855 wa~ finally accepted in the County and Borough Police Act 1856 in which the 
Home Office, as the institution of the state, was placed in an essentially' background 
role '. The possibility of a system of national policing, directed from London by the 
Home Office, in which the control of the" New Police" rested solely on the relation 
between the Chief Constables and the Home Office was thereby excluded. The" New 
Police" were, therefore, to evolve during the latter part of the nineteenth century as 
an integral element in the structure of local governance of the counties and boroughs. 
Policing practice and operation were to be the product of the interaction between the 
" New Police" and the Watch Committees in the boroughs and the magistracy in the 
counties. This structure of control meant that the" New Police 11 were utilised as an 
instrument for the application of the norms generated within this system of local 
governance. This system was predicated upon both the exclusion of the working-
class movement 7from a participatory role within it and their concomitant 
characterisation as the permanent threat to the existence of this system. Hence, the 11 
New Police" were utilised in the surveillance, discipline and prosecution of these 
threatening groups. This context of local governance was also to be the site where 
the " New Police" were to develop into an increasingly autonomous social system 
during the latter part of the nineteenth century. This process was to result in the 
decreasing control of the localities over the operation and implementation of norms by 
the " New Police" and with this went the increa~ing ability to act relatively 
autonomously within society. This capacity was enhanced by the dominance of the" 
New Police" in the practice of law enforcement and the prosecution of offences in 
which the spread of law over society, the decision to prosecute and the construction 
7. Working class movement takes the same definition as that ofE.P. Thompson, The Making a/the 
English Working Class (London: Penguin, 1991) 
, 
of the case against the accused was now determined by a logic orientated by the 
institutional concerns and systemic values of the 11 New Police ". 
The second chapter focuses on the developments within the system of 
prosecution during this period. It charts the rise of the 11 New Police 11 during the ftrst 
half of the nineteenth century to a position in which they were conducting the majority 
of criminal prosecutions. This is seen to be a result of the failure of the Seventh and 
Eighth Reports of the Criminal Law Commissioners to change the dynamics of the 
criminal process. This position of the " New Police" is then described within the 
context of the attempt'i, between the mid 1850s and early 1870s, to establish a system 
of public prosecution which would remove the " New Police" from the conduct of 
prosecutions and confme them to that of the collection and evidence and witnesses. 
The failure of these attempts is presented as being tied to the increasing legitimacy of 
the 11 New Police" in this role which is given legislative recognition in the 1879 
Prosecution of Offences Act. With only minor modiftcations in 1884 and 1908 thi'i 
was the basis for the modern system of prosecution. These developments are viewed 
as producing a situation in which the prosecution of offences is dependent upon the 11 
New Police 11 since they are in exclusive control of the building of the case against the 
accused. This, in turn, is seen to undermine the validity of the claim that the trial and 
the rules of legal evidence are themselves sufficient to exercise control over these 
activities of the " New Police" and hence to place doubt on the ability of the trial to 
be the sole site of gUilt determination by it'i capacity to nullify an asymmetrical 
relations of power in the pre-trial proceedings. 
This wider conceptual legacy of the development'i and debates over the system 
of prosecution is dealt with in the third chapter which concentrates upon the position 
of the defendant in the transformations in the criminal process during this period. The 
dominant conception and characterisation of the defendant is seen to flow from the 
Criminal Law Commissioners Report of 1836 on the representation of defendant. 
This altered the foundation of the defendant's position from one based entirely upon 
judicial discretion to one based on a system of articulated rules of evidence and 
procedure, but this changed form of expression did not alter the defendant's position 
as an object of prosecution produced by the asymmetrical distribution of social power 
in the criminal process. This is seen in the other reforms and developments within the 
criminal process at this period, ending with the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898, which 
clearly reveal this underlying systemic logic as the determinant of the defendant's 
position. These systemic values are further revealed through an examination of the 
Poor Prisoner's Defence Act 1903 in which they are confronted by opposing position 
which views the defendant's position in terms of rights. The failure of the rights based 
conception is viewed as demonstrating not only the strength of these systemic values 
in the sense of their embeddedness within the criminal process, but also the way in 
which they determine the limit'i of the possible terrain of debate by the continued 
projection of the trial as the sole site of guilt determination. The efficiency of the 
criminal process is what guides the demarcation of the position of the defendant with 
the parallel neglect of the need to consider the control and review of police practice. 
Systemic values are also held to be both the origin and the determinants of the 
establishment of the Court of Appeal in 1907 dealt with in the fourth chapter. This 
institutional addition to the criminal process is viewed as entirely the product of the 
institutional needs of the Home Office and its conception of it'i role within the criminal 
process. By an examination of the presentation of the events in the Committee 
Reports on the miscarriages of justice in the case of Adolf Beck and George Edalji it 
shows that' public' concern was not transformed into recommendations for the 
creation of a Court of Appeal but merely into the need for certain adjustment'i in the 
existing system. This relegitimation of the existing system meant that the impetus and 
perspective which was to orientate any change in the appellate procedure in the 
criminal process was to be determined by the concerns of the internal, institutional 
element'i of the criminal process. In this instance it was to be the Home Office whose 
( 
increasing self-consciousness of its overloaded administrative role coupled with the 
ea5e with which event') in the criminal process could extend themselves into' political' 
questions led it to create the Court of Appeal. An examination of the legislative 
framework of the Court an analysis of the 1909 case of (R v Gowlett)8 seeks to show 
that the same institutional role previously played by the Home Office in the exercise of 
the Perogative of Mercy is adopted by the Court of Appeal from its inception. In 
other words, that the practical aim underlying the creation and operation of the Court 
of Appeal is a simple institutional adjustment geared to the more effective generation 
of the legitimacy of the criminal process through a consistent willingness to give a 
postive construction to both the trial process and police practice. 
8. Criminal Appeal Reports, VoU 1909, pp.204-5, 238-40 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF CRIMINAL LA W: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE" 
NEWPOUCE" 
This chapter charts the emergence and development of the 11 New Police 11 into an 
increasingly autonomous institution during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. The failure of all attempts to institute a completely centralised, state 
directed and controlled structure of governance and operation for the" New Police" 
means that the emergance of their institutional autonomy has to be traced through an 
examination of the system of local governance within which they were placed. The" 
New Police" were confronted by an initial position in which they were the creation, 
servant and instrument of a system of local governance and it is the reconfiguration of 
these institutional relations which forms the basis for the generation of an increasing 
institutional autonomy free from external regulation and intervention. The unfolding 
of this process had led, by the beginning of the twentieth century, to the evolution of 
the " New Police "into a social system which enforced the norms of criminal law 
solely in accordance with an internally determined set of criteria and goals within 
which the individual accused was represented ac; an entity against whom a conviction 
wac; to be secured, and, whose recognition, in terms of the procedures of 
investigation, collection of evidence and witnesses, varied in accordance with the 
attainment of this goal. 
The first section concentrates upon the system of law enforcement which entered 
the nineteenth century. It describes the practices and interrelation between the parish 
constables, night watch and Prosecution Associations and sets these elementc; within 
the wider social order. The second section deals with the introduction of the " New 
Police" into this system and shows that the establishment of the Metropolitan Police 
10 
in 1829 and the centralised structure of control which it enacted was to be the 
exception for the rest of England where it was to be an element of local governance 
under local control. The challenged posed by Chartism to this modified structure of 
local governance and the inadequacies that it revealed are dealt with in the third 
section together with the County Police Act 1839/40 which extended the capacity to 
establish 11 New Police 11 forces into the counties. It describes the continuing problems 
that the Home Office, as the representative of the institutions of the state, had in 
. trying to ensure the universal adoption of the 11 New Police 11 by the localities and the 
increasing emphasis upon adjustments to the local structure of law enforcement in 
conformity with the maintenance of high degree of local autonomy and control. The 
initial growth of the 11 New Police 11 within this structure of local governance is dealt 
with in the fourth section where the decline of the agents of law enforcement of 
existing system is described together with the problems that the 11 New Police 11 
encountered in their relations with the localities. These problems fmd articulation in 
the Select Committee Reports on the Police of 1853 which along with the Bill of 1854 
represent the final attempt to introduce a system of national system of control, and 
administration of the" New Police". The failure of the 1854 Bill marks the end of the 
attempt'i by the State, in the form of the Home Office, to take a central and dominant 
position in the structure of control of the 11 New Police ". It is replaced by a new 
policy of an indirect and facilitative role for the State coupled with the recognition of 
a substantial degree of local control as encapsulated in The County and Borough 
Police Act 1856 which is dealt with in the fifth section. This presents the 1856 Act as 
the producing the basic structure and parameters in which subsequent development'i 
were to take place by the removal of the last vestiges of the I old system I of law 
enforcement and the placing of the 11 New Police 11 within a local structure of 
governance. This reinforced the a'icendancy of the 11 New Police 11 over the I old 
system I which had begun with the transformation of the magistracy by Jervis's Act'i of 
1848 which is dealt with in the sixth section. This transformation is linked to a wider 
change in which the legal order is separated from society; and; the position of the 
II! 
magistrate confined to the purely legal realm of the trial and rendered I passive I with 
the removal of their capacity to enforce the law directly in the social environment. 
The increasing autonomy of the" New Police" in the later nineteenth century is 
traced in the seventh section through an examination of the unfolding of the 
centralising tendencies of the 1856 Act; the generation of the preconditions for 
autonomy through the activities of Chief Constables and a changing relation between 
the state and the" New Police" ; and; their growing institutional self-identity through 
the evolution of a durable, perceptual framework within which self-initiated, 
institutional action upon the surrounding environment was possible. The content of 
this perceptual framework is dealt with in the eighth section with the examination of 
the character, structure and concentration of the practices of law enforcement. The 
ninth section deals with the position of the " New Police" as a collectively organised 
system of prosecutors in a private form of prosecution and the concentration of social 
power that resulted from this. The final section describes the occlusion of this 
structural imbalance at the foundation of the criminal system in the Royal Commission 
on the Metropolitan Police 1908. 
The Unreformed System 1750·1828 
Apart from various minor adjustment') by statute 9, the system that entered the 
nineteenth century had remained virtually unchanged during the eighteenth century. 
The " Old System", as it was increasingly characterized with the advent of the " New 
Police It, was without any central, state direction and was very much a localized entity. 
It operated as a result of the purely individual initiatives of the three main elements of 
law enforcement - the parish constables, Prosecution Associations and night watches. 
The system of parish constables provided the most territorially consistent and 
generalized form of social control and law enforcement during this period. They were 
9. See, for the details of these, D. Hay and F. Snyder, 'Using the Criminal Law, 1750·1850: 
Policing, Private Prosecution and the State " in D. Hay and F. Snyder ed. Policing and Prosecution 
in Britain 1750·1850 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) 
'2 
elected to the office ( though it was possible for those elected to appoint and 
remunerate a deputy if they did not wish to act), unpaid and rotated annUally. 
However, by the 1830s parish constables were commonly holding the post for a 
number of years, and, many of them continued to practice a trade during their tenure 
of the post. Phillips' 10, historical examination of the Black Country between 1835-60, 
suggests that the conventional view of parish constables a') ineffective, inefficient, 
ignorant and illiterate has to be revised. In the Black Country, the role of parish 
constable came to be defined as applicable to persons of certain class positions. The 
majority were literate and drawn from the social classes of fanners, in rural parishes, 
and, artisans and tradesmen in the towns. This position a<;sumed a place within a 
collection of other social roles occupied and maintained to the exclusion of lower 
social classes. The social prestige and respectability of the position was a combination 
of the initial class position of the parish constables and the competence and capability 
developed within the role itself. This enabled them to ' feed-in' individuals into the 
legal system without incident, and, ensured their control over the pre-trial stages of 
arrest and committal. 
The lack of any collective identity or operation among parish constables meant 
that the scale of their operation remained small, domestic and essentially reactive. 
Many of them, as in the Black Country, operated from their own houses and detained 
pri')oners in them. This amplified their connection and intimate reaction with the 
community over which they had the discretion to enforce the law. For, the social 
. space in which they carried out their law enforcement function was composed of tight, 
stable communities where the perpetrators and events became widely known. This 
allowed public disturbances to be quickly broken up; and; where the parish constable 
was not called to the event while it was happening, because of the nature of the crime 
itself - theft, robbery and burglary - the perpetrators were usually identified or 
described. 
10. D. Pbillips, Crime and Authority in Victorian England: The Black Country 1835-1860 (London: 
Croom and Helm, 1977), cbapter 3. 
Since the office itself was an unpaid one, its source of income came from 
costs and fees gained from the legal system, and, the person who sought the allsistance 
of the parish constable. The likelihood of assistance, therefore, came to rest on 
whether the person had money or property. The relation between each victim and 
each parish constable was a unique and singular one dependent upon the discretion of 
the particular parish constable. It actively discouraged the development of the 
preconditions for the collective organisation and practice of parish constables; as a 
result, the individual nature of prosecution at this period was mirrored in the 
independence of the parish constable from any type of collective mentality or 
organisation. The system of parish constables subsisted within a wider system of 
social control which was predicated upon the maintenance of large amounts of 
discretion, fluidity and flexibility of action. 
Prosecution Associations were established in both urban and rural areall. 
Initially, they flowed from the activism of magistrates, but later property-owners, 
without these public offices and roles within the criminal process, were the dominant 
force behind their creation. These later creations reflected a local interconnection 
between this perceptual framework of I crisis I and a local incident, or, outbreak of 
crime. In the 1740s they were founded to enforce the game laws, but, from the 1760s 
they adopted a broader focus - the prosecution of felons. Phillips 11 looks upon the 
period between the 1770s and 1780s as evidence of a period of crisis, symbolised in 
their formation in large numbers. This perception of crisis was created by the 
agglomeration of a number of elementll. Growing concern by provincial and 
metropolitan magistrates about the inadequacies of the social control matrix of parish 
constable, prosecution and punishment found expression in the work and ideas of Sir 
John Fielding. His attempts to improve and regulate the system of policing, as 
articulated through the schema in the General Preventative Plan ( 1772-3 and 1775) 
corresponded to the search for an effective, measured and unified system of social 
11. D. Phillips, ' Good Men to Associate and Bad Men to Conspire: Associations for the Prosecution 
of Felons in England 1760-1860 " in D. Hay and F. Snyder ed. Policing and Prosecution in Britain 
1750-1850 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) 
control. The arguments within the Plan coupled with the spread of his criticisms of 
the existing system began to shape the behaviour of the government and property-
owners in so far as they crystallized into theoretical schemas for the perception and 
evaluation of this system. 
It was the dissatisfaction with the protection conferred. by the existing system 
of law and order, upon property, which provided the enduring impetus for the 
formation of these Associations to which the appearance of further' crises' could only 
but strengthen. However, Associations were the product of private initiative few of 
them sought to establish their own potential for law enforcement, by recruiting a 
body of people to do this. Their sphere of operation remained fmnly local, though 
there were a few attempts at covering a larger territory they rarely came to anything 
and were exceptions. The dominant type of Association usually covered only a 
relatively small area 12. This territorial localism of the Associations wao;; tied to the 
social order of which they were a product. The aristocracy, gentry and clergy, who 
formed the dominant groups, exercised a form of highly personalised power based 
upon its visibility which meant that to remain effective it had to be confined to fairly 
small areas. Therefore, with the circumscription of the area of operation of 
Associations, came, not simply a lack of a challenge to the existing form of social 
power and system of law enforcement, but also a set of organisations through which 
this could be enhanced by the local aristocracy, gentry and clergy taking an active role 
in their creation. 
The Associations offered their members two types of ao;;sistance. The first, 
concerned attempts to detect and apprehend suspected offenders where the 
Association would react by printing hand bills and placing adverts in local newspapers 
offering a reward for information which led to conviction for the offence. They would 
also use their money to enable people to search for stolen goods and the offender 13. 
12. See D. Phillips, ibid, p. 134 
13. See D. Pbillips, ibid, p.l38 
Those who apprehended suspects would often be given rewards and payment~ for 
time and trouble. 
The second, applied where the member had managed to detect and apprehend 
the suspected offender. Here the solicitor of the Association would take over and 
ensure that the suspect was committed for trial before a magistrate. The expense of 
preparation and conduct of the case was borne by the Association. This cost wa~ 
sought to be recovered from the county rate, at the end of the trial, but, it barely 
covered half the total cost with the rest having to be taken out of the fund that had 
accrued from member's subscriptions. 
The majority of Association funded prosecutions concerned thefts. The normal 
route for these suspects committed for theft was to be tried on indictment at the 
courts of Quarter Sessions or Assizes. However, this did not prevent Associations 
making use of the expansion in the range of the courts of summary jurisdiction, from 
the 1820s, where they felt that the other route wa~ not proving effective enough. For 
summary conviction offered the advantage to those who prosecuted, of a quicker and 
cheaper form of legal process in which one only had to convince a magistrate of the 
guilt of the suspect. Moreover, they were not adverse to dealing with and obtaining 
convictions for more serious offences where members were subject to them. With the 
outbreaks of unrest in the early 1820s and during the 1830s rural Associations 
responded by offering rewards for persons convicted of arson. 
The effectiveness of these Associations is difficult to establish, as Phillips 
points out, because the information in their records does not allow one to calculate 
the ratio of convictions to offences reported - the I clear-up rate'. However, Phillips 
suggest') that Associations were not, locally, responsible for many prosecutions per 
year, but that taken nationally they: 
11 
11 prosecuted large numbers of people, and were responsible for securing many 
severe sentences. 11 14 
The boroughs and larger towns, particularly those which had grown up during 
the Industrial Revolution, also produced modifications to the system of social control 
which entered the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This was the 
consequence of the essentially reactive role of parish constables, and a reluctantly 
reactive role at that, which, in the context of the changing nature of the social order 
was perceived as lacking the necessary visibility and coverage which regular patrolling 
provided. They responded to the system's perceived inadequacies by establishing 
bodies of paid watchmen, who were funded from the rates, and were employed to 
patrol the streets of the borough and industrial towns, especially at night. Rural night 
watches were also set up~ though more intermittently, during the 1820s and 1830s, in 
response to rural' disturbances' which became particularly prevalent in the 1830s-
the era of 'Captain Swing' . 
The Emergence of The " New Police" 
The establishment of the Metropolitan Police, by the then Home Secretary Robert 
Peel, in 1829 meant that the tenability and acceptability of a perspective which sought 
change the existant system of social control was reinforced by the operation of the 
new body of police which provided a constant reminder of, and possible model for, 
any attempted change outside London. The Metropolitan Police operated within a 
structure in which their activities and practices were only subject to the authority and 
guidance of the Home Office not to any system of local governance. This represented 
a radical break with the previous systems and structures of law enforcement by the 
clear definition and demarcation of roles, and, spheres of competence and operation. 
The Home Office, as a particular institutional element of the state, was projected as 
residing at the centre of political power with the Metropolitan Police as the 
14. D. Phillips, ibid, p.l44 
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collectivity responsible for the organisation and implementation of the demands and 
pressures of law enforcement addressed to the central power of the state. There was, 
under this presentation, a strict separation of politics and administration in which the 
action of the Metropolitan Police was tied to the norms of Parliamentary legislation. 
These' inputs' propounded by a separate and superior institution were to be the 
premises of action of the Metropolitan Police which were merely to be continuously 
applied in social reality. However, from starting as the model which could become 
generalized gradually throughout England and Wales it ended as the model in a 
different sense - an ideal, exceptional entity specifically tailored to the situation of the 
Metropolis. 
The creation of the 11 New Police 11 in the boroughs outside London was to 
be a product of a broader scheme concentrating on reform of the totality of the 
municipal structure of governance. The Murucipal Corporations Act 1835 initiated the 
conditions for the emergence of the 11 New Police ". It was part of an attempt to 
consolidate the power, at the local level, of the new political order produced by the 
expansion of the electoral franschise under the Reform Act of 1832. 
The new political order, at borough level, was to be to be maintained by 
producing a limited ratepayer's democracy in which the new property owners -
merchant5, manufacturers, shopkeepers and tradesmen - became the dominant groups 
in this electorate and were the social groups from which the members of the new 
borough councils were drawn. The electorate excluded the majority of small 
householders and the whole of the working class whose housing was not rated. These 
Municipal Corporations were empowered to appoint watch committees who were, in 
turn, to appoint the men and draw up the regulations for the running of the force. The 
Home Office was to have no direct, interventionist role in borough poliCing; it was 
simply to receive quarterly reports about pay, appointments and regulations. The 
legislation itself did not provide a clear, specific definition of the areas of competence 
and jurisdiction of corporation, watch committee and magistrates. Both the 
. establishment and operation of the 11 New Police 11 was to be left entirely in the control 
of the boroughs themselves and determined by the interaction between these element'S 
at local level. 
The Whig Government in 1835 assumed, during the formulation of this 
measure, that the social order could continue to be maintained by local initiative, 
policy and control without the need for direct control from centralizing state 
institutions through the imposition of a consistent centralization and universalization 
of the" New Police ". It was simply presumed that borough councils would share the 
same perspective as the framers of the legislation and would therefore establish 11 New 
Police" forces as part of a national force without need for the explicit formulation of 
these decision-making premises. 
Once established, the Watch Committees acted from a perspective which in no 
way considered the police force in their borough to be part of, or, founded upon an 
idea of a national, professional police force. The borough forces were developed 
within a perceptual framework which saw them as integral element of local,borough 
governance evolving solely in accordance with the maintenance of a low borough rate 
and the Watch Committees' assessment of the priorities of policing policy. 
This profound divergence in the conceptualisation of the role, purpose and 
identity of the" New Police" between the boroughs and the institutions of the state, 
in particular the Home Office, undermined the ability of the Municipal Reform Act 
1835 to implicitly transfer, through a structure of complementary expectation, the 
state's premises in regard to the 11 New Police ". The capacity of the state to enforce 
it'S conception of the 11 New Police" rested on it'S ability to intervene in the boroughs. 
Under the Act, the Home Office had little scope for intervention directly or indirectly 
since it bore no part of the expense of this borough force, and possessed no machinery 
of inspection, it was without an effective means whereby boroughs could be 
compelled to provide forces to a uniform standard. Formalisation and centralisation 
of the role and function of the 11 New Police 11 had been felt to be both unnecessary 
and impracticable to achieve the goals of the state in regard to establishment of the 
conditions for the emergence of the a national police force. Yet, the failure of the 
boroughs to accept the these premises for the conception of the 11 New Police 11 meant 
that there was little, within the terms of the Act, that the state could do to re-establish 
its authority as power-holder. The dynamic of police reform was to be driven by the 
capacity of the state to achieve a national form to the 11 New Police" despite the 
resistance of the localities. 
The" New Police" and Social Control 
This local focus to police reform meant that the establishment of borough forces was 
slow, inadequate and lacked efficient organisation and operation. Despite the passing 
of the M unicipal Reform Act 1835 very few boroughs had, by the time of the initial 
emergence of the Chartist movement, established a police force capable of coping 
with these disturbances. It was only in Liverpool, Bristol, Newcastle, Hull, 
Manchester and Birmingham that there existed a sufficient force either to dispense 
with the need for military assistance, or, at least minimise it Therefore, what 
confronted the Chartist') was a slightly modified version of the form of social control 
which had established it<;elf during the mid to late eighteenth century. 
The increasingly organised mass social unrest of this period - a direct 
challenge to the social order - exposed the' old system's' incapability to deal with this 
type of disorder. The further development of the 11 New Police ", and their extension 
to the Counties (under the County Police Act 1839/40), was intimately related to the 
social and political situation between the 1830s and 1840s. 
.:la 
The unrest of the 1830s and 1840s was a product of both the economic 
conditions in which the rural and urban lower classes found themselves, and, the 
attempts to install a new social order principally through the disciplinary mechanism 
of the New Poor Law of 1834. Both of these developments were filtered through an 
increasingly class conscious atmosphere which led, in the 1830s, to the formation of 
the Chartist movement. Chartism represented a particular articulation of far longer 
and deeper evolution of working class identity, constituted in opposition to the 
totality of social conditions in which they were placed, through the ideas of political 
radicalism 15. This complex of ideas centred around the belief that the intellectual and 
moral development of the individual, necessary to attain a society based upon the free 
exercise of reason, could only be achieved by the removal of political and economic 
ineqUalities. 
This foundation of Chartism in 1839 led to the specific demands set out in the 
Six Points of the Charter (universal suffrage, vote by secret ballot, annual parliaments, 
the abolition of property qualifications for members of parliament, members of 
parliament to be paid by the state and equal electoral districts). The Six Points were 
more than merely I political I demands conceived within, and, wishing to retain the 
established society 
" the demand for manhood suffrage had a totally different significance for 
Chartism than for the Reform League in 1866 ...... The Charter was directly concerned 
with class and power, whereas the mid-Victorian radicals perceived the problem in 
tenns of the more abstract categories of refonn and progress. Demanding the 
vote ..... the Chartists saw political democracy as a means to a shift in power relations. 
" 16 
15. On this, see G. Steedman Jones, I Rethinking Chartism 't in G. Steedman Jones, The Languages 
of Class: Studies in English Working Class History 1832-1982 (Crunbridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983),90-178 
16. Trygave F. Tolfsen, Working Class Radicalism in Mid-Victorian England (London: Croom and 
Helm, 1976), p.8S 
Substantial change was the aspiration of the Chartist movement which underpined the 
plurality of versions of Chartism which existed within it This change was aimed at 
social transformation in which the working class were to exercise control over their 
existence with the concomitant elimination of all forms of deference and subordination 
17. For this to be achieved universal suffrage had to be introduced in order to 
establish a form of popular sovereignty capable of overcoming the political 
domination of the propertied classes. 
Chartism contested the view of bourgeois consciousness that political 
domination had been made rational and that the social preconditions for this political 
order - the laws of political economy - were a ' natural order '. With the combination 
of economic' crises' and disciplinary mechanism of the New Poor Law the 
competitive social order, operating in conformity with political economy, could no 
longer maintain sufficient legitimacy for the guarantees of equality of opportunity to 
secure private property, or, open access to participation in the political realm. 
Conflicts which had subsisted in this private economic sphere spread, under Chartism, 
into the public sphere. 
It was this public, political character of Chartism with its demands for 
substantial change which manifested itself predominantly in meetings and 
demonstrations, that confronted the existing system of social control. Chartism, being 
a predominantly urban movement meant that it was mainly the boroughs that 
experienced the movement directly. However, the industrial villages and towns within 
the counties, and, rural partl) of South Wales were also affected by Chartism. 
It was the magistracy, with the local forces available to them, who confronted 
the Chartist movement in the early spring of 1839. For, each locality and the 
17. See. for more detail on this and the attempt to create within the Chartist movement a 
prefigurative reflection of this. Eileen Yeo, ' Some Practices and Problems of Chartist Democracy. ' 
in J. Epstein and D. Thompson ed. The Chartist Experience: Studies in Working Class Radicalism 
and Culture. /830-/860 (London:Macmillan. 1982),345-380 
apparatus which had evolved within it to maintain social order, bore the prime 
responsibility to direct and organise the response to Chartism. The magistracy, on the 
whole, sought the intervention of the state through military assistance and repressive 
legislation. The Home Office, dependent upon the magistracy for a view of the events 
throughout England and Wales, was flooded with anxious reports and pleas for 
intervention from a magistracy who portrayed the situation as one close to 
breakdown. 
This anxiety stemmed from their a5sessment of the forces locally available to 
deal with the phenomena of Chartism. These they saw as inadequate, and, lacked 
confidence in their ability to maintain order with them. Many borough authorities had 
too few policemen to deal with the disturbances. Magistrates tried to supplement 
th~m by enroling special constables, but this proved to be a difficult task a<; the local 
inhabitant'), in the main, refused to co-operate. Even where they were enroled they 
proved largely ineffective against the pressure of popular unrest. There was, 
therefore, little that the magistrates felt that they could do a<; the element<; which 
composed the 
11 pennanent civil force was inadequate both in quality and size, and there were 
not enough troops regularly stationed in the large manufacturing area of Lancashire 
and Yorkshire to supply the means of dealing with any large-scale outbreak 11 18 
Parish constables, the other main element in the ' old system " were incapable 
of dealing with this type of 'disorder' and unrest. The small, independent and 
domestic scale of their operation meant that the parameters of their practice, was an 
essentially reactive one. Their lack of a preventative role and collective mode of 
organisation caused them to be overwhelmed by the outbreaks of violence and large-
scale public disorder of Chartism. 
18. F.e. Mather, Public Order in the Age of the Chartists (M,Ulcbester: MCUlcbester University Press, 
1959), p.227 
Initially, the Home Office gave advice when consulted and sent down 
members of the Metropolitan Police to assist. They did not direct operations nor 
augment the resources of the localities. Eventually, in the late spring of 1839, the 
Home Office took more direct action. This was confined to enhancing the existing 
machinery of social control either by instructing the various elementl) in the system al) 
to the practices they should adopt, or, by supplementing it in order to improve itl) 
normal operation 19. This was sufficient to engender greater activity on the part of 
the magistracy such that Chartism was for a time, in the late summer of 1839, 
removed from public view. 
Despite the seeming success, the Whig Government passed the County Police 
Act 1839/40 in order to implant a Rural Constabulary force to establish an immediate, 
uniform and supply a suitably large, permanent civil force to dispense with the need 
for a civilian role for the army. The immediate demands of the situation interlocked 
with a wider and more profound change in the attitudes and definitions of order and 
criminality which formed a constellation around a consensus between Chad wick, the 
rural gentry and the Government, in the 1830s, that rural England should have a 
police force. However, a wider project, on the part of Chad wick and others, which 
sought a police force which would fit into a Benthamite foundation for the operation 
of the state, law and society was rejected, despite the carefully tailored evidence of the 
Royal Commission on the County Constabulary(produced under Chad wick's guidance 
20), in favour of a combination of local and central control over the new county 
constabulary. 
Control over the" New Police" was not given to the parishes but placed with 
the magistrates at Quarter Sessions. They were to fix the size of the police force and 
had the power to appoint and dismiss the Chief Constable. Once the Chief Constable 
19. F.C. Mather, Public Order in the Age o/the Chartists (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1959), p.229 
20. See, for more detail on this, Stanley H. Palmer, Police and Protest in England and Ireland, 
J 780-J 850 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 
had been appointed, however, he was to have absolute rights of appointment over the 
composition of the force within the numerical limits set by the magistrates. The Home 
Office wa') to play a more active role by producing the rules and regulations as to the 
organisation, pay, clothing and equipment of the county constables. The cost of this 
new force, like its counterpart in the boroughs, was to be borne locally by the county 
ratepayer's. 
The County Police Act 1839140 became effective after the first major surge of 
Chartist activity had ebbed. It was not until its re-emergance in 1842 with the 
burgeoning number of strikes in the Northern, industrial areas, which increasingly 
began to take on a pOlitical character, that the system had to confront Chartism again. 
This confrontation revealed that little had changed even with the extension of the 
capacity to develop a " New Police" by the County Police Act. 
Local magistrates were as equally hesitant as boroughs to embrace the" New 
Police". The rural gentry remained totally at variance with any notion of a 
centralized, national force controlled from London. They still remained wedded to a 
modification of the existing, local system of social control rather than dramatic new 
reform, and, were reluctant to bear the cost of this' new' force. The optional 
character of the County Police Act meant that very few counties had, by resolution of 
Quarter Sessions, decided to establish a " New Police" force, and, even where this 
wa') the so their size was small. For, since the county ratepayer's had to bear the cost 
of the force, the landowners in the counties (many of whom were also magistrates) 
had an interest in maintaining a low county rate. Moreover, since the ' new' force had 
a county basis those in rural district') perceived themselves to be bearing the largest 
share of the cost. They were 
" remote from industrial unrest but heavily rated on account of the large 
amount of landed estate situated within them,[and] would be footing the bill for the 
maintenance of public order in the relatively distant manufacturing towns and villages, 
where property of high rateable value was more scarce" 21 
The Home Office lacking any direct means, under either the Municipal Reform 
Act or the County Police Act, to intervene to push boroughs and counties into 
adopting, or, maintaining sufficient police forces was forced to supply Metropolitan 
Police or the army to areas experiencing Chartist unrest. Even the policy of refusing 
initial requests for assistance wall only successful in a few cases. 
The Rebecca Riots in 1843 exemplified this position of the Home Office. 
Requests to the Home Office asking them to dispatch Metropolitan Police to the areas 
of South Wales experiencing the disturbances were, at first, refused. The Home 
Office replied by stressing the duty of magistrates to adopt the County Police Act 
andlor swear in special constables. The magistrates, however, continued to request 
assistance, and, the Home Office eventually sent 50 Metropolitan Police to the area. 
There was little they could do, and, later detachments from the army were sent in. 
This assistance, by the Home Office, was meant to be perceived by the magistracy as 
of an exceptional nature with the linked expectation, that it would lead to the 
establishment of a I new I police force. The counties ignored this Home Office 
reasoning and were content to retain the local situation unchanged once order was 
restored. There seemed no reason to contemplate the introduction of the" New 
Police "with some magistrates going as far as rejecting any responsibility for the 
expense of the detachments of the Metropolitan Police sent to them 22. 
After this and other similar experiences the Home Office tried to ensure the 
adoption of the" New Police" by the threat of withdraw of the military from the 
affected areas. This had only a very limited success as did the circular sent to the 
21. F.C. Mather. Public Order in the Age of the Chartists (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1959), p.l31 
22. See L. Radcinowicz and R. Hood, A History of English Criminal lAw and its Administrationfrom 
1750. Vol. 4' Grappling For Control' (London: Stevens. 1968). pp.252-253 
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boroughs with populations over 20,000 which did not have a sufficient ratio of pOlice 
to population. For, although the circular warned of the imminent withdraw of troops 
who had been stationed in small detachments throughout the country, only 14 of the 
38 recipient boroughs were persuaded to increase their forces. 
This resistance by both boroughs and counties, despite the explicit threat to 
implement decisions outside the legislative framework of both Act~, demonstrated the 
continuing inability of the state to effect the transmission of it~ conception of the 11 
New Police" into the decision-making premises of magistrates or Watch Committees. 
Perceiving itself unable to overcome this resistance the state altered the nature of its 
response to the object of transforming the structure and level of operation of law 
enforcement. It turned to a policy of modification of the existing system of parish 
constables throughout the later 1 840s with last piece of legislation in 1850 23. The 
superintending constable system which emerged from this combination of legislation 
met with much greater successs as it retained a large degree of local control over the 
patrolling force. It was adopted by many magistrates and rural gentry in the counties 
who had rejected the county police scheme. 
The system of social control which entered the 1850s, prior to the County and 
Borough Act of 1856, was one produced by compromise in which alteration ofthe 
system of social control was tied to a demand that institutional change should not 
remove the control of the localities. Local affairs while of concern to the state were 
not to be in the domain of actions of the institutions of the central state. The role of 
the state wa~ to be limited and enhancing not all-embracing and determinant 
From the 1830s up to the 1856 County and Borough Police Act the role of the 
state was characterised by this form of' existence in the background '. This led to a 
pattern in which the adoption of the 11 New Police 11 and the removal of the ' old' 
23. This is comprehensively dealt with in R. D. Storch, 'Policing in Southern England before the 
Police: Opinion and Practice, 1830-1856', in D. Hay and F. Snyder ed. Policing and Prosecution in 
Britain 1750·1850 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) 
system of parish constables, night watch and Prosecution Associations was particular 
and contingent product of a diverse number of essentially local responses. However, 
the diversity of this response was more marked in the counties than the boroughs 
since the boroughs had to establish a supervisory Watch Committee under the 
Municipal Corporations Act 1835 . 
. The Growth of the" New Police" 
The character of the legislation dealing with both borough and county ensured . 
that It New Police It forces were established in accordance with local imperatives and 
perceptions. This lack of central, formalised, state control was coupled with 
maintenance and continued existence of the elements of the 'old system '. The It New 
Police It were confronted with a social space in which they had to gain ascendency and 
acceptance through active competition and other strategies. It was they who had to' 
break-in' to the control exercised by parish constables over prosecutions if they were 
to be in a position to be more than a body which dealt with public order. This process, 
by which the police forces attained this object, was a gradual one as it had to be 
achieved through wresting control from private prosecutors, Prosecution Associations 
and parish constables. 
Parish constables were, apart from the magistracy, the major element in the' 
old system's' structure of law enforcement. It was their role and practices which 
visibly and publicly defined the parameters of legality and illegality under the ' old 
system', The decline of the parish constables was one of the central factors in the 
ascendency and growth ofthe It New Police ", It was in many area'i a conflictual 
process with an active struggle for dominance between the parish constables and the It 
New Police It 24. The 1830s and 1840s saw only a minimal change in the structure of 
24. As was the cao;;e in the Black Country with conflicts between the 11 New Police" and parish 
constables over the right to use lock ups and other facilities as shown by D. Phillips, Crime and 
Authority in Victorian England: The Black Country 1835-1860 (London: Croom ~U1d Helm, 1977). 
pp. 75-81 
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control over prosecutions 25 since the police themselves were in a process of 
establishing the parameters of their own operation, and, their coherence as a societal 
institution. It was not until the 1856 County and Borough Police Act that the 
predominance of the 11 New Police 11 and the disappearance of the parish constables 
was finally ensured. 
Prosecution Associations initially opposed the 11 New Police 11 as a needless 
and costly addition to crime control. Yet, the disturbances of the 1830s and 1840s 
jolted many property owners out of this opposition to the 11 New Police 11 as it became 
obvious that the system of social control, of which they had in any event sought to 
modify themselves, was inadequate 26. Acceptance of the I New I police led 
Prosecution Associations to modify themselves in accordance with the changed 
situation. Many disappeared or fonnally dissolved themselves. While others 
remained seeking to establish an intimate relation between themselves and the police 
as had existed between them and parish constables. This was done by paying fees, 
expenses and rewards to constables and this seems to have been a widespread practice 
during the 1840s and 1850s, extending even to senior members of the police force. 
Yet, many Chief Constables set themselves against this from the inception of their 
forces, or, were forced to do so by the revelation of this practice which had developed 
to the extent of pecuniary inducements being offered to policemen to bring forward 
charges. The co-existence of Prosecution Associations and the police was a short one 
as the police were part of the reform of the ' old system I which the prosecution 
association, despite being a modification to it, still represented. As the I New I police 
achieved a degree of stability and certainty in their operation they took on more fully 
the practice of investigation and apprehension of offenders and the organisation and 
conduct of the prosecution of those offenders whom they had already apprehended. It 
25. Parish constables in the Black Country were still actively pursuing their practice of law 
enforcement as late as 1847, ibid, pp.78-79 
26. See evidence of George Matthews, Solicitor and Clerk and Treasurer of the Caistor Association 
for the Prosecution of Felons in First Report of Select Committee on the Police, Par!. Papers 1852-
1853 Vo!. XXXVI, p.78 and more generally R. D. Storch, I Policing Southern England before the 
Police: Opinion and Practice, 1830-1856 I, pp.250-1. 
was this ability to move from arrest to prosecution which removed the major reasons 
for the existence of Associations, and, through the active capacity of the police to 
apprehend offenders and prevent offences being committed by their regular patrols the 
Associations ceased to be a central element in the process of prosecution 27. 
Financial constraints of ratepayer's finance proved the most enduring and 
permanent problem for the" New Police". While the Chief Constables of County 
forces had greater autonomy then their borough counterparts, in terms of policy and 
appointment of men, they were united in their dependence upon local, ratepayer's 
finance for their operation. Budget') were tightly controlled to keep down expenses 
and maintain a low county rate. Most Chief Constables had to become' cost 
conscious' since they were held fmancially responsible for the force in their 
determinations over the number of men to be recruited and maintained, and, the 
allocation of men throughout their area. Prior to the Act of 1856, stringent local 
financial control of police activities meant that Chief Constables found it extremely 
difficult to conduct the activities of their forces with any degree of continuity, 
consistency or stability in the early years. Many forces were under-funded which 
caused some Chief Constables to engage in dubious financial practices in order to 
keep their forces going 28. 
The ratepayer's became the polices' public on whom their existence and 
legitimacy rested. The police rate was seen as unpopular, and, therefore, maintained 
at a low level. This could not but effect the amount of police wages and the 
establishment of police retirement funds (Superannuation funds). Wages were set at a 
level where it was just possible to get recruit') who were literate. This proved to be 
insufficient to bring large numbers of applicants, and, even when recruits joined it was 
only in the last decade of the nineteenth century that pensions became a regular 
27. On this process of decline see D. Phillips, I Good Men to Associate and Bad Men to Conspire: 
Associations for the Prosecution of Felons in England, 1760-1860 I 
28. See B. Weinberger, 'The Police and Public in Mid-Nineteenth Century Warwickshire', ill V. 
Bailey ed. Policing and Punishment in Nineteenth Century Britain (London: Croom and Helm, 1981) 
expectation of service. While the It New Police It offered security of employment the 
low pay and harsh discipline prompted many constables to leave the force. 
Drunkenness was also a major problem with many constables dismissed, on account 
of it, during this period. 
The autonomy that this new system of local control conferred by the powers 
of Watch Committees under the 1835 Act and magistrates under the County Police 
Act 1839/40 was deeply felt, and, led to the maintenance of a size of force that was 
numerically weak so that it was ea'iily controllable by these local bodies. It was the 
independent boroughs in the counties, particularly rural areas, where the greatest 
problems arose. The small size of the borough force had led many of these boroughs 
to ask the County for assistance during periods of unrest, but they refused to 
amalgamate their forces with those of the County 29. By the time of the Select 
Committee Report on the Police in 1853 the relations between county and borough 
police forces were bad. All the evidence pointed to strained relations and a marked 
lack of co-operation with county forces claiming that boroughs would not help them, 
and, since these areas were inadequately policed they became the location for 
criminals who then moved into the counties to commit crime. Even some boroughs 
themselves were aware of the isolated, disjointed system of policing which had 
developed by the late 1840s and early 1850s 30. 
This fragmented pattern which characterised the early growth of the" New 
Police" became the subject of renewed Parliamentary interest when Palmerston 
became Home Secretary in 1852. Palmerston sought the advice of Chad wick whose 
secret recommendations were similar to those made in the Constabulary Report of 
29. See the evidence of Henry Thompson, Mayor of Andover(p.32) and John Reynolds Beddome, 
Senior Alderman of Romsey(p.38) in the First Report of the Select Committee on the Police, Par!. 
Papers 1852·1853 Vo!. XXXVI 
30. This was clearly articulated by John Reynolds Beddome, in ibid, p.38, who, while admitting that 
the system of policing in Romsey was inadequate said that the Watch Committee were unwilling to 
deal with the situation because of the fear that this would lead to amalgamation with the county force 
and the law of borough control and the exercise of municipal autonomy. This refusal had led many 
members of the local property order to desert the town' because our police is so bad; it is infested 
with beggars '. 
1839. For him, local control should be swept away and the borough forces 
amalgamated with those of the county who, in turn, would be formed into a national 
police supervised from London from a newly created 11 Police Office "- the Irish 
Constabulary and Metropolitan Police were the models to be emulated in the 
provincial legislation. Formalisation and Centralisation of the role and operations 11 
New Police 11 was the object of this schema. It would firmly define the relation 
between the 11 New Police 11 and the state, in the institution of the Home Office, as the 
sole origin of the control and articulation of norms and values. These would be 
implemented by the 11 New Police 11 in the localities so that power would' flow' from 
the Police Office as power-holder to the 11 New Police 11 forces ac;; power-subjects 
through the transmission of these norms and values. 
Chad wick's plan did not make Palmerston legislate directly upon its contents. 
He sought to create a more' objective' articulation for the need for change and 
through the institutional mechanism of a Select Committee on the issue. 
The Select Committee Report~ of 1853 
The Select Committee on the Police of 1853 created both the legitimacy for reform, 
and, sought to define and pre-determine the nature and parameters of reform by itc;; 
comparative portrayal of the failings of the ' old' system and its attempted 
modifications, and, the success of the 11 New 11 forces where they had been adopted. 
The dissatisfaction with control by Watch Committees, and, in some cases with 
Quarter Sessions magistrates in the counties pointc;; to an underlying purpose to guide 
the proposals towards both centralisation, and, greater autonomy for the office of 
Chief Constable. 
Borough police and their system of local control by Watch Committees; the 
system of parish constables; and; the emergent system of the 1840's up to 1850, of 
3~7: 
,; 
forces of parish constables with superintending constables were the subject of severe 
criticism by the evidence given to the Select Committee. 
Parish constables were seen a') inactive 31, because being drawn from the 
locality in which they operated they were viewed as under the influence of the 
neighbourhood leading to partiality in their enforcement practices. Moreover, since a 
number of them who were selected were still undertaking other employment during 
their period in the office then they only devoted time to their duties if they were sure 
that it would lead to the detection of the offender. For, any time given over to 
constabulary duties was time taken from their other occupation or work and would 
lead to the loss of money unless compensated by the certainty of conviction of the 
alleged offender whom they would have to expend time to apprehend. Therefore, 
these was a tendency for parish constables only to take an interest in crime if the party 
could make available funds for the process of detection, apprehension and trial. There 
were also allegatio~s that parish constables had a pecuniary interest in the continuance 
and increase in crime since the constable received no money if the commission of 
crime was prevented then the tendency would always be to adopt a purely reactive 
role towards crime. 
Detection and pursuit were undertaken within the total discretion of the each 
parish constable with the unreformed, unmodified parish constable lacking a 
preventative role of a regular, consistent and collective policy of suppression 
involving a number of persons acting together. Even after a person had been arrested 
the activities of parish constables at the trial were criticised. With the knowledge that 
the prosecutor could get his costs of conducting the prosecution from the court some 
parish constables tended to artificially inflate their costs by various devices such as 
utilising many witnesses for which costs would be incurred, and, managing their ca')es 
31. This description of parish constables is an amalgamation of the evidence of Sir William 
Heathcote, ex-Cbainnan of Hampshire Quarter Sessions, pp. 23-24; William Hans Sloane Stanley, 
Magistrate in Hmnpshire, p.26; Captain John B.B. McHardy, CbiefConstable of Essex, p.56; Jrunes 
Parker, ex-clerk of indicttnents and Solicitor in Cbelsmsford and London, pp.64-65 in The First 
Report o/the Select Committee on the Police, ParI. Papers 1852-1853 Vol. XXXVI 
so that they were kept to the last part of the court's sitting so as to increase the 
expense of witnesess by keeping them longer before they gave evidence at trial. 
The system of superintending constables adopted by the County Police Act, 
were presented as flawed and incapable of changing the bac;;ic inefficiencies of the 
parish constable. Superintending constables were to supervise parish constables and 
attempt to engender a preventative policing role by ensuring a more collective 
organisation and set of practices. The superintending constable was portrayed as 
having a large area to cover in the county which necessitated a selectivity in his 
activities. The efficiency of the force still rested on parish constables and there was 
seen to be an enduring conflict of interest between the professional, salaried, 
superintending officer and the elected, non-waged, fee and cost reliant parish 
constable. The superintending officer wall dependent upon the parish constables for 
information which enabled the parish constables to retain their ability to act 
independently. The frustration that this caused to superintending constables is 
expressed by a superintending constable of Buckinghamshire who stated that there 
was 
" no chance of detection; you do not receive information often for two 
days .... the parish constable happens to be out for a considerable time, and sometimes 
constables are very careless in giving information. " 32 
Parish constables and the superintending constable system, which they 
increasingly came to operate under, were seen as inefficient and incapable of 
approaching the standard of the " New Police ", where they had been adopted under 
the County Police Act 1839/40. The superintending constable system, established by 
many counties who were opposed to the adoption of the" New" police, under the 
County Police Act, was viewed by those giving evidence as having achieved little 
practical improvement in the I old I parochial system centred upon the parish 
32. First Report of the Select Committee on the Police, ParI. Papers 1852·1853 VoI. XXXVI, p.71 
constable. The public affinnation of the inefficiency of the parish constable and the 
superintending constable system was vital to the legitimacy of the " New Police". For 
it was these systems that were the main' competitors' with the" New Police", and, 
hence the avowal of their incapacities could only strengthen both the " New" forces 
acceptance and the likelihood of the promotion of the " New Police" by the 
Government. The capabilities of the" New Police" were strongly affmned in the 
hope that local forces' initiatives and practices would lead to legislation to make it 
mandatory to establish the" New Police". 
It was not merely the inefficiencies of the' old' system and the small borough 
forces which were a focus of attention, it was also the question of the type and 
location of control over the " New" forces. The question of local management of the 
" New Police" figured most prominently in the minds of the Chief Constables of both 
County and Borough Forces. It wal) the system of local control in the boroughs that 
was the subject of the greatest criticism. There were complaints that it involved a 
number of competing jurisdictions, particularly between the Watch Committees and 
the magistrates as to the power of dismissal 33. Not only was this viewed as causing 
uncertainty, but the professional concerns of the Chief Constable, were being 
submerged in these local institutional conflicts. The Chief Constables' 
recommendations of appointment and promotion were being ignored by the Watch 
Committees as was the effect of reinstatement by the Watch Committee of constables 
dismissed by the magistrates. 
Borough control, as a whole, wa') looked upon with disfavour a') the working 
of the police was seen to depend upon a fluctuating body of people which led to a 
lack of stability and continuity of control and policy towards appointmerits. The fact 
that members of the Watch Committee were also local politicians led to allegations of 
lack independence due to their dependence on ' public' opinion. Moreover, there 
33. See evidence of John Dunne, ChiefConst.'lble of Norwich, in Ibid, pp.l23-128 who alleged that 
his recommendations of appointment and promotion were ignored by the Watch Committee, and, 
that the Watch Committee had reinst.'lted constables dismissed by magistrates. 
were allegations that premises belonging to publicans, brewers and spirit merchants 
were very rarely the subject of police attention when they served on the Watch 
Committee 34. 
The general view was that control should be removed from Watch 
Committees and placed with the Chief Constables in order to ensure the efficiency of 
the force and allow I professional I rather than I political I considerations to be 
dominant. The response of Chief Constables to the idea of a national force which 
would overcome these difficulties by moving the locus of control to London and 
thereby solve the problems of borough and county jealousy and conflict, those of 
conflict between Watch Committees and magistrates in the boroughs and the lack of 
control of Chief Constables was less enthusiastic with disagreement as to the necessity 
for a national system of policing 35. 
However, what this displays is a definite attempt to discredit the system of 
local control which had arisen under the Municipal Corporations Act 1835, and, to try 
and point to the necessity of a reduction in the degree of local control over the police. 
The fact that the need for central control was not strongly and coherently articulated 
in the evidence led the Bill of 1854 to attempt to institute a system of compulsory 
policing with a stronger and more direct role for the Home Office in the governance 
of the police. This, in turn left the appointment of Chief Constables to a national 
framework of rate-payer financial boards who would replace both the Watch 
Committees in the boroughs and the magistrates in the counties. 
The 1854 Bill represented the last attempt to institute a clearly centralised, 
national police force in which local control over policing practice and operations 
34. As alleged in the evidence of Thomas Heagren Redin, Govenor of Carlise County Goal who had 
previously served five-and-a-half years in the Essex Constabulary and four-and-a-half years in the 
Liverpool Borough Force attaining the position of second-in-command in ibid, pp.95-97 
35. Compare the evidence, in ibid, of Captain WiIliam Hams, Chief Constable of Hampshire, in 
favour(p.22); and; Captain John B.B. McHardy, CbiefConstable of Essex, who objects to 
centralisation(p.53) 
would have been minimised and confmed within clearly defmed parameters. Its failure 
ended a period in which the state had attempted, on numerous occasions and by 
various means, to ensure the establishment of a system of policing in which the Home 
Office was to be placed directly and transparently at its apex. The policing structure 
of the Metropolitan Police was no longer to provide the source for a ' programme' of 
transformation of the' old' system of social control. The idea of policing outside 
London was to remain embedded within the framework and dynamics of local 
government. The County and Borough Police Act 1856 recognised the legitimacy of 
the established framework of local governance of the police produced by the 
Municipal Reform Act 1835 and the County Police Act 1839/40. It also sought to 
increase the efficiency of the policed within this framework and by this action was to 
be the ftrst important move in the increasing autonomy of the" New Police". 
The County and Borough Police Act] 856 
The" New Police" were now placed, conceptually, as an integral element of the 
local structure of governance. This local structure of governance, with its high degree 
of control and supervision over the" New Police", wa" now attributed with an a 
priori legitimacy. The possibility for state intervention within this system only opened 
when the adequacy of this system's internal operations was placed in doubt. It was 
only when local government wall obviously failing that central government was 
conceived to have a capacity for involvement. This circumscription of the state's 
possibilities also entailed a redeftnition of the purpose of that state intervention. 
Centralis m and localism were no longer two radically distinct paradigms of control. 
Both had become means to be flexibly utilised in attaining the goal of maintaining the 
predominance of property within this local structure of governance. 
" Centralisation was justified and expanded, because it could provide direction 
to the localities. Government was to extend the moral partnership between the state 
at Whitehall and the counties: Grey [the Home Secretary who introduced the 1856 
Act] felt that through compromise he could complement each move towards 
centralisation with a corresponding increase of authority for the local authorities. 
Concessions were made to these local bodies, or legislation encouraged them to act 
on their own initiative, based once again on the assumption that they could manage 
their own affairs best. 11 36 
This change in the conceptualisation of the relationship between the Home 
Office and the governance of the localities meant that the 1856 Bill was far less radical 
than the one of 1854. Despite this, Grey found the localities resistant on the issue of 
Home Office intervention in the 11 New Police ". The boroughs perceived the measure 
as overt state intervention which would decrease local autonomy and control over the 
11 New Police ". In order to ensure a greater role for the Home Office,Grey adopted a 
flexible approach reducing the directly interventionist role proposed for the Home 
Office until sufficient numbers of M.P.s were prepared to give it their support. 
11 Clause 6," the backbone of the Bill ", was excised. The Government 
thereby forfeited its power to establish rules over pay and clothing or to frame a set of 
general regulations; all that remained was a prohibition of constables' fee taking. 
Clause 5, giving the Home Office the right to direct the police in the performance of 
their duties, was also stricken. The original requirement that the heads of the county 
and borough forces report at the will of the Home Secretary (Clause 8) wa~ diluted to 
the requirement that they present him with an annual statement of crime (Clause 14). 
The Home Secretary's right to require counties to be divided into police district':l 
(Clause 2) was softened by requiring affected county ratepayer's to petition for this 
districting. 11 37 
36. David Smith. ' Sir George Grey at the Mid-Victorian Home Office', The Canadian Journal of 
Social History 19. (1984), 361-386 (p.367) 
37. StanJey H. Palmer, Police and Protest in England and Ireland /780-1850 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), pSIS. 
The 1856 Act, after these concessions, wa~ to ensure the reconciliation of 
competing claims of local and central government by maintaining the ability of local 
government to provide law and order coupled with the state's contribution to this goal 
reduced to providing the background conditions for its attainment. Indirect methods 
were to be used ensure the efficiency, consistency and coherence of the 11 New Police 
11 by the incorporation of new and important centralising characteristics. An 
Inspectorate for the Police was to be established and these Inspectors were to 
examine the efficiency of local forces on an annual basis. This entailed the 
Inspectorate in the consideration of the provision of police stations, charge rooms and 
cells for each local force as well as the ratio of police to population. If deemed I 
efficient' the local borough or county would be entitled to payment of one-fourth of 
the cost of pay and clothing of the force out of central government. The effect of 
these Reports by the Inspectorate was to make the system of policing a national issue 
by providing a means for the comparative assessment of local forces with pressure 
able to be placed on those forces which appeared weak. 
The Act also formalised the nature of the 11 New Police 11 themselves by 
delineating the career structure for the force, establishing superannunation funds and 
forbidding constables to either work for a fee or to take any other employment while 
they were in the police force. This sought to distinguish and articulate the 
institutional identity of the 11 New Police" within a framework of local governance 
and control. The 1856 Act, rejecting the possibility of a national police independent 
of the local authorities, created a system which meant 
11 only the abandonment of totally free choice in the provinces, and suggested 
that policemen might act beyond the area defined by a rate levied to pay for their 
services. 11 38 
38. Carolyn Steedman, Policing The Victorian Community: The Formation of English Provincial 
Police Forces, 1856-80 (London:RoutIedge, 1984), p.27. 
It was intended to be a more effective method to encourage a greater degree of 
uniformity in the number of police employed by the boroughs and counties. In this 
way the" New Police" would have a structure of operation similar to that of 
" reformatory schools .... part of the regular machine for the maintenance of 
law and order ... to be maintained .. by funds contributed by all, like our prisons, 
penitentiaries and workhouses. " 39 
The effect of the Act was to make permanent an essentially indirect role for 
the Home Office in the area of policing. The Municipal Corporations Act and County 
Police Act were conftrmed as the enduring structures of governance of the police for 
the duration of the nineteenth century. The enforcement of criminal law was now to 
be the sole concern of the" New Police" with the 1856 Act marking the end of the 
continued existence and persistence of those elements of the 'old' system. This 
recognition of the legitimacy of the police, by the Act of 1856, entailed their 
acceptance as part of the local system of control in which they acted as both the 
protection for the local property order and in an administrative capacity for the 
magistracy and Watch Committees. The " New Police" were local police acting at 
the behest of the local property order within a locally controlled ftnancial structure. 
The nature of their practices and operations in the enforcement of law were to be 
developed within the context of as interaction between the local perceptions of social 
order, the extent of local control and the activities of the Chief Constables. 
The relations between the Chief Constables and the system of local control 
was to be the focus for the development of the police as a social system during the 
rest of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The autonomy so clearly desired 
by the Chief Constables wa'S to be slowly produced as a result of these practices and 
interactions between them and the Watch Committees and Quarter Sessions 
magistrates. The 1856 Act, by the provision of central government finance and the 
39. Sir George Grey in The Times, 18 January 1856 qUOk'ltion from Steedman, ibid, p.27. 
establishment of the Inspectorate, created space in the previous total dependence of 
the " New Police" upon local ratepayer's finance and many forces had their numbers 
increased thereby producing forces which now began to exceed many localities' ability 
to completely control policing policy. 
The beginnings of the preconditions for the development of police autonomy 
were located in the ascendancy of the police as the dominant agents of social control, 
and, as the body increa5ingly responsible for the management of prosecutions a5 
opposed to private prosecutors, prosecution associations and magistrates. The 
magistracy was the other central element which the police had to gain ascendancy 
over in order to achieve the status of the dominant agents of social control. Unlike 
the parish constables and prosecution associations it was directly and uniformly 
produced by Parliamentary legislation in the form of Jervis's Act5 of 1848/9. 
The Transformation of the Magistracy 
The magistracy occupied a central position in the social and legal order of the' old' 
system. They formed the link between the localities and the institutions of the state in 
the maintenance of order and the provision of information. The movement for reform 
of the role of magistrates had initially surfaced during the period 1825-1828, but little, 
in the form of legislation, had been achieved. In the face of the challenge of Chartism 
they, as part of the' old' system had been severely tested with the institutions of the 
state, particularly the Home Office, being called upon to play an actively 
interventionist role. 
In 1848 the Attorney General introduced four bills setting out to remould the 
magistracy. These Bills related to the two main practices of magistrates - processing 
people charged with indictable offences, and, conducting summary trials. This was 
.... 
supplemented with legislation regulating the holding of Special and Petty Sessions, 
and, the protection of magistrates for act') done in the execution of their office. 
These measures were presented by the Attorney General, in his speech to 
Parliament, as simply rendering assistance to the magistracy by clarifying the law upon 
which the magistracy operated and performed its duties. The first Bill and second Bill 
collected together and condensed into a single source all decisions and statutes 
concerning, respectively, the function of committing offenders chargeable with 
indictable offences and the trial of summary offences. He stressed that these two Bills 
introduced nothing new the 
" object had been simply to collect together the enactments and decisions 
forming the existing law upon these heads. " 40 
The third bill, provided the opportunity for magistrates to hold their summary 
trials and committal proceedings in specially constructed buildings, paid for out of the 
county rate, so that the previous venues - commonly public houses - would be 
replaced with specifically legal places for the holding of Special and Petty Sessions. 
Also, the magistrates' clerk paid was to be paid by salary with an agreed scale of fees 
to be universal throughout England, to be established through discussion between the 
magistracy and the Home Secretary. 
The last Bill was constructed to provide for the protection of magistrates in 
their decision-making free from consequences. Only if the party challenging the 
validity of the decision could prove that malice wa') the motivation behind the 
particular magistrate's decision wa') any action likely to succeed. 
The totality of the change was presented as both unexceptional, technical and 
not' political' and, therefore, these 
40. Parliament<'U)' Debates, HC(3rd ser.), col. 3 Febru<rry 3rd, 1848, The Attorney General 
., .... 
11 matters not being subjects of political importance might not be interesting to 
many, and, unaided by hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House, he (the Attorney 
General) could not hope to succeed in this undertaking .... [but]he trusted [that he] 
should have the ao;sistance for which he looked. At all events, he felt that he was 
taking a step in the right direction. 11 41 
This presentation and explanation of these Act')' effects masked the 
fundamental change which they entailed. These reforms connected, amplified and 
reinforced a broader and more fundamental change in the position of the magistrate. 
The magistrate embodied a personalised, demonstrative authority in the told' society 
in which social position and judicial role overlapped. Law and society had a vital and 
indissoluble link in the figure of the magistrate who symbolised the natural origin and 
truth of law and society. Life in human society was expressed in terms of natural law 
in which legaVsocial relations were intertwined and undifferentiated. In the realm of 
practice it centred around the activity of paternalism in which a degree of reciprocality 
and responsibility was recognised by all those taking up positions in the social order. 
This practice of paternalism took place within an essentially discretionary framework 
in which rank in the social order was intimately connected to the amount of discretion 
which could be exercised. 
The magistracy subsisted in a legal system lacking a clearly articulated 
separation from the surrounding social order, and, in which the operation of that legal 
system itself remained highly fluid due to it') dependence, for a case to come to trial, 
upon the interconnection of a number of decisions to utilise the law. The system wa') 
one of private prosecution in which the decision to invoke the law was one based 
upon an individual rationale of calculation of effectiveness and cost. The decision to 
invoke the law was as uncertain as the premises upon which the decision at the trial 
was made, and, the relation of Petty and Special Sessions to the higher court'), 
especially court') of Assize and Quarter Sessions. 
41. Ibid, col.3 
Within this system the magistrates were able to adopt, if they chose to, a pro-
active stance. This meant that they had a role in which the decision to invoke the law, 
by beginning the process of prosecution, was combined with the ability to make law 
through the making of decisions at the trial. Therefore, the distinction between the 
trial and the pre-trial process wa<; essentially blurred with procedural certainty and 
differentiation dependent upon and inscribed within magisterial discretion. 
The degree of intervention in the pre-trial process was again dependent upon 
the individual magistrate it could amount simply to pressuring the parish constable to 
take up the complaint of an individual, or, helping in the preparation of the 
complainant's ca<;e. However, he could actually investigate the matter himself and 
arrest the individual or individuals he considered responsible for the offence. He 
would then conduct the prosecution of those arrested by him. 
The processing of offenders by the magistracy at Petty and Special Sessions 
was an equally discretion-bound procedure. The nature of the examination of the 
suspect by the magistrate or bench of magistrates before committal for trial, for an 
indictable offence at a higher court, wa') entirely dependent upon the practice adopted 
by the magistrate(s). It could be confined to merely eliciting the issues in order to 
define the parameters of the case, but it could equally be geared to establishing the 
guilt of the defendant by questioning, with the form of questioning, often producing a 
confession. 
This role in specifically criminal matters was one element in a wide variety of 
otherwise social and administrative practices. The magistracy was at once embedded 
in the social order and differentiated from it such that the role was capable of the 
particular form of practice required by paternalism. This wider social role had 
become the focus of criticism by landowners in the early nineteenth century through 
discontent over the operation of the system of Poor Relief. The system wa') seen to 
• I 
be too expensive from the amount of county and parish rates demanded for it to 
function. This was compounded by the view that it was a system founded on the 
practice of paternalism in which there was little control over expenditure and too 
much discretion, since the magistrates had an appellate function in the system of Poor 
Relief, with a predominant tendency to satisfy the expectation of recipients of poor 
relief 42. 
The New Poor Law 1834 led to the de-differentiation of the magistracy by 
their incorporation into boards of poor law guardians. 
" as ex-officio members .... they were thereby incorporated into a body of 
diverse property owners,[and] they were no longer in an independent position to 
thwart ratepayer's inclinations had they wished to do so. " 43 
With this incorporation went the generation of a new system of expectational 
structures and a social order based upon a concern for efficiency and effectiveness. 
This change brought about by the Poor Law signalled a fundamental restructuring of 
the social order, particularly in rural areal), in which the position and function of 
elements in the ' old' system were modified or removed. 
The position and function of the magistracy, therefore, changed with this more 
general movement. Their social and administrative powers were stripped away with 
the process being 'quicker and more dramatic in rural areas than in urban, metropolitan 
42. See, for more detail on this, A. Brundage, 'The Landed Interest and the New Poor Law: a 
reappraisal of the revolution in government " English Historical Review 88, (1972), 27-48; P. 
Dunkley, ' The Landed Interest and the New Poor Law: a critical note " English Historical Review 
89, (1973), 836-841; A. Brundage, 'The English Poor Law and the Cohesion of Agricultural Society 
" Agricultural History XLVII, (1974),405-417; P. Dunkley, 'Paternalism, the Magistracy mId Poor 
Relief in Engllmd, 1795-1834', International Review of Social History, XXIV, (1979), 371-397; P. 
Dunkley, ' Whigs and Paupers: The Reform of the English Poor Laws, 1830-4 " Journal of British 
Studies, 10, (1981),124-149; W. Apfel and p. Dunkley, 'English Rural Society and the New Poor 
Law: Bedfordshire, 1834-47 " Social History, 10, (1985), 37-68; P. Mandler, 'The Making of the 
New Poor Law Redivivus " Past and Present 117, (1987), 131-157. 
43. W. Apfel and P. Dunkley, 'English Rural Society and the New Poor Law: Bedfordshire, 1834-47 
" Social History 10, (1985), 37-68 (p.49) 
and industrial areas. Their role became one set within purely legal parameters as a 
result of this process. It is at this juncture that Jervis's Act') of 1848/49 become 
intelligible as an integral part of this process of redefinition the magistracy. 
The first two bills, by clarifying the position with regard to the committal of 
indictable offences and the trial of summary offences, remove the discretionary and 
fluid operation of the magistracy. The malleable distinction between trial and pre-trial 
stages as well as the ease with which the judicial role became one of prosecution was 
now finnly prevented. The magistracy were now to have an exclusively judicial role 
with the practices of the' old' system, in which a proactive approach could be 
adopted, removed. The pre-trial process in the committal of indictable offences was 
clearly demarcated as a preliminary inquiry with the object being simply the gathering 
of information from witnesses, prosecutor and defendant to establish whether there 
was a case and whether it should be set down for committal for trial. 
In regard to summary offences, the process of clarification was linked to the 
containment of magistrates' decision-making abilities. The mass of unsystematised, 
summary offences, constituting the operational space of the magistracy in regard to 
the trial of criminal offences, allowed wide scope for the exercise of discretion. The 
gaps, blanks or ' loopholes' in the area of criminal jurisdiction provided express 
devices through which the legal order could be made to conform to the demands of 
the social order of paternalism in which order was imposed through a method of 
individual, singular incursions from above. In this way, law was still intrinsically 
linked to society and it is this relation that this legislation sought to sever. 
The process of setting out the parameters of the magistrates' summary 
jurisdiction established an explicitly rule-bound jurisdiction. This fmnly differentiated 
the magistrates from the surrounding society and produced a separate legal order 
which was characterised by it') intimate relation to change and contingency and not 
upon the maintenance or symbolisation of an unchanging natural order of reciprocal 
relations. This was done indirectly by establishing a central supervision over 
magistrates' clerks who were to be paid by the state on an uniform scale of fees. This 
would create a stable, salaried position for the role of magistrates' clerk to it be filled 
by those who had received training as a solicitor. Therefore, to strengthen thi5 
position was to strengthen the influence of a legal perspective upon the magistracy. 
For, it was he who advised them on points of law and hence provided them with the 
legal structure in which their decisions were made. 
This disembedding of the magistracy from the social order and social system 
of which they had been an integral element was to be further accentuated by the 
provision which sought to set up specifically constructed buildings for the holding of 
Special and County Sessions. This wa<i to be the symbolic complement to the 
differentiation of law and society pursued in the realm of practice and procedure of 
the magistracy. The increasing specificity of function of the magistracy was now to 
take place at a specifically legal site. 
This concentration and reduction of the magistracies' role carried out by this 
legislation shifted the parameters of its operation onto a positive law basis. The space 
of summary jurisdiction was now one in which the process, procedure and substantive 
law ba'iis of summary jurisdiction and the committal to trial for indictable offences 
were clearly demarcated. This was to increase the ability of these courts to process 
large numbers of decisions by making the decision-making process it'ielf essentially 
procedural. 
With this legislation, however, the ability to invoke the law was lost by the 
magistracy. They were now confined to decision-making. Magistrates' court5 now 
become dependent upon the surrounding social system for the introduction of cases. 
It is at this juncture that the phenomenon of feeding cases into the legal system 
becomes separate from decision-making within the legal system. This function of 
decision-making now becomes the legitimate terrain and basis for the definition of the 
role of the magistracy. Hence the trial, in turn, comes to be defined as the sole site of 
guilt determination, and, therefore clearly differentiates and defmes it ... elf from, and in 
regard to, the pre-trial process. The collection of evidence and witnesses prior to the 
trial ceases to be the legitimate concern of the magistracy as does the conduct of 
prosecutions themselves. 
This contraction and reduction of the role of magistrates to' purely reactive, 
judicial role coupled with the decline in the importance of the parish constables and 
prosecution associations allowed the It New Police It a growing, uncontested space in 
which to take control of the management of prosecutions and the maintenance of 
social order of which it formed a part. 
The Development of the Police into a Relatiyelv Autonomous Social System 
during the Later Nineteenth Century 
Acceptance of the police, after 1856, was as an integral part of the local framework of 
society under the guidance and control of Watch Committees and magistrates. The 
latter part of the nineteenth century was to be the period in which the police began to 
develop, in this context, the preconditions for their evolution into a relatively 
autonomous social system. 
a)The Unfolding of the Centralising Tendencies of the 1856 Act: The Activities of 
the Inspectorate 
The 1856 Act had created an Inspectorate whose responsibility it was to ensure that 
the principles of policing efficiency became local reality. The Inspectorate were 
element ... in a modified administrative structure in which it was proposed that the 
Home Office would hold a greater degree of authority than had it held before. The 
effectiveness of this administrative structure rested on their aptitude and inclination to 
enforce its principles. They had to mark out a sphere of influence which would entail 
a break with the notion of an uninterrogated power of local authorities. For, it was the 
decline of this conception of local authority which would be the basis for any 
transformation in the structure of governance and with it the generation of a greater 
space for the development of autonomy for the 11 New Police ". 
The three Inspectors had an independent status and lived and operated within 
one of the three regions to which they were assigned. The Inspectorate began with 
an initial affinity between their perceptions and those of the counties and boroughs on 
the role of the 11 New Police ". Both saw the 11 New Police 11 as part of a system of 
local government within their areas. This accounted for the early success of their 
attempts to increase the number of 11 New Police 11 employed by the localities. The 
Inspectorate simply stressed the capability of the 11 New Police 11 as an instrument of 
local governance and their ability to undertake administrative functions44. By 1857, 
therefore, 
11 all counties but one, and the great majority of boroughs, had efficient 
forces." 45 
Problems remained, however, with the small boroughs with populations of under 
5,000 who had been excluded from the central government grant under the 1856 Act, 
particularly in the NorthWest(Lancashire, Cheshire and NorthWest Derbyshire) and 
the West(Somerset, Devon and Cornwall), as the Inspectorate could only seek to 
persuade them to amalgamate with the county force. By 1870 this continued to be a 
problem, but had ceased to be one of national significance. 
44. For a detailed account of the early workings of the Inspectorate see Carolyn Steedman, Policing 
the Victorian Community: The Formation of English Provincial Police Forces, 1856-1880 (London: 
Routledge, 1984),pp.38-41. 
45. H. Parris,' The Home Office and the Provincial Police in England and Wales, 1856-1870', Public 
lAw (1961), 230-255 (p.230) 
The efforts of the Inspectorate throughout the late 1850s and 1860s rendered 
the majority of forces 'efficient'. By lifting the police out of an exclusively local 
structure of finance it encouraged the localities to employ more police constables, 
since they no longer had to bear the total cost to their employment, and, in turn, made 
. the police forces themselves recipient.;; of a guaranteed, stable source of finance tied to 
considerations other than the amount of the county or borough rate. This increasing 
financial stability produced the conditions for the development of a self-consciousness 
of their operation and encouraged the autonomous formulation of both the identity 
and policy of the It New Police It. The basic foundations for it.;; emergence were 
already in place since the police, as an organisation, had been set up as a I new I entity 
in response to the failings of the I old I system and were therefore already 
differentiated, in terms of form, from the existing social roles and positions of the 
existant social order. 
b)Increasing the Preconditions for the Development of Autonomy: The Activities 
of the Chief Constable with the Local Structure of Governance and the Changing 
Definition of the Relation Between the State and the" New Police" 
It was the position of the County Chief Constables that enabled the fullest 
development of these preconditions because of the nature of the local structure of 
governance within which the county forces operated. The system of control by 
magistrates at Quarter Sessions remained unchanged by the 1856 County and 
Borough Police Act, and, the subsequent legislation of the 1880s. Chief Constables 
bad been drawn from army officers with military experience which meant, in the 
context of mid-Victorian society, that they came from gentry families. 
Their social statues and standing was reinforced under s.6 County Police Act 
1839 by the specific, legislative recognition of their office. With no elected element in 
the system of county government until 1888 a space for the development of the 
autonomy of the Chief Constable was thereby created. His control over policy and 
appointment was far greater than that of his borough counterpart. The social and legal 
status of the Chief Constable led to a greater acceptance and approval of the police 
and their activities from the outset. Therefore, even the limited capacity for scrutiny 
and control was not fully exercised. From the mid-nineteenth century County Chief 
Constables were in a situation in which they could operate with an 
11 effective autonomy that could later, when reinforced by a developing sense 
of themselves as possessors of professional expertise, be transmogrified into the 
ideology of constitutional independence. 11 46 
Along with this developing practice of independence went, ac; an integral 
element, a strengthening of the links between the Home Office and the County Chief 
Constables. The duty to provide information to the Home Office under the 1856 Act 
broadened out and became more interactive with frequent, direct contact between the 
Home Office and the Chief Constables. This effectively undermined the small amount 
of local control that the magistrates had, and, it had become so embedded that even 
the 
11 formation in 1888 of Standing Joint Committees, evenly divided between 
councillors and magistrates, as police authorities, made little difference. 11 47 
The Borough police forces were in a different situation from the outc;el They 
were under a far more rigorous system of local control - the Watch Committee. The 
Watch Committees had considerable powers of control over their police forces with 
the ability not only to determine policy, but also to sack any mem ber of the force 
including the Chief Constable. However, this potential for strict local control wac; 
increallingly unutilised ac; the nineteenth century progressed. Smaller boroughs, from 
46. L. Lustgarten, The Governance of the Police (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1986), pA2 
47. L. Lustgarten, The Governance of the Police (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1986), p.42 
the inception of their forces were consensual in their approach to the control of the 
local force through careful selection of the Watch Committee members 48. Local 
control in this framework was more a matter of establishing a stable, expectational 
framework between the Watch Committee and Chief Constable than a policy of direct 
and constant intervention in the running of the force. With the small boroughs this 
was as much as self-conscious decision on the part of the Watch Committee as it was 
of the social environment in which policing took place. Crime although always to be 
found was not of the nature or magnitude of the larger industrial and urban areas 
which necessitated the type of I engaged I policing typical of these areas. 
Local government in the large urban and industrial municipalities walS a far 
more consciously felt and important entity. Municipal politics in these arealS entailed a 
definite and distinctive municipal policy. Within this policy the issue of control over 
the police was an important element. It led to firm and vigilant control over the police 
by the Watch Committees coupled with particular emphases upon police practices. In 
the city of Liverpool during 
" the first eleven years of the force [1836-47], the constraintlS, and direction by 
the Watch Committee were severe. A sub-committee of the Watch met daily to 
supervise police operations. During the first five years, the Watch issued an average 
of one order a week for the direct payment of police officers." 49 
This rigorous nature of control was, however, only to be characteristic of the 
early period of the Watch Committee. The expansion in local government activities 
and areas of competence created an administrative system far more complex and 
demanding than that of the earlier period. Control of the police now became one 
element within a far wider administrative framework. This wac; symbolised by the 
changing functions of the Watch Committee which was made responsible for the 
48. For example, see the Evidence of George Kitson, magistrate for Somerset and ex-Mayor of Bath, 
to the Select Committee on the Police, First Repon, ParI. Papers 1852·3 Vol. XXXVI p.l43. 
49. M. Brogden, The Police: Autonomy and Consent (London: Academic Press, 1982), p.62 
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general control and organisation of the city in which the police were a component 
The change in the form of local government in the mid-nineteenth century 
interweaved itself with a change in the type of control exercised over the police. The 
police had become an accepted part of local government and this foundational 
legitimacy led to a decline in direct control with the establishment of a set of patterns 
and practices of police operation which provided a stable and uncontested domain of 
mutual expectations. The general direction of the force gradually transferred itself 
from the Watch Committee to the Chief Constable with intervention by the Watch 
Committee becoming an exceptional practice. 
With these developments went the preconditions for the development of the 
doctrine of independence though in a less visible and direct form than that of the 
County Forces. Independence from the Watch Committees was achieved through a 
combination of strategic element5 deployed by the Chief Constables in their dealings 
with the Watch Committee. Chief Constables of borough forces, in large urban and 
industrial areas, utilised operational discretion to avoid clear directives from Watch 
Committees where the force saw duties to be opposition to occupational practice. It 
was this knowledge of police practice, opposed to the fallibility lack of experience of a 
political perspective, which underpined this resistance to and avoidance of the 
interventions and directives of the Watch Committees in the later nineteenth century. 
These bases of resistance of Chief Constables in both boroughs and counties 
were reinforced by the changing legislative definition of the relation between the" 
New Police" and the state from the late 1860s onwards. This redefinition entailed a 
shift in the role of the" New Police" from that of carefully supervised agents of local 
magistrates and Watch Committees to that of agents of the state. The legislation was 
to place it5 implementation directly with the" New Police" without any role or 
position within it for the magistracy or Watch Committee. This had the effect of 
loosening the relation between the structures of local governance the " New Police" 
:" 
and their status as an administrative instrument for the realisation of the norms of the 
local ratepaying community 50. This loosening wa<i enhanced by the increase in the 
proportion of central government finance available to local forces under the Police 
Expenses Act 1874 which now made the state responsible for one-half of the total 
cost of clothing and wages. 
This enabled the development, during the nineteenth century, of an 
independent space for police practice increasingly freed from local control. With this, 
came the components and preconditions for the doctrine of police independence and 
managerialism. For, independence from local control can become articulated as 
independence from any social class or political foundation. Hence, the position of 
Chief Constables becomes an impartial, bureaucratic and administrative role-type 
whose demands for wider and greater powers simply conform to the assessment of 
internal organisational needs. It was only to finds its ' public' articulation and 
discursive existence after the First World War when the combination of an increased 
Home Office role and dominance, after the police strikes of 1918/1919, and, the 
response to the post First World War political situation cemented the relation between 
the Home Office and Chief Constables, and, their independence from local control 51. 
The evolution of the distinction of the" New Police" from other public 
officials on the ground of the former's lack of need to be controlled by representatives 
of the' public' enabled the " New Police" to operate with an increasingly wide ambit 
of decision-making and parameters of practice. This necessitated the heightened 
ability to both process and determine the value of information in order to produce a 
stable position in which decision-making could take place in accordance with the 
systemic im peratives of the" New Police". This, in turn, demanded that the practice 
50. This legislation consisted of the Wine and Beer House Act 1869, The Habitual Criminals Act 
1869, The Prevention o/Crimes Act 1871, The licensing Act 1872, Explosives Act 1875, The 
Adulterated Foods Act 1875. 
51. See, for a detailed description and analysis of this, L. Lustgarten, The Governance oltlle Police 
(London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1986) 
of information processing be one governed by preferences built into that practice 
which would prestructure the 
11 perception of choices, the way of posing questions, incentives to explore, 
preferences and so forth. 11 52 
It was the shared perceptual framework of norms and values developed with the 11 
New Police 11 , during the nineteenth century, which provided the possibility for this 
stable, system specific abstraction from the surrounding social environment 
c)The Maintenance of The Identity of the " New Police It: The Evolution of a 
Durable, Perceptual Framework 
The norms and values developed within the police force were a product both 
of the military model of organisation and discipline imposed upon and structuring the 
relations between members of the force, and, the perceptual framework or' 
personality structure' evolved in response to and interaction with the social 
environment which surrounded the police. 
This military model of organisation and discipline sought to re-educate the 
recruited constables. It was to do this by producing, through this type of discipline 
and training, a durable, internalised set of norms and values which were the 
crystallisation of the influences brought to bear both within and without the police 
forces. That military models were utilised is due to the fact that a total break is 
sought with the recruit's previous social situation, perceptions, practices and 
expectations and their substitution with those of the police. A process of 
. desocialisation and resocialisation is simultaneously at work seeking to produce a new 
52. N. Luhmann, The Differentiation of Society (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1982), 
p.I72. 
set of perceptions and practices while simultaneously having to deal with the pre-
existing perceptions and practices of the recruit 'i. 
For this process to be effective, this imposition of norms and values which 
structures thought and practice needed to. be maintained by the recruits themselves 
through self-discipline and self-censorship. The extent to which this is unconscious is 
the measure and extent of the internalisation of these norms and values. Furthermore, 
not only must this be unconscious, but the very process of imposition of a set of 
particular values must be ' forgotten' so that both the thought and practice of the 
recruit'i takes place . 
" in the illusion of freedom and universality. " 53 
This process of internalisation had led, by the 1860s, to the emergence of this 
durable disposition in police constables. The Police Service Advertiser, established in 
1860, testifies to the extent to which constables themselves regarded each other a'i 
sharing common conditions, views and situations. After only a year in publication, it 
" concentrates solely on police matters ..... While the policemen were generally drawn 
from below the artisan class, clearly the professional policemen saw himself as having 
risen to a position of respectability, with the hopes of rising further through hard 
work, dedication and sobriety." 54 
It was at this period that constables themselves began identify and articulate a set of 
values and norms which they regarded as natural and universal. This lack of 
remembrance of the social conditions of their imposition reflected their strong 
internalisation. The arbitrariness of their inculcation was now perceived a'i the 
constitution of a' professional' police. 
53. P. Bourdieu, Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture trans. R. Nice (London: Sage 
Publications, 1990),p.40 
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The break between social class position and role as constable began to 
manifest itself clearly with the position of constable leading to the self-identification of 
the individual, through the process outlined above, with the set of values and norms of 
the police force rather than those associated with their initial class position. This self-
identification reflects both the total internalisation of the values, constraints and 
disciplinary mechanisms of the training procedure and their transformation into virtues 
or laudable character traits - the subsumption and determination of the practices and 
thoughts of the constable by that system. 
The values and norms of the police force, allowed to develop and crystalise 
more strongly, after the 1856 Act, were a historical and material product of the 
influences exercised upon the police. It is there norms and values which the system of 
discipline, based upon a military model, sought to inculcate in constables by producing 
a set of dispositions within them. These norms and values were then continuously 
reproduced and perpetuated in the future by their embeddedness in the individual and 
collective practices of both policemen and the police al) a social system. 
These norms and values were the amalgamation of the perceptions of the 11 
New Police" themselves and the I public I to which they were, or, felt themselves to be 
accountable - Watch Committees or magistrates. They were the product of the 
changed sensibility and definition of crime and social order which occurred in the early 
years of the nineteenth century. It was a redefinition of social order which entailed 
the utilisation of the police in a number of areas outside a strictly criminal law context 
This was the process which established the content of the norms and values the" New 
Police tt. 
s' 
The Police and the Definition of Criminality 
The 11 New Police 11 were created as one element of a more general and wide-ranging 
apparatus that was to implement the fundamental change in sensibility in which a new 
perception of the lower classes and social order had been produced. This 
transformation in the dominant perceptual framework was tied to the increasingly 
obvious inadequacy of the element~ of the paternalist structure of local governance in 
the maintenance of societal cohesion - the active creation of consent to the legitimacy 
of the existing social order and the property system on which it was based. This sense 
of inadequacy extended, during the fIrst two decades of the nineteenth century, into 
the realisation that these elements of the existent local social order could not merely 
be adapted or adjusted to achieve the revitalisation of the system of local authority. 
Profound transformation in this structure of governance was necessary to ensure the 
social system's continued survival. 
a)Making the Break with the' Old ': The Redefinition of the Working Class under 
the New Poor Law 1834, and the Emergence of the " New Police" in a Central 
Position in its Implementation 
The fust practical implementation and institutional embodiment of this wal) the New 
Poor Law of 1834. This Poor Law Amendment Act changed dramatically the old 
system of outdoor relief which supplemented wages and whose criteria was based 
upon the number of children in each household that claimed relief. It abolished this 
system of outdoor relief, except for medical assistance, to any able-bodied person 
who now claimed relief. Assistance wal) now concentrated upon indoor relief in the 
form of the workhouse where those seeking assistance would have to pass the 
workhouse test. Parishes, the previous administrative unit for the' old' system of 
relief, were to lose their control by being grouped into poor law unions over which a 
Central Poor Law Board would exercise supervision. 
~IJ 
The New Poor Law unions and boards of guardians were, in the main, 
composed of ratepayer's representatives of rural parish farmers.This had the effect of 
unifying the property order allowing a rapid implementation of the new legislation, the 
dismantling of the' old' institutions and the construction programme for workhouses 
- the central disciplinary institution of the ' new' system. 
" Once formed, moreover, the new boards of guardians proved to be far more 
proticient at economising than scattered overseers had been in the period of transition 
from old to new systems. In virtually every area of administration - the hiring of 
union personnel, the auditing of accounts, the operation of workhouses, and the 
examination of pauper rolls - relief of the ratepayer's, rather than the destitute, 
constituted the guiding principle upon which policy was decided and implemented. " 
55 
This unity also manifested it<:;elf in the delocalization of the New Poor Law 
administration coupled with its depersonalization. The areas covered by the New 
Poor Law unions exceeded any comparable community area, and, thereby became the 
new location for the administration and its interaction with the poor. The process of 
territorial expansion was tied to a centralisation of administration and reduction in the 
number of officials who had previously been employed under the' old' system. Poor 
relief was no longer to be a result of the regular interaction of element') of the social 
order under the expectation of reciprocity and accountability. 
The nature of administrative interaction under the New Poor Law was 
collective and increasingly professional based upon relieving officers and workhouse 
masters whose very roles were created by the new legislation, and, hence bore no 
relation to existing roles which were embedded in the ' old' social order. These new 
roles were predicated upon the evolution of a policy and norms of action by a 
55. W. Apfel and P. Dunkley, 'English Rural Society and the New Poor Law: Bedfordshire, 1834-47 
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corporate management board. With this disappeared the limited notion of 
reciprocality and mutuality embedded in an appellate procedure which, while seeking 
to evoke both fear and gratitude, still enabled an appeal to be made against decisions 
of parish vestries to magistrates. 
The application procedure for relief changed with the ' old' system of facing 
two or three landowners, or, a group of farmers and tradesmen in the parish church 
being replaced with a tightly organised and regular gathering. The prospective 
applicant now faced a body 
" sworn to economy and dedicated to workhouse discipline (if needs be), many 
of them unknown, drawn from areas beyond the village, and attended by clerk, 
relieving officer, workhouse master and the rest of the panoply of union servant~. 
Even the physical difficulties of making an application could be fairly formidable, 
certainly more so than prior to 1835, since the poor in outlying parishes were miles 
from the towns in which board meetings were held. " 56 
The New Poor Law was the first, radical break and transformation of the ' old 
'system. It rejected it~ supporting ideas of reciprocity and accountability by a~serting 
the primacy of property right~ over customary right'i and the shifting the responsibility 
for the pauper from the community to that individual's family. Members of society 
were now placed in social space in which only property ownership and capital 
accumulation were recognised. With this re-orientation of the foundations of social 
space to strictly economic practices went a concomitant redefinition of the position of 
the lower cla<;ses. Working-class poverty was no longer seen a'i a contingent 
occurrence which gave rise to a right, exercisable against the community, not merely 
to subsistence, but also to labour at a fair rate of pay and rehabilitation at public 
expense if the ability to work was lost. It was now viewed as the inevitable result of 
immorality and indecent habits. 
56. Ibid, p.57 
The initial theoretical articulation of this altered perceptual schema was the 
Christian Political Economy of Malthus, Paley, Sumner, Copelston, Whately and 
Chalmers 57. Within this schema the market of labour and capital, freed from the 
impediments produced by the' old' system of poor relief, was to impose a life of trial 
and discipline in which the pressures of scarcity, competition and inequality created 
the essential conditions for intellectual, moral and spiritual development. These 
pressures of the market would bring forth, through the exigencies imposed on the 
individual, the innate economic orientation of behaviour which subsisted in each 
individual. The operation of this self-regulating economic sphere established the 
necessary entwinement of prudence, moral virtue and physical comfort Thit.; 
constellation was to remain at the centre of the dominant perspective despite the 
increasing transformation of its foundation from religion to science during the later 
nineteenth century. The internal transformations of the dominant perspective during 
the nineteenth century, therefore, did not produce or evolve a definition of the relation 
between the individual and the state outside this moral ideology. The distinction 
between' deserving' and ' undeserving' poor remained the constant concern and 
overrode all considerations of individualism and collectivism. 
The implementation of this distinction was to be produced by the creation of: 
11 a local bureaucracy answerable to the Commissioners at Somerset House. 
The Poor Law Amendment Act[ 1834]legislated a new pool of union officers into 
existence, whose responsibility it was to see that the principles of less eligibility for 
relief became local realities. Ultimately, the efficacy of the New Poor Law rested on 
their ability and inclination to enforce its principles. 11 58 
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The central positions in the effective implementation of the system in the localities 
were the workhouse master and relieving officer. In many of the Poor Law Unions 
there was a preference for the employment of total strangers with military, police, or 
prison experience who would operate in these' managerial' roles with efficiency and 
be unaffected by any relationships of patronage that might remain. They were to 
ensure the regularity of relief practice and reduce the Poor Rate. 
The effectiveness of ex-Metropolitan Police constables employed as relieving 
officers in some Unions which led some in the modified structure of governance to 
recommend the expansion of their use and the potential for the integration of the" 
New Police" and the Poor Law Unions. As The Chairman of the Towcester Union 
pointed out, the position enabled relieving officers 
" to make themselves personally acquainted with the want.;;, habit.;;, 
companions and pursuits of each applicant, by this means to obtain personal 
knowledge of every vicious character and thus afford every facility to detect every 
crime committed in the union ... Under proper regulations, I conceive their might be an 
efficient body of Police throughout the co~ntry, without expense to Government" 59 
However, this potential institutionalisation within the Poor Law Unions of discipline, 
surveillance and law enforcement went unrealised. The attempts to a establish a 
national system of policing on this foundation ended in failure60 along with the many 
other local' experimentc; I in policing between 1830 and 1856. The confmnation of 
the exact position of the" New Police 11 in the transformed system of local governance 
came with the County and Borough Police Act of 1856. It was to be as the 
instrument of the Watch Committees and magistrates - the local authority in the 
59. J.T. Pinkard to London Police Commissioner, 1 June 1835, Public Records Office File MH 
1218879 quotation from A. Brundage, 'The English Poor Law of 1834 and the Cohesion of 
Agricultural Society ',Agricultural History XLVIII (1974), 405-417 (p.414) 
60. See, for a det.'liled analysis of these developments R. D. Storch. ' Policing Southern England 
before the Police: Opinion and Practice, 1830-1856', pp.252-3 in D. Hay and F. Snydered. Policing 
and Prosecution in Britain 1750-1850 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) 
boroughs and counties - and with this went the firm definition of their role in the New 
Poor Law. 
The New Poor Law acted as the final element in the growth of a I free market I 
in labour, but its creation also marked the end of the ability to stabilise the lower class 
within the unit of the parish through the social practice of paternalism. The freedom 
of the lower classes to sell their labour also entailed the freedom of movement outo;;ide 
the local community. It was a freedom which was also seen to have the potential to 
initiate and cycle of indiscipline and degeneracy. 
" [It] began with rural labourers breaking contracto;;, deserting their families 
and becoming tramps or migrants to a life of precarious urban employment When 
this failed them they took to begging and petty crime and, if challenged, took 
advantage of the vagrancy laws to have themselves repatriated to their parish of 
settlement at rate-payer expense, only to begin the cycle once again when opportunity 
offered. This disturbing pattern of behaviour wao;; being perceived by the 1820s as a 
full-blown crisis of labour discipline, with implications for the ordering of society. " 61 
The " New Police" were to be employed in the supervision of those members of 
the working-clao;;ses who were mobile and unsettled. They were to classify these 
individuals in accordance with the binary moral schema of I deserving I and I 
undeserving '. This was to be done through their control of the I way-ticket system I in 
which the destitute person who lacked a place of permanent residence or settlement 
were issued, every time they entered a county, with a pass which detailed the place 
were they intended to obtain work and the system of casual wards that existed along 
their route. This occurred at different times with the police being utilised in this role 
only in the late 1860s and 1870s in Birmingham 62 whereas this role had been allotted 
61. MJ.D. Roberts, I Public and Private in Early Nineteenth Century London: The Vagrancy Act of 
1822 and its Enforcement I The Journal of Social History 13, (1988), 273-94 (pp.281-2) 
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and adopted by the Essex County Police in the 1840s 63. By 1880,37 counties were 
employing the" New Police" in this role with these members of the working-classes 
required to apply at the police station for a casual ward admission ticket. In practice, 
this meant that in every town or village the casual ward was constructed next to the 
police station so that when they entered they were directed by patrolling constables to 
the police station where the station sergeant determined whether they were' 
respectable' or' criminal', and this classification sent them either to the casual ward 
or led to their retention at the police station for further inquiries. 
This practice of examination, identification and distinction generated a 
continuous reinforcement of the ' threat' that the vagrant posed to the' community'. 
The durability of this classification within the organisational practices and perceptions 
of the" New Police" was evident from the characterisation of these members of the 
working class by the Chief Constable of Chester in his evidence to the Eighteenth 
Annual Report of the Poor Law Board: 
" estimated roughly, I am decidedly of the opinion that 75% of them never 
work, but spend their time tramping from union to union" 64 
These views of the Chief Constables determined and reflected the attitudes and policy 
of the force itllelf in regard to the practices of intervention, control and surveillance of 
the casual working class. 
The location of the police in this role was determined by the system of local 
governance. They were the administrative agency responsible for the implementation 
of the norms generated within local county and boroughs politics. The content of 
these norms were fixed by a ' public' founded on the rateable value of the 
63. See L. Radcinowicz and R. Hood. A History of the English Criminal Law Vol. 4 (London: 
Stevens. 1968) 
64. Eighteenth Annual Report of the Poor lAw Board ParI. Papers 1866 Vol. XXXV p. 7. QUot'ltion 
from Carolyn Steedman. PoliCing the Victorian Community: 171e Formation a/the English 
Provincial Police, /856-/880 (London: RoutJedge, 1984). p.58 
individual's property .. Payment of rates determined both the composition of this' 
public' and the nature of the relationship between them and the system of local 
governance. It rested on a quasi-contractual foundation in which the rate-paying' 
public' paid for the provision of services which would confer a benefit upon them as 
part of this 'community'. 
The construction of this' community' was predicated upon the exclusion of 
non-rate-payers from the public sphere of local politics. Those placed on the outside 
of this' community' were rejected as outgroups and attributed with negative 
characteristics in opposition to the ingroup of the' community' which was 
unquestioningly accepted and imbued with positive characteristics. It was a perceptual 
schema which imposed hierarchical ordering on reality - a division it into ingroups and 
outgroups - where group interaction within the societal whole was one in which 
ingroups are dominant and outgroups are subordinate and this is viewed as inherently 
correct, just and necessary. The dominance of the ingroup is a position which is 
constantly under threat from these outgroups who always seek to challenge and 
overcome its continued authority and control. The continued reproduction of the 
dominant position of the ingroup depends upon the maintenance of the outgroups in a 
subordinate position, and, since the threat is located in an active group, readily 
identifiable in reality, then this' evil' has to be 
" attacked, stamped out, or segregated wherever it is found, lest it contaminate the 
good." 65 
The threat to the' community' is also the perpetual capacity for culture and 
society to fall back into nature and the chaos of improvidence, irresponsibility and 
immorality 66. Culture must be wrested from Nature and it is in this process that the 
65. T.W. Adomo et. al., The Authoritarian Personality (Abriged Edition) (London: W.W. Norton 
and Co., 1982), p.6 
66. See on this, for the early Victorian Period, B. Hilton, The Age of Atonement: The Influence of 
Evangelism on Social and Economic Thought 1785-1865 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) and its 
continuance, despite now being founded on the premises of I science I E.P. Hennock, I Poverty and 
respectable community is distinguished. The property order was culture without 
nature and those outside were nature unbounded by culture in whom rested these 
impulses antagonistic to society67. Everything from personal hygiene and appearance 
to traditional recreation practices was the subject of this determination to distinguish 
nature from culture. The" New Police" were to be utilised by the local structure of 
governance to ensure this protection and segregation. Chief Constables clearly and 
publicly concentrated the parameters of police policy in accordance with the 
sensibilities of those to whom they were most directly accountable. 
b )Enacting the De/intion 0/ the Respectable: The" New Police It, Public Order 
and the Constitution 0/ an Institutionally Produced Social Outlook 
This split between Nature and Culture entailed a necessary re-ordering of 
perceptions of social space, daily life and ' public' and ' private '. For, it was balled 
upon a radical break with a notion of community predicated upon a sphere of 
commonality in which an 
" equilibrium of tolerance, mutual support and interestll ... had maintained the 
illegalities of different social strata side by side. " 68 
The rejection of this formed the basis for the manifestation of the distinction and 
separation of classes. With it went a concomitant move away from the communal and' 
the customary to the legal. 
11 Standards, once the concern of' the community' to define and defend on a 
basis of informal consensus, are now selectively appropriated by public authorities on 
Social Theory in England: The Experience of the 1880s', Social History 1, (1976), 67-92; and a 
differing conception of the role of the Sk'lte R. Vorspan, 'Vagrancy and the New Poor Law in Late 
Victorian and Edwardian England', English Historical Review 92 (1977),59-81 
67. On this see J-P. Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason Vol. 1 trans. A. Sheridan-Smith 
(London:Verso, 1985), pp.735-780 
68. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison trans. A. Sheriden (London: 
Penguin, 1987), p.273 
grounds of public security and good order, and compliance is to be enforced .. by 
official agent~ of the state ... And, second, there is the attempt, made necessary in some 
degree by this extension of state regulation, to redefine or, perhaps, sharpen the 
distinction between the • public • and • private • spheres of activity - to identify the 
boundaries of' public • space. 11 69 
It was to be the 11 New Police 11 whose activities would fonn the protective barrier 
around the new • community • of the Victorian property order and itc; conception of 
social space. 
The implementation by the 11 New Police 11 of these nonns of the new • 
community' had as its central, foundational element the Vagrancy Act 1824 sA. It 
allowed the police to stop (with the possibility of arrest and charge) anyone displaying 
a criminal intent. Therefore, the person stopped did not have to be in the process of 
actually committing an offence. There only had to be an intent to commit an 
arrestable offence. Subsequent legal clarification demanded two acts to substantiate a 
definition of intent but there was no necessity for these two acts to be separated in 
time nor to be of differing types. As a result, 
11 Simple loitering in the street was in itself sufficient to demonstrate to a 
magistrates' court that intent was present. Intention rather than action was penalised 
under the sus clause. 11 70 
This gave the 11 New Police 11 a wide and unfettered ability to intervene in the social 
environment which they patrolled. Each encounter between the police constable and 
any individual in the social environment always took place within an asymmetrical 
structure of interaction based upon the police constable's ability to utilise these 
69. M. J. D. Roberts, 'Public and Private in Early Nineteenth Century London: The Vagrancy Act of 
1822 and its Enforcement " The Journal of Social History 13, (1988), 273-94 (p.290) 
70. M. Brogden and A. Brogden, 'From Henry III to Liverpool 8: The Unity of Police Street Powers 
" The International Journal o/the Sociology 0/ Law 12, (1984),37-58 (p.38) 
powers. The operation of the stop is predicated upon embodiment and enactment of a 
practical, perceptual filtering of the social environment by the police constable. It is 
governed by a strict socio-Iogic in which its use increases with the ascription of 
unrespectable status to the individuals encountered 71. 
The purpose of this activity of the " New Police" was to enforce a particular 
usage and defmition of public space and engage in a constant process of surveillance 
of working-class areas and recreational activity. 
" This involved, on the one hand, the' opening' of the street to fully' public' 
use - the redefinition of 'communal' space as ' socially neutral' space. It also 
involved .. the displacement of these communal activities which might have taken place 
there and, by weakening communal control over local space, it undennined communal 
ability to ' police' the area according to any implicit consensual standards which might 
vestigially remain. Instead, policing was to become a professional responsibility, with 
a bias towards protection of fonnalised rights to use and enjoyment of fully public(or 
fully private)space. And those who, like children, adolescent,) and the casualty 
employed, use public space for recreation or fringe economic activity, become subject 
to the direct discipline of the police and the magistrate's court. Those activities which 
public authorities, rate-payers, commercial interests and moral guardians agreed to 
tolerate and encourage were gradually transferred from public space to specialised and 
more controllable venues - covered markets, theatres, swimming baths and the like. " 
72 
The maintenance of this defmition of community, public space and social order 
by the" New Police" led to their control over the streets and neighbourhoods of 
urban and industrial areas and the villages and towns in the counties. They were to 
endeavour to maintain certain standards of behaviour in these' socially neutral', ' 
71. See, for more detail on this, M.Brogden and A. Brogden, Ibid, ppAI-2 
72. M. J. D. Roberts, 'Public and Private in Early Nineteenth Century London: The Vagrancy Act of 
1822 and its Enforcement " Journal of Social History 13, (1988), 273-94 (p.293) 
public' spaces by the use of street powers which were strengthened, amplified and 
extended by the legislation of the 1860s-1870s dealing with public houses, (Wine and 
Beer House Act 1869 and the Licensing Act 1872), and habitual criminals and 
vagrants (Habitual Criminals Act 1869 and the Prevention of Crimes Act') 1871). 
Legislation of the late 1860s and early 1870s extended and broadened the parameters 
of police supervision, regulation and control, placing the police in a visibly central role 
in the enforcement of law. These increa')ed parameters and possibilities for 
intervention and regulation strengthening both the powers of the individual constable 
and the potential homogeneity of outlook of the police force. For, it was through the 
daily application of the categories of the legislation - vagrant, habitual criminal etc. -
that the central tenets or ' nuclear ideas '- within the perceptual framework of the 
members of the police force were continually reinforced. 
This crystalised into a structure of perception with these' nuclear ideas' 
sucking in other, additional opinions and views leading to the formation of a broader 
ideological system. The system as a whole provided the rationale for the particular 
ideas within it, and, turned towards the social environment, was the way in which the 
police force gained knowledge of that environment. It was this system which 
determined police action through the application of the norms and values within it to 
the social environment. This system was not closed for it had the ability to adapt 
. through the perception of the effectiveness of policies of enforcement. In this sense 
the system was open, cognitive and capable of learning through the transformation 
which took place at the level of the type of intervention or regulation to be adopted. 
However, the foundational system of norms and values which justify that intervention 
were very resistant to fundamental change. This complementary resistance and 
flexibility of the ideological structure was the condition for the development of a 
relatively autonomous ideological system capable of self-initiated action upon the 
social environment. 
The concentration of law enforcement in the hands of the 11 New Police" and 
the increasing loosening of the controls over this process by the structure of local 
governance placed the" New Police 11 in a position in which their clear demarcated 
role as the administrative agency responsible for the implementation of the norms 
adumbrated by local politics became blurred. With this developed the possibility to 
utilise these norms of policy and legislation instrumentally in accordance with dictates 
of their own assessment and definition of the goal of law enforcement 
The Police as Prosecutors 
The specific recognition of their participation in the legal system - as the principal 
body responsible for prosecutions - had already occurred by the time the Select 
Committee Report on the Public Prosecutor in 1856. By the 18708, this role had 
ceased to be a perceived as a problematic one with the collapse of the final attempts 
to institute a system of public prosecution in which the 11 New Police" would have 
been excluded from the actual conduct of prosecutions 73. This left the" New Police 
11 to operate in a system of prosecution which had maintained it~ private form. The 
maintenance of this form together with the fact that the initial emergence of the" New 
Police" had taken place within a structure of local governance in which they were 
conceived as the servants of the local property order led to the formation and . 
articulation of the view that the policeman had no more powers than the individual in 
society. 
By the 1880s, it had become a fmnly established perspective having 
transmitted itself into James Fitzjames Stephen's A History of the Criminal Law of 
England. The police were categorised as public officers acting in their capacity as 
private persons since the system of prosecution is one which i~ left entirely to private 
decisions made by individuals. Therefore, the 
73. This is dealt with in the following chapter on the system of prosecution. 
11 police in their different grades are no doubt officers appointed by law for 
purpose of arresting criminals; but they possess for this purpose no powers which are 
not also possessed by private persons .. .in a word, with some few exceptions, he may 
be described as a private person paid to perlorm as a matter of duty acts which, if so 
minded, he might have done voluntarily. 11 74 
The characterisation of the police as private individuals brought with it the 
concomitant denial, or, occlusion of the collective social power of the police 
reproduced both within the police force itself, and, in the daily encounters between the 
police constable(s) and citizens. Not only was society merely slightly modified by 
these police constables, but the powers they themselves possessed represented only 
exceptions to their general identity with the position and interaction between 
individual citizens outside the institutions of the state in the malleable space of civil 
society. 
The private prosecutorial form reinforced this perception since it rested on the 
functional differentiation between trial and police practice. This defined the police 
role as one entailing the collection of evidence and gathering together of witnesses 
with the trial being presented as the sole site where guilt or innocence is determined 
through the presentation of evidence by prosecution and defendant. The mediation 
and interaction between these two functionally distinct elements of the legal system 
came through the rules of criminal evidence, and, the ability of police practice, which 
elicited information, to be transposed into categories of criminal evidence. These was, 
as a result, little scrutiny or perception of the need to inquire into the conduct of the 
police in the gathering of evidence for the presentation of a case. 
74. Sir Jmnes Fitzjmnes Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England Vol. 1 (London: 
Macmillan, 1883), p.497. Stephen presented this development as one which had gone almost 
unnoticed with the gradual change in the position of the magistracy who had become' preliminary 
judeges, and the duties which they originally discharged devolved upon the police, who had never 
been trusted with any special powers for the purpose of discharging them. It was thus by a series of 
omissions on the part of the legislature to establish new officers for the adminstration of justice as the 
old methods of procedure gradually changed their character, that English criminal trials gradually 
lost their lost their origins as public inquiries, and cmne to be conducted in almost the smne manner 
as private litigations '. 
This ignored the fact that what was being created was the definition and 
transposition of police practice into legal evidence through the active creation by both 
parties of its parameters and boundaries. It was in this context that the issue of' 
confessions' and to a lesser extent' identity parades' and ' identification evidence' 
generally emerged. For, they were practices which were increasingly utilised to obtain 
evidence by the police of these offences. Their judicial acceptability as forms of 
practice which generated evidence was the acceptance of these practices as modes of 
conviction. For, the very production of these types of evidence came from police 
control over the system of prosecution. 
Police control over the system of prosecution meant that in this societal 
institution were concentrated the dynamics and nature of law enforcement The 
conceptual split between the trial and police was incapable of acknowledging that with 
this concentration of the task of law enforcement went the question of the logic of this 
practice of enforcement, namely, the social conditions of production of the al)sembly 
of evidence and determination of itl) content by the n New Police n. 
Thus it ignored the antagonism which subsisted at the root of police practice 
of law enforcement. Law enforcement differed from the observance of law in that it 
was not in itself normative action since it sought the maintenance of 
law/reintroduction of legality. The efficiency and effectiveness of this practice was 
bal)ed on the extent to which it succeeded in the universalisation of the observance of 
law. This, in turn, meant that efficiency was rationalised in terms of the achievement 
of concrete results not in terms of the implementation of given rules or the compliance 
with established routines. The premises of police action were transformed from rules 
into resources, that is, they became dependent upon the criteria of instrumental 
suitability to the fulfilment of this concrete task of law enforcement. Therefore, 
" the primary criterion for judging actions and decisions internal to the 
administration; the inputs which are sought after and used depend upon these 
projected administrative outcomes. Efficiency is no longer defmed as the I following 
of rules I, but as the I causing of effect<; I. " 75 
The operation of the practice of law enforcement in accordance with this goal-
rational mode of action created a permanent antagonism between attaining the 
conviction of the accused individual and the treatment of the individual accused. 
Since the goal was law enforcement then the attribution of the criteria of efficiency 
was dependent upon the attainment of the conviction of the individual accused. The 
efficient implementation of this task entailed a concomitant belief in the gUilt of the I 
suspect I and the concentration in the conduct of the investigation upon assembling 
enough material to ensure the proof of that' suspects' guilt. Investigative strategies 
were geared to the construction of the strongest case possible against the' suspect '. 
The subordination of the investigative strategies of the " New Police" to this goal of 
law enforcement entailed the necessary denial of the importance or credibility of any 
evidence which might place doubt upon the guilt of the I suspect '. 
This structural problem produced by the concentration of law enforcement in 
the hands of the police could not be conceived within the descriptive classification of 
the dominant perspective centring upon the division of the criminal process into the 
stages of pre-trial and trial in which the latter was the only one of conceptual 
importance. The degree to which this had become embedded and unquestioned is 
ret1ected in the perception in the 1908 Royal Commission on the Duties of the 
Metropolitan Police that when the accused entered the police station 
" the curtain, so to speak, drops behind him, and no one knows what takes 
place within the station except the Police and the accused person. It is only the 
75. elaus Offe, Disorganised Capitalism: Contemporary Transformations of Work and Politics ed. 1. 
Keane (Oxford:POlity Press, 1985), pJ05 
following day, when the accused comes before the Magistrate that the curtain liftli and 
day light is let in. That is the system. " 76 
The Royal Commission on the Metropolitan Police1908: The Definition 
of Police Practice in Relation of Charging the Suspect as a Purely Executive 
Function 
The Royal Commission's activities77 were focused upon the was in which the police 
dealt with' street offences " namely, those offences which were defined exclusively by 
the police themselves and were prosecuted summarily by magistrates. This 
represented the first, major investigation into this area of the criminal law and police 
practice, and, the Commission drew their terms of reference widely, establishing their 
focus as a question of 
" whether the operation commencing with arrest and leading up to prosecution 
in the police court are or are not properly performed by members of the Force, which 
76. Royal Commission on the Duties of the Metropolitan Police. VoI. 1. ParI. Papers 1908 
(Cd.4165). Vol. L. p.84. 
77. The Royal Commission set out its tenns of reference in section 6 (pJ) of the Preface to the 
Report:" It appeared to us that our inquiry resolved itself into two general questions:-
1. What are the duties to the police in dealing with cases coming within the three classes of 
offence[drunkenness. disorder and solicitation] just referred to?and 
2. In what manner are those duties discharged by the police? 
The interpretation of the first question presented no difficulty, but that of the second was not so easy. 
Construed in the most restrictive sense it might be said to involve simply an inquiry into the method 
according to which the police discharge their duties. Construed in a more extensive sense it might be 
deemed to involve an inquiry into the manner in which those duties are discharged - well or ill. 
properly or improperly, and efficiently or inefficiently. 
That the latter was the construction placed on the Tenns of Reference by Your Majesty's 
Principal Secret.'lry of St.'lte for the Home Department seemed certain, since he had laid before us for 
our consideration papers in relation to the cases in which misconduct was alleged against divers 
police const<'lbles and as to which he himself had caused inquiry to be made. 
We, therefore. came to the conclusion that it was our duty not simply to make an inquiry 
into the fonn and method according to which the police discharge their duties but to make an inquiry 
of a broader kind raising the question whether the officers and const.'lbles of the Metropolitan Police 
Force discharge their duties honestly and efficiently and in such a manner as to deserve the public 
confidence. " 
fonns the principle topic of our Inquiry, [and, therefore] it becomes necessary to 
consider what the duty of the police in regard to each stage of the process is. " 78 
This meant that police practice, when the defendant was taken to be charged at the 
police station, was to be an integral part of the Commission's investigation. It was in 
the charge room that the decision to prosecute the individual, arrested by the 
constable on patrol, was taken. The Commission's approach, and the conclusions that 
they drew fonn their investigation of this stage fo the process explicitly rearticulated 
the externality and lack of importance of these procedures to the detennination of 
guilt or innocence at the trial: including the propriety and competency with which they 
were carried out. 
a)The Charge Room: The Committees' Construction and Definition of Police 
Practice 
The individual arrested by the constable would be taken back to the police station 
where he/she would then be taken to the charge room. Here the arresting constable(s) 
would state to the station Sergeant or Inspector the offence on which a prosecution 
should be brought against the individual whom he had arrested. The duty Inspector, 
or, station Sergeant would then decide whether the individual should be charged with 
the alleged offence, and, whether he/she should be detained further at the police 
station after having been charged. 
The evidence of the London magistrates about this stage of the process, which 
was received by the Commission as providing the parameters of perception of police 
practice, characterised this function carried out by the Inspector/station Sergeant as an 
executive function and not as a judicial one. 
78. Royal Commission on the Duties o/the Metropolitan Police, YoU, ParI. Papers 1908 (Cd.4165), 
Vol. L, p.45. My emphasis. 
" His duty is partly for his own protection before' accepting a charge that there 
is a prima facie case that the prisoner ha\) committed some offence punishable by law, 
and it is no part of his duty to try the question whether the allegations of the arresting 
officer are true or not. " 79 
The Inspector/station Sergeant followed the Regulations set out in the' Instruction 
Book for the Government and Guidance of the Metropolitan Police Force '80 when 
exercising this function of taking or refusing charges, and the magistrates were all of 
the view that the content of these Regulations were satisfactory and that the practice 
of Inspectors/station Sergeants was proper. There was, therefore, no need for any 
reform,or, alteration of these Regulations. 
The definition of this practice of taking or refusing the charge as executive 
wa\) linked to the maintenance of the dominant perceptual schema in which the trial 
was the sole site of guilt determination. For, if this practice was characterised as 
judicial it would mean that there was site of gUilt determination which existed outside 
the trial, and, hence that the trial could not be presented in a pre-eminent position and 
that police practice would be seen to have a direct effect upon the determination of 
the guilt or innocence of the defendant at the subsequent trial. This, in turn, would 
demand some form of external supervision of scrutiny of police practice in order to 
ensure it background institutional legitimacy. The exercise of this function cannot, 
therefore, be anything other than a simply formal procedure whose criteria are set out 
in the Regulations 
Once this practice is characterised as executive then the conditions which 
ensure the propriety of its exercise have to be sought within the institutional practices 
and structure of the police themselves. The Commission view that the police as a 
social institution in which there is free, occupational mobility with those of humble 
79. Royal Commission on the Duties o/the Metropolitan Police, Vol. 1, ParI. Papers 1908 
~Cd.4156), vol. L, p.83. 
0. The structure and content of this Instruction Book are set out in the Royal Commission Report. 
rank capable of rising to the highest rank. There are, on this view, very few 
temptations to deviate from the Regulations because, if they are adhered to, then the 
constable stands the chance of promotion. With this construction of the institutional 
occupation structure then those who do not obey the Regulations are seen to be 
exceptions. This then allows those who do not obey the Regulations to be presented 
as deviant individuals whose' radical defects of character " or, ' lack of intelligence' 
are the origin of this deviancy.81 The occurrence of deviancy is, therefore, incapable 
of refuting the institutional legitimacy of the police because it is the product of 
isolated, individual acts and not a particular instance of the institution's general mode 
or logic of operation. This, then, finds its conclusion in the statement that the spirit 
and letter of police instructions were out properly and that instances of misconduct 
were" extremely rare" 82 
b) The Defendant in the Charge Room: The Commission confirms the Defendant 
as an Object of Prosecution 
When the individual who had been arrested was brought to the police station he/she 
was taken to the charge room where the constable told the station Sergeant/duty 
Inspector of the events which led to the arrest, and, the constables' opinion that the 
individual should be prosecuted. If the individual arrested made a statement during 
the process of charging this was supposed, under Regulation 198, 
" to be accurately written down at the time by the officer on duty and reported 
to the magistrate who hears the case. " 83 
81. See under beading' Cbecks on Police Action', Royal Commission on the Duties o/the 
Metropolitan Police, Vol. 1, ParI. Papers 1908 (Cd.4156) Vol. L, p.l13 
82. Ibid, p.115 
83. Regulation 198, in the t Instruction Book/or the Government and Guidance o/the Metropolitan 
Police Force' 1900, quotation from the Royal Commission on the Duties o/the Metropolitan Police, 
Vol.l, ParI. Papers 1908 (Cd.4156), Vol. L, p.116 
This was supposed to be the practice which the police followed in relation to 
statements made by the defendant. However, the Commission found that in reality 
statement') were only recorded where the individual was charged with an indictable 
offence. Where the individual was to be dealt with summarily no statement that the 
individual made on her/his own, or, in response to the reading of the charge over to 
the individual was recorded by the Inspector or other officer.84 
The Commission were, therefore, directly presented with evidence of both the 
. consistent, institutional disregard for the Regulations which were supposed to govern 
and reflect the practice of the police and the police carrying out a practice which 
contradicted the characterisation of this stage of the process as being incapable of 
affecting the subsequent trial. The individual charged, was being treated, by the 
police, as a mere object of prosecution. The supposedly consistent and universal 
application of Regulation 198, was in fact subordinated to the type of offence with 
which the individual was charged. It rested in the exclusive discretion of the duty 
Inspector/station Sergeant who was carrying out the decision a') to whether the 
individual should be charged, and, with what offence(s). 
The Commission's response was to reaffmn the dominant, trial centred 
perspective upon the criminal process. They desired that: 
" the magistrates shall be afforded evidence of what was said by the prisoner in 
the charge room which is as complete as possible. We are not concerned ... whether 
adherence to the Regulation [198] in question would tell in favour of the person 
charging or of the person charged, and are thinking only in the interests of justice. " 
85 
84. Royal Commission on the Duties o/the Metropolitan Police, Vol. I, ParI. Papers 1908 
(CdA156), Vol. L, p.l16 
85. Ibid, p.117. Emphasis added. 
With this approach, the trial remained the sole site of gUilt determination, 
whose decisions were ba-sed upon the evidence presented. Since this institution and 
its practices were seen to operate according to rules of evidence which were distinct 
and detached from both the prosecution and the defence it equated the proceedings of 
the trial with the enactment of ' justice '. In order for this conceptualisation of the 
importance of the trial to remain in place the police had to be shown to be incapable 
of influencing the outcome of the trial process. This the Commission did by viewing 
the Regulation which governed this practice as a formal rule to which police practice 
simply had to adhere in order to ensure that the proceedings in the charge room were 
without both an asymmetrical relation between the police and the individual accused, 
and, that the statement., made by the accused were recorded. 
However, this was ba'Sed on the presumption that the Police Regulations were 
rules of a quasi-juridical type which were more or less consciously mastered by the 
police, and, therefore, that the Regulations represented the objective structure and 
regularities of police practice. This, in turn, rested on the further presumption that the 
police practice of law enforcement obeyed the same logic as the observation of legal 
norms by the public at large. The Commission presumed that the social world of the 
police operated according to the Regulations and that police practice could be 
explained by stating the explicit Regulation in accordance with which it was allegedly 
produced. The codification of police practice by means of the Regulations which, by 
formalisation, gave it a logical coherence and an explicit normativity was conflated by 
the Commission with the discipline and normalisation of police practice. The 
symbolic order of the Regulations became, in the view of the Commission, the reality 
of police practice. The Commission failed to comprehend that a rule is not effective 
by itself as it depends upon an interest in obedience and this interest for the police was 
supplied by the institutional defmition of their practical goals in which the substantive 
criminal law and the Regulations simply a means to an end. It, thereby, ignored the 
goal-rational nature of police practice which placed the substantive criminal law and 
the Police Regulations in a necessarily subordinate and contingent position as 
potential resources for the achievement of institutional goals. 
By constructing this as a simple matter of conformity to rules the Commission 
presumed that this in itself was sufficient to produce I justice I at the trial. It did not 
consider how this conformity was to be produced, but merely assumed that it would 
take place with the articulation of its necessity in the Royal Commission Report. 
Furthermore, within their view, there was already an indication that a certain 
variability in this rule conformity was acceptable in that the statement~ made by the 
defendant should be provided to the magistrate in as full a form as possible. With 
this, a space was already created for the operation of the purely systemic 
considerations of the police. No new, external form of control over police practice 
was necessary as it had already been defIned as an executive function at this stage, 
and, the background legitimacy of the police of which the Regulations were it~ public 
presentational form provided the means for the Commission to assert the capacity for 
the self-regulation of police practice. 
The Commissions' assumption of the self-regulation of the police was tied to 
the projection of police practice form arrest to prosecution as an essentially 
disinterested process. Yet, the success of a prosecution depended upon the police 
building a case against the individual accused. Therefore, not only were the relations 
between the police and the individual accused essentially antagonistic, but were 
asymmetrical in that an individual accused confronted an institution whose goal was 
the enforcement of law through arrest and prosecution. The goal for the police was a 
successful trial in which the accused was found guilty, or, pleaded guilty herlhimself. 
From the outset the individual accused was an object of prosecution to be processed 
by the police and sent for a trial in which the police had an overwhelming interest in 
the conviction of the defendant. In this situation, the substantive criminal law and 
Police Regulations were treated only as part of an environment in which police 
3: 
interventions in society follow their own institutionally defined conditions of 
effectiveness. 
Conclusion 
The relative autonomy of the 11 New Police 11 from the structure of local governance, 
developed during the later nineteenth century, became the condition for it~ emergence 
as the major, collective agent of social control, and, with this, ascendancy within the 
legal system. By the end of the nineteenth century this process had led to the 
evolution of the 11 New Police 11 into a central social institution straddling both the 
social order and the legal system. Alongside this, came a concomitant development of 
the judicial view of the police as an unexceptional, legitimate and natural element in 
the criminal process. The dominance of this projection of the criminal process meant 
that there was felt to be little need for consistent or demanding external scrutiny of the 
construction of the case against the accused through the practices of the collection of 
evidence, witnesses and charging of the suspect. 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION: 
THE DECliNE OF PRIVATE PROSECUTION TO A MERE FORM 
This chapter charts the attempts made in the nineteenth century to establish a system 
of public prosecution, controlled by public prosecutors, to replace that of the system 
to private prosecutions. The initial failure or these attempts, in the earlier part of the 
century, left the system of private prosecution to develop and change according to a 
very different dynamic. By the time of the establishment of the Office of Director of 
Public Prosecutions, under the Prosecution of Offences Act 1879, these changes had 
become accepted as both legitimate and not in need of a type of reform based upon a 
replacement with a scheme of public prosecution. 
The fIrst section outlines the dynamics of the system of private prosecution 
which entered the nineteenth century. The second section deals with the The Criminal 
Law Commissioner's reconceptualisation of the criminal process through their 
interpretative relation to the Common Law' tradition' of the existent system. It seeks 
to show the divergence between the Commission's activities and Bentham's project of 
legal transformation conceived as a severing of the realms theory and practice in 
Bentham's project. Despite this divergence, the section seeks to show the importance 
of the Commission's activities for the articulation of the dominant perceptual schema 
from within which all subsequent attempt'i at the reform of the system of private 
prosecution would be articulated. With the failure of the Commission's Reports to 
find legislative expression the third section describes the evolution of the criminal 
process according to the internal dynamics generated by the changes in the reach of 
the criminal law, the development of the" New police" and other agent'S of 
prosecution. These developments, which led to an increasing police dominance in the 
prosecution of offences became the subject of concern in the 1850s with the Select 
Committee on the Public Prosecutor and Phillimore's Bill seeking to redefine the 
police role and institute a system of public prosecution. This is dealt with in the fourth 
section which outlines these attempts to reconfigure the criminal process. The fifth 
section describes the growing legitimacy of the police in their role as prosecutors 
between the 1850s and 1870s with the failure of the attempt~ in the 1850s to establish 
a system of public prosecution. The section seeks to show that this growing 
legitimacy prevented the implementation of the subsequent attempts in the early 1870s 
to establish a system of public prosecution. The sixth section deals with the 
Prosecution of Offences Act 1879 which established the Office of the Director of 
Public Prosecutions. It views this Act and the role it created as essentially a 
legislative expression and recognition of results of the development of the criminal 
process by this period, particularly the position of the police. The final section deals 
with the minor modifications to the position and parameters of operation of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions it:t 1884 and 1908 as the system of prosecution 
entered the twentieth century. 
The Private Nature of Prosecution 
The system of prosecution that entered the nineteenth century, and formed the 
material on which all attempts at reform were formulated was one in which 
prosecutions were conducted privately. The action ofthe criminal process was 
dependent upon the activities of magistrates and private prosecutors for placing 
suspected offenders in the courts and obtaining their conviction for those offences at 
trial. The pivotal role in the system was that of the magistracy who represented a 
functional differentiation from the generality of the rural ruling cla'\s. This 
differentiation, however, marked only a formal independence from the existing social 
order. The role remained tied to the social class from which it evolved and the role 
itself was guided by the discretionary and highly personalised politics of the 
paternalism of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
The activism of individual magistrates determined the parameters of their role. 
This produced a situation in which the criminal process existed upon a very small 
number of extremely active magistrates to whom the majority of pre-trial and trial 
elements were attributable. The activities of the magistrates were part of a criminal 
process which was composed of spheres of overlapping discretion. Therefore, to be 
effective, the activism of magistrates had to coincide with a decision or practice of 
activism on the part of parish constables or watchmen. Since the magistracy lacked 
the power of compulsion over either of these groups this could only be done by 
persuasion with all the contingency of agreement that implied as it usually only 
applied to single offences rather than to broader policies. Hence the activism of the 
magistracy could be amplified to confmed depending upon the uncertain co-operation 
of the parish constables or watchmen. 
The pattern of magisterial practice was one of singular, individual incursions 
into a criminal process whose certainty of operation depended upon the decisions of 
other elements within it. Nevertheless, due to the concentration of power in the role 
of the magistrate a decision to intervene remained extremely effective however limited 
the territorial extent and range of that activism. The ability to pursue investigations; 
collect evidence; persuade constables, watchmen and victims of crime into action; 
issue warrants; question suspects and gather information from surrounding areas by 
corresponding with other magistrates and goalers in other counties provided the 
preconditions for the success of this activism. 
The development of these practices could do little when confronted by the fact 
that prosecution was vested entirely in the discretion of private individuals. 
Magistrates were functionally incapable of conducting all prosecutions themselves, 
and watchmen and parish constables only I fed-in I ca'ies to be tried when fmancial 
considerations of the case determined that the rate of remuneration would be 
satisfactory. As a result, 
" not only assaults, but virtually all thefts and even some murders were left to 
the general public. That meant that responsibility for the initial expense and entire 
conduct of the prosecution was thrown on the victim or his or her family. In the 
eighteenth century even sedition cases were often left to local magistrates or private 
citizens .... And there was no assurance at all that the vast majority of offences would 
be prosecuted competently to conclusion. " 86 
The criminal process lacked a universal and complete range of coverage over 
the social order which it presumed to regulate and control. Because of its highly 
personalised and discretionary composition the operation of the criminal process from 
investigation to conviction appeared as an obvious and overtly particularistic mode of 
practice. The social construction and determination of a case wa'i visibly inscribed 
and enacted in the criminal process as an integral part of its very operation. This 
flowed from the vesting of the system's discretion in roles which were still tangibly 
linked to the sc>cial class positions form which the occupant., had come. 
The evolution of this system was reinforced by the structure of criminal 
offences and the form of intervention by Parliament, through legislation, in the 
criminal process in both substantive and procedural law. Summary jurisdiction at 
Petty and Special Sessions had a very limited sphere of operation at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century beingjurisdictionally competent to deal with only a few 
offences. The majority of offences were defined as only capable of being tried on 
indictment and were dealt with by Court., of Quarter Sessions or Court., of Assize. 
Theft, the most commonly charged offence was rarely given a jurisdictional definition 
which allowed it to be tried other than at Quarter Sessions or Assize. 
Both Courts of Quarter Sessions and Assize were located in the county town 
which presented the potential prosecutor with the additional cost of travel to the 
86. D. Hay and F. Snyder, 'Using the Criminal Law, 1750-1850: Policing. Private Prosecution and 
the State " in D. Hay and F. Snyder ed. Policing and Prosecution in Britain 1750-/850 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1989). p. 24 
actual trial and subsequently for sentencing. This had to be added to the initial cost of 
, getting up , the case which entailed gathering witnesses and any other necessary 
evidence, copying and filling documents with the court charged according to a scale 
of court fees, putting the case in the hands of a solicitor or even counsel, or, 
alternatively paying a parish constable to undertake the case with the consequent cost 
of making up the discrepancy between the costs gained from the court and the parish 
constable's assessment of the actual cost of his activities 87. 
This structuration of the position of the potential prosecutor meant that only 
those with property and money were capable of contemplating prosecution. Even 
here the costs and other difficulties of the criminal process prompted many into a 
privately initiated, but collective response in the form of Prosecution Associations 88. 
This modification still left the overall configuration of the criminal process intact in 
which the initiation of a prosecution would, in many cases, be a preparatory 
bargaining position in which a subsequent compounding of the prosecution was the 
result. Many potential prosecutors were deterred not only by the economics of 
instigating a prosecution but by the fear of retaliation and reprisal should they proceed 
with a prosecution, or, as a result of intimidation of prosecution witnesses. 
The Parliamentary response to this situation was a limited one. It was only in 
the later decades of the eighteenth century that these matters became the subject of 
attention resulting in legislation which provided state finance, in the form of legal 
costs, to those who carried a prosecution through to conclusion 89 . 
87. See, for a more detailed description of the problems which faced potential prosecutors in the 
Black Country in the early nineteenth century, D. PhiIIips, Crime and Authority in Victorian 
Britain: The Black Country 1835-1860 (London: Croom and Helm, 1977) 
88. See D. Phillips, ' Good Men to Associate and Bad Men to Conspire: Associations for the 
Prosecution of Felons 1760-1860 " in D. Hay and F. Snyder ed. Policing and Prosecution in Britain 
1750-1850 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) 
89. See, for a comprehensive description of this legislation, D. Hay and F. Snyder, ' Using the 
Criminal Law, 1750-1850: Policing, Private Prosecution and the State I, in Ibid. 
This legislative intervention was unable to overcome the structural difficulties 
of the criminal process as the attempt at increasing the coverage of the criminal law, 
through the enhancement of the economic position of the prospective prosecutor, 
failed to have any serious effect since the amount of money provided, through legal 
costs which could be reclaimed, was insufficient to produce the desired effect. The 
system of private prosecution was, as a reSUlt, tacitly accepted as a bac;is of the 
criminal process. As the parliamentary response, during the eighteenth century 
remained tied to reactive, unstructured intervention this system was allowed to 
develop and strengthen itself thereby lodging itself fmnly within the amorphous I 
tradition I of Common Law. 
The Criminal Law Commissioners: The Emerging Critique of Private 
Prosecution from a Critical Survey of a Criminal Law Based on the Common 
The initiation of a I programme I of reform, in which the totality of the criminal 
process, was its object, can be precisely located in the speech given by the Lord 
Chancellor, Brougham, in 1828. Changes had been initiated before this, with Peel and 
Russell at the Home Office, but this represented the first, coherent articulation of a 
normatively grounded basis for a project of reform. It was Brougham who 
established the Royal Commissions charged with criminal law reform which continued 
to produce reports until the 1840s. 
These Reports were seen, by subsequent historiography, to mark a profound 
break with the I old order I symbolising the transition form an arbitrary, aristocratic 
system to that fitted to the emerging bourgeois modernity of Victorian England 90. 
90. This is the interpretation given to them by Holdsworth in his History of English 
Law(London:Methuen, Sweet and Maxwell, 1965), Vo!. IX, pp. 143-163. This period was also to be 
subsumed under the term Benthamite, by Dicey in his low and Public Opinion, near the end of the 
nineteenth century, in contradistinction to what he saw as the growing collectivism and state 
intervention characteristic of the later nineteenth century (the 1880s onwards) in which he was 
writing. 
The main impetus and theoretical foundation for this aspect of the reform movement 
was seen to come from the theoretical output of Jeremy Bentham whose position -
the increasing insertion of legal and jurisprudential issues within a much wider 
political and economic framework - marked a radical break with the past The 
theorisation of the interrelation of law, sovereignty and the state; coupled with a 
mechanistic, materialist conceptualisation of the ' springs of human action " which 
Bentham put forward, represented a profoundly different articulation of the nature 
and dynamics of society 91. 
While Bentham began with a study of punishment this quickly led him to an 
investigation of actual and potential legislative principles and policies. This, however, 
led to the tabulation of all possible fonns of human social behaviour and the 
circumstances which are capable of constituting offences and, hence, the expansion of 
Bentham's project and theoretical system. 
11 A critique of criminal jurisprudence or a plan for a penal code would soon 
cease to suffice as an embodiment of Bentham's intellectual ambitions. Nothing less 
than a complete social science - a system of morals as well as legislation - would do. 11 
92 
Bentham remained vehemently opposed, throughout his life, to the Common 
Law system which he regarded a~ the origin of the problems which burdened and 
undermined the effectiveness of the criminal process 93. The Code as a fonn, was to 
be the basis and ground for the branches of criminal and civil law as distinct from the 
notions of tradition and community which had played this function in the Common 
91. See Nancy L. Rosenblurn, Bentham's Theory of the Modem State (Harvard:Harvard University 
Press, 1978) and Douglas G. Long, Bentham on liberty: Jeremy Bentham's Idea of liberty in 
Relation to his Utilitarianism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977) both of whom see 
Bentham as a self-conscious theorist of the modern state who rejected the previous tradition of 
political phi1osohy. 
92. D. Long, Bentham on liberty: Jeremy Bentham's Idea of Liberty in Relation to His 
Utilitarianism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), p.lOO . 
93. See Gerald G. Posterna, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1986) 
81J 
Law system. The Code, among other element's, was to be the system which replaced 
this inherently flawed' tradition' whose claims to natural justice and consent he 
regarded as suspect both in theory and practice. It would represent a complete 
refashioning of the criminal law without regard for' tradition' or' ancient law' with 
the object of creating a general, compendious, uniform, scientific and practical body 
of law. 
" In a map of the law executed upon a such a plan [Code] there are no terrae 
incognitae, no blank spaces; nothing is at least omitted, nothing unprovided for: the 
vast and hitherto shapeless expanse of jurisprudence is collected and condensed into a 
compact sphere which the eye at a moment's warning can traverse in all imaginable 
directions. " 94 
Central to the project of Codification was the delimitation of the spheres of 
action of the state and the judiciary in order to allow the emergence of a private 
sphere freed from the interference of public authority. The state was to be the sole 
locus of sovereignty as the sole source of law, through legislation. The basis of this 
sovereignty was itself founded upon law in which state functions were to be bound to 
general norms. State interventions outside this normatively guaranteed framework 
were not conceived to be unjust, but as interfering with and hampering the rational 
calculation of individuals as commodity owners. The possibility of the reproduction 
of society rested upon the maintenance of a background of calculable and stable 
expectations which demanded the specification of jurisdictional area') and legal 
formalism as two essential elements of the state. This meant that codification was an 
integral part, not only of Bentham's legal theory, but also his political theory, Hence, 
the importance Bentham attached, by means of codification, to replacing the whole 
system of operation of the Common Law 95, 
94. Jeremy Beniliam, Of Laws in General in H. L. A, Hart ed. Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham 
(London, 1970), p.236 
95, See Gerald G, Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition (Oxford:Oxford University 
Press, 1986), 
0; 
Bentham's project, however, did not find practical embodiment in the 
recommendations of the Commissions. This divergence was apparent from the very 
inception of this' programme' as attested to by Bentham's rejection of Brougham's 
speech on legal reform in the Westminster Review 182996. The Common Law was 
retained, but in a modified fonn. This separation of Bentham's project from the 
activities and recommendations of the Commissions, caused the bifurcation of that 
project into the divergent realms of theory and practice. The link between the 
Commissions and Bentham related solely to a shared interpretative horizon in which 
codification became unhinged from its integral place within Bentham's project. It was 
here that the split between Bentham and Benthamism emerged. 
Bentham's overarching critique of the traditional criminal process was 
transposed, within the Parliamentary system, into a pragmatic, political practice aimed 
at revamping the' traditional I system. Benthamism, and those who sought to follow 
his ideas as Benthamites, was not the some as Bentham's project. The perceptual 
schema he had fonnulated was re-orientated toward refonn rather than radical 
transformation. 
This re-orientation of Bentham's project was part of a more general resistance 
of the dominant classes' mental structures to the full acceptance of Bentham's project 
This produced a constellation, or, coexistence of Benthamite ideas and the models of 
behaviour inherited from the ancien regime. It found its most coherent theoretical 
expression in the entwinement of Christianity and political economy in the first half of 
the nineteenth century. Christianity, the dominant fonn of thought and identity of the 
collapsed ancien regime, sought to understand and find meaning in the changing 
conditions of human life - the advent of industrial capitalism. 
96. The Westminster Review, xi, (1829),448. This is pointed out by Micbael Lobban. The Common 
lAw and English Jurisprudence 1760-1850 (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1991), pp.192-3 
" during the fIrst half of the nineteenth century, the British were extremely 
ambivalent in their attitude to the unprecedented economic growth around them ... a 
mood of' change and decay' vied with exhilaration and patriotic optimism. The fact 
that Britain was perceived to be the only industrialising country, .. the fact that' time' 
was conceived as following a cyclical course which might easily just as easily lead 
backward as forward: all this meant that the supreme question, not always susceptible 
to a clear-cut answer, was whether to applaud and encourage, or lament and stifle, 
this process of economic and industrial growth. " 97 
The entwinement of Christianity and political economy was not the simple survival of 
element') of ideology that was once fmnly situated in the social totality of the ancien 
regime, and now were dysfunctional and unsituated in reality. Christianity did not 
represent the mere remnants of a previously active ideology, but the repository of 
" a preserved identity, of intangible and deeply rooted structures, the most 
authentic expression of collective temperaments. " 98 
Therefore, the radical break with the previous political and legal thought, which 
Bentham's theory represented, never achieved this effect in the mental structures of 
those in politics, and, hence in the overall conceptualisation of society and the object 
of the reform 'programme '. 
The Commissions did not present or see themselves as engaged in a dramatic 
process of creation and change in the criminal system. It was only a matter of altering 
what was already in existence in order to realise its potential which wa') hampered by 
the operation of the present, unreformed system. The Common Law was to be 
enabled to fInd its ' natural level , by these adjustments and then left to evolve and 
97. Boyd Hilton, The Age of Atonement: The Influence of Evangelism on Social and Economic 
Thought 1785·1885 (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1991), pp.65-6. 
98. Michel Vovelle, Ideologies and Mentalities, trans. Eamon 0' Flaherty (Oxford: Polity Press, 
1990), p.9. 
develop in conformity with its ' natural tendencies '. For common lawyers it provided 
a system which would allow them to conceptualise the development of the criminal 
law in the form of rules, but the substance of the Common Law system would be 
retained. The criminal law was to be translated in to a system of rules which would 
replace the existing method of inferences, and the substantive offences had to be 
clearly defined so that obedience to the law would be based upon a prior public 
knowledge of that law. At his point, there emerged, through this definition of the 
Common Law in terms of rules, a change in the source of law. Law now meant 
commands from a single source - the state - which, through legislation, determined 
the nature and character of the substantive criminal law. The criminal law wa'i now 
projected as more than an amorphous system which redressed wrongs. It now fmnly 
defined and delimited system which was to act as an instrument with which to 
maintain and reproduce society. 
However, this was the limit of the Commission's effect upon the criminal law. 
That they would not go further, becomes explicable form the composition of the 
Commissions themselves. 
" The Commissioner's included one judge, Justice Wrightman, a'i well as, 
Henry Bellenden Ker, Thomas Starkie, Andrew Amos and John Austin. The last 
three were all academic lawyers, but only Austin, professor of jurisprudence at 
London University, was a disciple of Bentham. Starkie and Amos lectured on the 
Common Law and both were traditional common lawyers.[Austin later resigned, in 
disgust, at the limitations of the Commission] " 99 
99. Michael Lobban, The Common Law and English Jurisprudence 1760-1850 (Oxford:Clarendon 
Press, 1990), p.202. Andrew Amos (1791-1860), lawyer and professor of law. Educated at Eton and 
Trinity College, Cambridge. Called to the Bar by the Middle Temple and joined the Midland Circuit 
building up a large arbitration practice. From 1826 until his appointment to the Criminal Law 
Commission, he became auditor of Trinity College, Cambridge; Recorder of Oxford, Nottingham and 
Banbury; Fellow of London Univeristy. " Amos's political and philosophical convictions were those 
of an advanced liberalism qualified by a profound knowledge of the constitutional development of the 
country and of the sole conditions under which the public improvements for which he longed and 
lived could alone be hopefully attempted." Dictionary o/National Biography (Oxford:Oxford 
University Press, 1959-60), Vol.I, p.367. John Austin (1790-1859), the first appointment to the chair 
It is this limitation of Bentham's project to the realm of the almost purely formal, 
analytical method which corresponds to the separation between theory and practice in 
that project, at the level of Parliamentary politics 100. The separation between form 
and content in Bentham's jurisprudence, made by the Commission formed the 
interpretative basis for all the subsequent operations of the Commissions. 
a)The Criminal lAw Commissioner's Seventh Report: Establishing the Relation to 
the Common Law Tradition 
The seventh report, although dealing with substantive criminal law - offences - is of 
interest as it sets out the principles with which the Commission operated and the 
foundations upon which the criminal law ought, in their view, to rest. 
The Commission retains from Bentham only the idea of the centrality of the 
state, sovereignty and the subordinacy of other social institutions to the state. This 
retention determines the critical aspect of their operation as it is these ideas which 
shape their conceptualisation and interpretation of the historical development of the 
criminal law. The problems which this interpretation identifies are founded upon the 
lack of state directed intervention and the ascendancy of the judiciary which has come 
to supplant the state in the practice of enunciating legal principles which underlie 
specific law and rules 101. This, in turn, is seen as a potential threat to the sovereignty 
of jurisprudence at London University 1828. Army service followed by work as a barrister starting at 
the Inner Temple in 1818. Becomes acquainted with James Mill and John Stuart Mill and forms an 
intellectual circle with them and others. 1826 appointed by the Council of London University to the 
chair of jurisprudence. Begins his ftrst course of lectures in 1828 after two years study in Germany. 
1832 publishes' The Province of Jurisprudence Determined '. 1833 appointed to the Criminal Law 
Commission. Resigns in 1834. Charles Henry Bellenden Ker (1785-1871) barrister at Lincoln's 
Inn 1814, conveyancing counsel to the Courts of Chancery, later becomes Recorder of Andover. 
Thomas Starkie (1782-1849) educated at Clitheroe grammar school and St. John' College 
Cambridge. Lincoln's Inn BAr 1810 and the no them circuit, K.C. at Lancaster and Q.C. at 
WesUninster Hall. 1823 Downing Professor of Law at Cambridge ... Originally a tory in politics, 
Starkie afterwards became a liberal, and in that interest unsuccessfully contested the representation 
of the borough of Cambridge in 1840" Dictionary of National Biography, VoI.XVIII, p.998. 
100. See on this W. Thomas, The Philosophical Radicals: Nine Studies in Theory and Practice, 1814 
- 1841 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979) 
101. The Seventh Report o/the Commissioners o/Criminal Law, ParI. Papers 1843 Vol. XIX, p.10 
of the state which rests upon its sole, exclusive right and authority to pass law. 
Furthermore, it is only the state which is capable of remedying this problematic 
situation as only it alone can render this area of law systematic through the form of a 
Digest. It is the Commission which will facilitate this reassertion of the state's 
centrality within society as the systematic formulation of the mass of different written 
sources and the multiplicity of precedents and principles emanating form the process 
of judicial decision-making will 
" convince all ranks of your Majesty's subjects that the laws are founded on 
just principles, having regard to the protection of all, and equally binding on all, and 
consequently to impress the duty and impress the habit of obedience. " 102 
The substantive criminal law needed to be accessible to the public and set out 
in intelligible language this' political' legitimacy was overlain by the demand for 
coherence within the system of substantive law tied to the need to simplify and make 
more practical. These principles were to find symbolic expression and textual unity in 
a Digest of newly coherent law expressed in a compact body of rules accessible to all. 
The content and import of these principles becomes clear when they are turned 
to the question of their interpretative and transformative practice with regard to the 
existing criminal process now conceived a~ , tradition '/'ancient law'. The 
Commission's self-imposed purpose of retaining, through rearticulation and 
reformulation, the ancient law appears when the Report turned to the examination of 
the ' present state oflaw in England '. They begin by legitimating the' tradition' by its 
value as a rich source of law whose richness related to the number of useful principles 
which it contained. However, this amassed wealth within the tradition was incapable 
of realisation or utilisation due to its lack of expression in a systematic body of rules 
(Digest). This was the result of the historical development of the criminal law which 
102. The Seventh Report o/the Commissioners o/Criminal Law, ParI. Papers 1843 VoI. XIX, p.4 
had suffered from long and continuous' legislative neglect '. This wal) manifested in a 
lack of concern with the systematic and coherent formulation of the criminal law and a 
plethora of individual pieces of legislation passed in accordance with perceptions of 
threatening disorder or specific types of crime. This created a mass of authorities 
which conflicted with each other and with the general rules which had evolved within 
the' tradition '. These authorities, despite the context in which they were developed, 
were regarded, by the Commission, a') a useful basis form which to start their 
examination for they simply lack the coherence of a systematic expression. 
They viewed their task a') one which demanded adherence to the principles 
enshrined in both ancient and modern law, and, the retention of the language in which 
those principles were expressed. With this body of law retained they would simply 
make the language more intelligible. The Commissioners are clear as to the reasons 
for that 
" We have acted in this respect under the conviction that the rejection of 
ancient and accustomed forms of expression, terms of well-known and familiar 
application, for new ones, can rarely, if ever, be attended with proponderating 
advantages. " 103 
The legitimacy of the ' tradition' or ' ancient law' rested upon its concrete, empirical 
existence rather than its conformity with a set of ideas or values of which it was held 
to be the embodiment 
What was aimed at was an accommodation and readjustment of the existing 
elements not the wholesale rejection of' ancient law 'and the reformulation of 
substantive criminal law premised upon the freedom conferred by a radical break with 
tradition. Here the principles are merely tools for reform rather than elements of a 
programme that seeks to implement a perspective which demands that reality be 
103. The Seventh Report o/the Commissioners o/Criminal Law, ParI. Papers 1843 Vol. XIX, p.2 
, 
judged and changed in accordance with its criteria. Rather than a Code a Digest is to 
be the product which was to reduce and encapsulate the criminal law in 24 Chapters. 
The application and extent of the principles underlying the Digest were only to 
apply to indictable offences with summary offences not included or subjected to 
scrutiny except where they also happen to be indictable offences. The Commissioner's 
choice to concentrate solely on indictable offences, thereby leaving out of 
con~ideration the whole of the summary jurisdiction, was tied to the rejection of any 
Code type orientation in regard to this area of substantive law. They were quite 
aware that his would not resemble the scientific brevity, and, regard for order and 
arrangement of Bentham's Code. Their task was merely to " digest systematically the 
existing body of Criminal Law". They chose to do this because of their rejection of a 
Code on the grounds that it was more advantageous to adopt the form of a Digest 
compared with the limitations of a Code. The limitations of a Code related, for them, 
to its general and abstract terminology which would lead to practical difficulties of 
application of the newly codified law. These would only be surmounted by the 
enactment of" subsidiary supplementary laws" which, by their very enactment, would 
be in contradiction with and hamper the idea of a complete and self-contained body of 
law formulated in a single Code. 
This characterisation of the nature of a Code and the process of codification 
was necessitated by their prior decision to hold back from a thorough going critique 
and transformation of the 'ancient law' which distanced them from Bentham's 
orientation towards' tradition '. What was intended by the Commission was the 
utilisation of certain elements from Bentham's theory for the practical reformulation of 
the existing system. 
By this process what wa~ sought to be achieved was the fixing of the state a~ 
the institutional entity which confers a cohesive unity on society through the 
presentation of the state as the legal state which produces abstract, formal laws. 
These are systematically expressed and form the basis for the peace and security of 
individuals through their relation with them. This unifying function of the state is also 
premised upon the isolation of the state from individuals in society. The state is placed 
I outside I society as a legal person/collective actor and counterposed to a society 
composed to private needs and interests. This separation is the condition for the 
attribution of action to the state since it is necessary for it to have a freedom of will 
independent of any causal interconnection with society. It is this combination of 
unification and isolation which, while creating the Digest of criminal law, leaves the 
prosecution under the control of private individuals over whom the state has no 
effective control other than by their initial defmition as legal subjects. Hence this 
11 double function of isolating individuals and representing the unity is reflected 
in the internal contradictions in the structure of the state: contradictions between the 
private and the public, between political individuals/persons and the representative 
institutions of the people/nation, even between private and public law, between 
political liberties and the general interest, etc. 11 104 
b)The Criminal Law Commissioner's Eighth Report: The Contradictions of the 
Commission's Interpretative Schema when Confronted with Criminal Procedure 
This tension becomes apparent when the Commission turns to the subject of criminal 
procedure in their eighth report. The Commission views the Digest, produced by the 
seventh report, as only concerning itself with the general provisions of the criminal 
law. This concern with substantive law is seen to exclude consideration of what it 
sees as the I minute details I of actual court practice which has evolved its own rules. 
The perspective which it adopts towards them is even less interventionist than in 
regard to its posture towards the substantive criminal law. These rules are simply to 
104. N. Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London: New Left BooksNerso, 1973), 
p.134 
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be sanctioned by the legislature as to do otherwise is seen as overburdening the Digest 
by enlarging it to an inconvenient size. Therefore, 
" the spirit of the statute .... leaves the court it'Self the framing of its own rules 
of practice ... deeming the principle a good one that such a court is best able to 
ascertain what rules of this kind will best answer the ends of justice. The same 
practice applies to the practice of the inferior courts, subject to the condition that their 
rules should be sanctioned by the superintendence and authority of some higher court. 
" 105 
Given the state's control over substantive law and the compositional demands 
of the' Digest form ' the courts are left a space of institutional autonomy within which 
to enact and create rules of practice. The institutional separation and demarcation of 
the realms of the state and judiciary are now tied to the control of the state over 
substantive law and the control of the judiciary over procedural practice. 
This separation was not an absolute one due to the link between substantive 
law and criminal pleading. The connection is held, by the Commission to be an 
intimate one which renders the consideration of criminal pleading highly expedient and 
leads the Commission to give an outline of the formal aspect.;; of criminal procedure 
from the preliminary proceedings up to the trial itself. This is important as it lays out 
the stages of this process and critically assesses the elements of which they are 
composed. The sections which are of essential importance relate to the framing of the 
formal charge and the principles relating to the trial. 
The first chapter, on the preliminary proceedings, deals with aspects of 
procedure prior to the framing/finding of the principle accusation or charge. The 
Commission sees the possibility of the ineffectiveness of the legal system if no action 
or practice intervenes before the actual formal charging of the accused. Without any 
105, The Eighth Report o/the Commissioners o/Criminal Law, ParI. Papers 1845 Vol. XIV, p.l65 
means of confining, identifying or ascertaining the whereabouts of the accused they 
are unlikely to be • fed-in • to the criminal process at all. This would then undermine 
the capacity of the criminal law to penetrate its social environment, and, hence, its 
concrete operation and existence. The practical implications of this led the 
Commission to recognise the legitimacy and necessity of arrest with or without 
warrant and preliminary inquiry before the magistracy to a'icertain whether there is 
sufficient ground for the proceedings. The Commissions indicates that it is desirous 
of a situation in which the process of effecting an arrest be under the control of the 
magistracy based upon the granting of a warrant of arrest. The condition of issue of 
this warrant would be to demonstrate to the magistrate, on oath, a reasonable case for 
, restraint of liberty'. The magistracy were to be, in the Commission's schema, the 
regulatory frame over the system of private prosecution through the conferral upon 
them of absolute discretion to issue warrants for arrest 106. It was this functional 
specialisation of the magistracy which led, in turn, to the conceptualisation of the 
criminal process as divided into classes of persons who performed different and 
distinct duties within it. The Commission viewed the criminal process as delegating 
If the duty of framing a criminal charge to one class of persons, the deciding 
upon the truth of that charge to a second, and frequently that of adjudication to a third 
class[except in summary offences where the second and third are combined in the 
magistracy]. Such a distribution renders it indispensably necessary that the charge 
should contain such a distinct allegation of precise offence committed ..... and such 
statement of facts as is sufficient to show that those concerning which inquiry is made, 
and evidence given, are the same with those on which the charge, if true is founded. If 
107 
This separation of functions entails the separation of charge and evidence so 
that to charge a person is not sufficient by itself to ensure a conviction. Evidence on 
106. The Eighth Report o/the Commissioners o/Criminal Law, ParI. Papers 1845 VoI.XJV, pp. 166-
168 
107. Ibid, p.l68 
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the basis of facts is required to further substantiate and determine the validity of the 
charge. Therefore, there is a need to collect evidence and witnesses for this purpose, 
but this process is carried out by a separate person or persons from both the process 
of charging and adjudication. The differentiation and specialisation that this creates in 
the criminal process has the consequence of dividing it into elements whose unity is 
conferred by a notion of coherence predicated upon a schema of definition and 
systematisation of function. Its unity and legitimacy is thereby located in an external 
source. This external source is the formal schema which overlays the criminal process 
and confers its sense of efficacy. 
The extent to which this notion of coherence is formal is clearly revealed when 
the Commission come to deal with these principles relating to the trial. When the 
Commission broaches the subject of evidence it quickly separates rules of procedure 
from rules of evidence. To the Commission, the 
" principles and rules of evidence on civil and criminal calles are substantially 
the same, it WOUld, we conceive, be inconvenient to incorporate them with these rules 
of procedure .... We have, therefore, limited the Digest to the course of the proceeding 
as regards the order of proof, and general rules which regulate the oaths and number 
of witnesses. "108 . 
The dichotomy between procedure and evidence flows from the formal and abstract 
level on which the Commission operates, and, reafftrms this level a..; the one upon 
which the systematic consistency of the criminal process is to be both conceived and 
practically established. Methods of evidence collection and the control over the 
process of that collection disappear from consideration and fall outside the scrutiny 
and definition of the Commission's project. Since the sphere of the Digest relates to a 
view of the criminal process founded upon the horizon of pleadings and order of 
proof the informational dependence of these forms upon evidence is neglected insofar 
108, The Eighth Report o/the Commissioners o/Criminal Law, ParI. Papers 1845 Vol. XIV, p.l78 
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as it is a concrete process of the gathering and fonnulation of factual material needed 
to substantiate the pleading. 
The limitation of the Commission's focus to this perspective relates to its 
wider purpose of re-establishing and re-asserting the dominance of the state. The 
decline which the state had suffered because of its ' legislative neglect I of the criminal 
law was to be halted and itS pre-eminence refounded through the enactment of the 
Digest. However, because of the constraints of form of the Digest structure, the 
state's capacity for intervention remains located at this formal level of the conferral of 
unity on the criminal process. As a result, it ha~ no control over the developmental 
tendencies and practices of the element~ of the criminal process which its schema had 
demarcated. 
This becomes obvious when the Commission turns to the practical issue of the 
prosecution of offenders. The effective prosecution of offenders, and with it the reach 
of the criminal law itself, is of the I highest importance' for the Commission. They 
recognise that private prosecution fonns the basis of the criminal process, and, that 
this is not only natural but 
" it seems more particularly incumbent upon him ... than any other member of 
society. " 109 
The Commission was aware, however, that the actual situation was far from effectual. 
The conditions confronting the private prosecutor were recognised as ' irksome, 
inconvenient, and burdensome I and deterring many fonn starting a prosecution, or, 
leading them to conduct the case inadequately. 
109. The Eighth Report a/the Commissioners a/Criminal Law, ParI. Papers 1845 VoI. XIV, p.184 
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11 Hence it happens but too often, that prosecutions are conducted in a loose 
and unsatisfactory manner, from want of the means and labour essential to a just and 
satisfactory inquiry. 11 110 
Furthennore, the ideally conceived private prosecutor, irrespective of the structural 
constraints within which he/she operated, was also far from being realised in many 
cases. Private prosecution meant individual, unchallengeable, subjective assessment~ 
of the prospect and nature of prosecution. This led many to engage in ' bribery, 
collusion and illegal compromises.' The private orientation of prosecution also meant 
that there was no notion of public, societal or state interest in prosecution with the 
result that it frequently occurred that with no person able to be called upon to 
prosecute the alleged offence could not be dealt with by the criminal process. 
This assessment of the situation led the Commission to the conclusion that 
11 The direct and obvious course for remedying such defects would consist in the 
appointment of public prosecutors .... We apprehend that a remedy cannot be provided 
without effecting a change in the administration of criminal justice so extensive as to 
require the greatest caution and consideration ... we are not at present prepared to 
recommend any specific course. 11 III 
Whatever course the legislature would take the Commission directly and specifically 
recommended that public funds should be made available for prosecution as 
inadequate remuneration resulted in inadequate prosecutions. 
These criticisms of the private prosecution system issue from the 
Commission's view of law as a creation of the state(as opposed to social contract 
theories Inatural rights theories) and, therefore, that the legal system is one which is 
110. The Eighth Report o/the Commissioners o/Criminal Law, ParI. Papers 1845 Vol. XIV, p.l85 
111. The Eighth Report o/the Commissioners o/Criminal Law, ParI. Papers 1845 Vol. XIV, p.185 
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based upon positive law. Coupled with this, and it'i essential compliment, is the 
ascendant and dominant position of the state which is the sole guarantor of the 
continued existence of the society conceived as a social order in conformity with the 
principles of peace and security. It is the maintenance of these conditions which 
provides the stable background conditions for the formation of an expectational 
environment in which social interaction between individuals can take place. The state 
act'i, through legislation, to enable individuals to achieve ~heir object'i thereby 
empowering them, but on condition that this does not inteIfere with the object'i of 
others, or, come into conflict with the background conditions of peace and security 
which represent the conditions of possibility for the existence of society and social 
action within it 
The system of private prosecution, for the Commission, ha'i come into conflict 
with these background conditions when individuals succumb to bribery, collusion and 
illegal compromises, or, when due to lack or financial means or legal advice they are 
incapable of pursuing a prosecution adequately. For, these event') undermine the 
effectual prosecution of offenders and, therefore, the administration and reach of the 
criminal law. Since the criminal law attempt') to uphold and reinforce societal 
stability, it') ineffectiveness hampers the state's position as guarantor of a' law-ba .. ed ' 
society. 
The Commission by operating with a theoretical perspective where state, 
positive law and a realm of negative liberty are the guiding perspective, coupled with, 
the radical separation of court practices from rules of procedure; concentration on 
pleadings as its orientation; and; the separation of evidence from rules of procedure 
creates a conceptual framework which focuses upon the system from the perspective 
of prosecution. The goals of peace and security were the objects to be produced by 
the reformed system of criminal law through the punishment of crime and the 
efficiency and legitimacy of the criminal process was to be adjudged by these criteria. 
10 
The existence of the defendant ac; a concrete entity in itself irreducible to these 
categories disappears within this conceptual schema. It becomes a position within a 
system pre-structured in its operational imperatives. 
Although these Reports were not the subject of any legislation, and, hence the 
criminal process was not refonned in accordance with its principles they remained 
important. They remained the source and basis upon which all subsequent attempt') at 
refonn, throughout the century, were bac;ed. This is the case even with those schemes 
in the 1870s as the perspective for refonn which they put forward is consciously 
viewed and articulated as representing various modifications to this initial perspective. 
The constitution of these Reportc; ac; the source and origin of the theoretical 
foundation and justification, of the various projects designed to institute a system of 
public prosecution, resulted from the Report's combination and articulation of state, 
law and the sphere of negative liberty. These elements represented the modified, but 
nonetheless critical perspective fonn which the existing system of criminal law could 
be interrogated. This was a conception in which law, a') a positive system of 
rules, fonned an external framework of fixed, public rules which established order and 
co-ordinated the pursuit of individual claims and aims. It did not actively detennine 
or define the common good, but merely provided the conditions for each individual's 
pursuit of a conception of the good. Law became legislation which represented 
commands of the state and were cause of social order and regularity not a description 
of it. 
Social instability rested, on this view, upon the absence of fully public 
standards and lack of assurance. Law, as a system of rules, would act as a focus for 
individual judgements. On this view, law became a transparently obvious creation of 
society and an instrument whereby social relations would be both constituted and 
sustained. It no longer sought to protect an existing social order, or, project its 
IUI, 
eternal origin and existence. The validity of law now became it5 existence a5 an 
expression of will which were commands from a publicly recognised source, namely, 
the state. They would be issued according to ' formalities' which would guarantee 
their authenticity. 
Within this social order, formed and sustained by positive law, the individual 
was constituted as an empowered social actor pursuing his object through an 
assessment of the surrounding social environment based upon a calculation, or, 
judgement of the likelihood of the fulfilment of their expectations. Social control, 
from this perspective, had an intrinsically individual orientation a~ the practice was not 
state inspired or carried out through designated agents as is evident in the 
Commission's Reports. It was seen as a' natural' and ordinary attribute of social 
interaction in which some disputes needed to be settled through the legal process. 
This sphere of societal expectation and interaction was the fundamental creation and 
basis of the system of positive law in which 
" no single political concept such as liberty, sovereignty, or even political 
society could be adequately understood in its isolation from the web of reciprocal 
relationships of command and obedience binding men together in any social group. " 
112 
As these ideas, taken from within the theoretical scheme of Bentham's political 
and jurisprudential project, became the discursive terrain of the programme of public 
prosecution, in the nineteenth century, so their coherence and validity ceased to rest 
on their internal, theoretical unity and meaning. The centre of this coherence and 
validity moved to more directly political considerations in which the theoretical notion 
of systematic, logical linkage of elements disappears to be replaced by the degree to 
which they are accepted. This uncritical, unreflective acceptance is then founded 
112. D. Long, Bentham on liberty: Jeremy Bentham's Idea of Liberty in Relation to his 
Utilitarianism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), p.92 
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upon the wider social and political conditions in which it operates and exist'). The 
lack of legislative activity on the basis of these Commission Report') wa') the condition 
which enabled the evolution of this process. 
Deyelopment According to an Internal Dynamic: The interaction of police. other 
agents of law enforcement/prosecution and changes in the reach of the criminal 
From the 1830s to the 1860s the police increasingly replaced the I old I system oflaw 
enforcement predicated upon parish constables, active magistrates and hired 
watchmen. As a result of their developing ascendancy, during this period, the police 
came to hold a prominent position in the conduct of prosecutions with their expanding 
share of the total field of prosecutions. The 1853 Select Committee Report on the 
Police was the first governmental recognition of this development with evidence being 
taken from Chief Constables themselves as to the effects that their forces have 
had(supplemented by the supporting evidence of magistrates and landowners), and, 
the obstacles that they perceive to be hindering their effectiveness and implementation 
of policy 113. This process of achieving ascendancy was an active one on the part of 
the police since their ability increase their share of prosecutions depended upon 
placing themselves within a competitive relation with the existing element') of the I old 
I system - parish constables, Prosecution Associations and private prosecutors. The 
nature and form of that competition varied with parish constables the focus of the 
most direct and conflictual interaction. Private prosecutors too were not immune 
from direct fonus of police activity with the police being prepared to bring to the 
attention of the court private prosecutors claiming expenses for legal representation 
which they never employed 114. 
113. The First Report o/the Select Committee on the Police, ParI. Papers 1852·3 Vo!. XXXVI, 
particularly the evidence of Captain William Charles Harris, Sir William Heathcote, F. King and 
Robert Baker 
114. See the evidence of Willi..-UIl Oakley to the Select Committee on Public Prosecutors, ParI. Papers 
1856, VoI. VII, p.382 
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This competitive posture whose aggressiveness was determined by the 
intensity of the perception of threat posed, was overlain by the changes in the 
structure of the criminal process in the 1840s and 1850s by the Juvenile Offenders 
Act.;; and the Criminal Justice Act 1854. These Acts allowed certain indictable 
offences to be tried summarily and led to an expansion in the number of cases coming 
before the courts 115. This made the task of private prosecution easier and gave the 
police more scope for action. 
The expansion, consolidation and re-definition of the summary jurisdiction 
carried out in the late 1840s and early 1850s coupled with the growing prominence of 
the police began to cement a relationship between magistracy and the police force 
based upon mutual assistance and the establishment of a stable expectational 
environment between them. The police gave direct assistance to the magistracy which 
confirmed their legitimacy in terms of both their existence and the facility with which 
they carried out their assigned tasks 116. 
With the creation and operation of the police the system of private prosecution 
became the subject of indirect state intervention which transcended the purely 
financial provision of prosecution costs. The practice grew up, and became more 
embedded with each repetition, of applying for legal advice and expert assistance from 
the Home Secretary. It began with the Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police 
applying in cases of murder, manslaughter and a.;;sault with deadly weapons. This 
practice was complemented by the Metropolitan magistrates applying directly to the 
Home Office for legal advice where, in important ca.;;es, no attorney appeared for the 
Crown. This led to the need for these prosecutions to be conducted by someone with 
legal expertise which wa.;; at first fulfilled by magistrate's clerks with the government 
115. See, for a description and analysis of the effects of these changes in the Black Country, D. 
Phillips, Crime and Authority in Victorian Britain: The Black Country 1835-1860 (London: Croom 
and Helm, 1977) 
116. See the evidence of James Parker, clerk of indictments, who sought the assist'Ulce of the County 
Chief Constable in the preparation of indictments enabling them to be prepared more throughly and 
quickly in First Report o/the Select Committee on the Police, ParI. Papers 1852-3 Vol. XXXVI, 
p.64 
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paying the additional expenses out of public funds. This was replaced in the mid-
1830s by the direct intervention of a public official in the fonn of the Solicitor to the 
Home Office who was assigned to assist the police. The abolition of this 
governmental position, in 1841, led this activity to be transferred to the Treasury 
which adopted the practice of conducting prosecution in cases of murder, 
manslaughter, vicious assaults and other cases involving the I public interest I in the 
Metropolitan Police District Gradually, the Treasury expanded its sphere of operation 
and began to conduct important prosecutions of the same character in the country at 
large 117. 
There was, therefore, an expanding system of I police-led I prosecutions, at 
first, based in London, and, then, extending to the rest of the country. This 
established, from early in the nineteenth century, a finn link between the Home Office 
and the Police. That system, moreover, was dependant upon the police activation 
since they became its sole source of infonnation with the choice to provide it, and 
initiate the process of Treasury assistance, rested exclusively with them. The 
Treasury wa'i placed, within this structure of interaction, in a purely reactive role 
rather than a pro active one. The nineteenth century was this expanding system 
become more and more embedded while attempt') were made to institute a universal, 
state-controlled public prosecution system. 
The Attempt at Reform: Phillimore's Bill and the Select Committee Reports on 
the Public Prosecutor 1854·1856 
The ascendancy of the police as the dominant agency of prosecution had by the 1850s 
come to be both the subject of attention and concern by Parliament Various local 
initiatives had been developed during the 1840s in response to what was seen as 
117. See evidence of Horatio Waddington, Undersecretary of State at the Home Office, in the Repon 
of the Select Committee on Public Prosecutors, ParI. Papers 1854-5 Vol. XII, pp.l68-169 
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police malpractice, and, an excessive and uncontrolled exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion and power. 
The debate over the police and their legitimate role centred upon the issues of 
costs, deals struck with ' low' attorneys and their general presence as prosecutors at 
the trial. The response of Liverpool and Leeds (which directly followed Liverpool's 
example) to this situation was to establish a system oflocal, public management of 
prosecutions controlled by the Municipal Borough Council. The system developed in 
Liverpool consisted of the magistrates binding over the Chief Constable to prosecute 
the case. This, however, was merely formal as the process of binding over marked the 
transference of the case to the Town Clerk who then managed the prosecution from 
that point onwards 118. The concern which this change sought to satisfy was the 
agreements which pOlice constables and attorneys were making under the tenns of 
which police constables would take fees from the attorney in return for the police 
constable giving him a retainer. In other words, to guarantee a steady and sure supply 
of business for these attorneys. Since the basis of prosecution still rested upon costrs 
and the amount that could be extracted from the court there was an enonnous 
incentive to conduct frivolous prosecutions and increase the number of witnesses for 
the prosecution in order to swell the total costs of prosecution. Alternatively, 
prosecutions could easily be conducted and brought to a successful conclusion against 
people who could be brought within the tenns of the growing body of criminal law 
which sought to deal with specific social groups such as vagrant~, prostitutes, beggars 
and the' idle' poor 119. The ease with which this could be done opened up the 
possibility and facilitated the framing of false and/or malicious prosecutions. 
The exponents of public prosecution or control over the system of police 
prosecution sought to confine the police to a role of gathering evidence and witnesses 
118. See the evidence of Thomas Ellis, Recorder of Leeds, in The Report of the Select Committee on 
Public Prosecutors, ParI. Papers 1854-5 Vol. XII, pp. 33-34 
119. See, for the practice of maliciously/falsely prosecuting people under the Vagrancy Act 1824 as' 
trrunps 'in Wales, Cheshire, GIoustershire and St.1ffordshire, D. Jones, Crime, Protest, Community 
and Police in the Nineteenth Century (London: RoutIedge, 1982), p.196 
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the validity and strength of which would be assessed at trial. The desire to confine the 
police to this role stemmed from a framework which perceived arrest, charge and trial 
to be distinct and distinguishable stages carried on by different elements within the 
criminal process. It was this differentiation which maintained the utility, coherence 
and legitimacy of the criminal process and de-differentiation by the accumulation of 
functions by one element, namely the police, threatened this. This separation of 
elements found its origin in the Report of the Commissioners on the Criminal Law 
whose views had become the dominant way in which the criminal process was 
conceived. It projected, due to its location of law in the operation of the state rather 
than in concepts of natural law or social contract, a purely formal unity of the legal 
system itself whose substantial validity rested solely upon the exclusive capacity and 
ability of the state to issue commands in the form of law. 
These commands sought to maintain a situation of peace and security in which 
individual social actors could pursue their particular objects. Peace and security was 
achieved by the criminal law providing clear, publicly accessible substantive laws of 
which all citizens would be aware and, therefore, cognisant of the sphere of society 
within which they could operate freely without undermining the very basis of that 
society. This realm of action was negatively constituted in that its very existence was 
a result not of a substantive and unalterable right, but of being the contingent 
remainder left after the framing of society within and by the commands of the state 
through law. Hence, individuals subsisted within a field of I negative liberty I whose 
very basis and continuance rested upon an always uncertain future of state activity. 
Any concentration of social power outside and independent of the state which, 
under the framework of the Benthamite interpretative horizon, is to be the sole source 
of social power, through positive law, represents both a challenge and an illegitimate 
entity. It is exactly under these terms that the police were conceived. However, this 
illegitimacy extended only to the role which they had come to adopt within the 
110 
criminal process as prosecutors. For, they owed their creation to the state either 
directly as in the case of the Metropolitan Police, or, indirectly by legislation which 
devolved power on groups to establish police forces (Municipal Reform Act 1835, 
County Police Acts 1839/40 and the County and Borough Police Act 1856). 
Their contribution to the maintenance of security and peace was not in dispute 
as was attested to by the evidence of the 1853 Select Committee Report on the 
Police, and further reiterated at various points in the Report from the Select 
Committee on the Public Prosecutors 120. What was, however, was their role as 
prosecutors which was sought to be removed by the definition and strict confinement 
to the collection of evidence and the gathering of witnesses. This accorded with a 
conceptual division between the notions of' legal' and' non-legal' in which' legal' 
was exclusively determined by the search for truth at the trial, and, the conduct of the 
case up to that point by the legal profession. This confinement of the police was 
entwined with an assertion fo the nature of their legal existence, through positive law, 
namely as subordinate officers in the administration of public justice whose form and 
content is to be determined by within the institutions of the state not by the police. 
Prosecutions conducted by the police were engendering a situation in which the 
administration of justice was being determined by them rather than by the imperatives 
of the state - the centre and condition of possibility of society. 
This perception of a threat, from the police, to this societal configuration is 
very clear from the Select Committee Report on Public Prosecutors of 1854/5. Yet, 
the articulation and content of that threat varies with the position which the person 
giving the evidence held within the criminal process. The pattern is of a gradual 
widening out and generalisation of the threat as the position the person holds becomes 
more prominent and important Magistrates, magistrate's clerks and prosecution 
120. See the evidence of Mr. Francis Hobler, Solicitor in the City of London, p.141; Horatio 
Waddington, Undersecretary of State at the Home Office, p.l60; Mr. Horace Avory, Clerk of 
Indictments on the Home Circuit, p.l86; The Right Honourable Lord Campbell, Lord Chief Justice, 
p.73 in The Report of the Select Committee on Public Prosecutors, ParI. Papers 1854·5 Vol. XII 
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solicitors perceived the threat to be towards the role they themselves played in--the 
criminal process with this threat being made more universal by it') assertion as a 
challenge to the criminal process itself. It was the Attorney General and the 
Undersecretary of State at the Home Department who, because of their position 
within and representation of the institutions of the state, located and assessed the 
threat, posed by the police as prosecutors, to be against the criminal process 
considered as an entity in itself. 
" policemen should be kept strictly to their functions a') policemen, as persons 
to be apprehended, and to have the custody of prisoners, and not as persons who are 
to mix themselves up in the conduct of prosecutions .... As it stands now, I believe 
there is often injustice done and a great deal of dissatisfaction produced ... .I think one 
should endeavour, as much as possible, to make the administration of justice find its 
immediate response of satisfaction in the minds of the persons who observe what is 
going on .... , therefore, I certainly am very strongly of the opinion, that prosecution 
would be more satisfactorily conducted if we had someone to intervene between the 
apprehension of the prisoner and the bringing of the case of court." 121 
The solution sought was to confine the police to the' non-legal' realm within 
which they were seen to be carrying out legitimate and effective activities. The 
removal of their presence within the 'legal' realm had the consequence of denying the 
, legal' character of police action and, therefore, the scrutiny of that activity itc;elf. 
For, this denial operated to place the police on the same perceptual terms as private 
persons who, through directly suffering from the activity of another(s), seek a remedy 
by means of the criminal law. Police practices of evidence collection and gathering of 
witnesses were thereby conferred with a competence and legitimacy as a result of the 
prior definition of the legitimate function of the police, in this' non-legal' realm, of 
which these practices represented the concrete fulfilment. 
121. Evidence of Sir A. Cockburn, Attorney General, in The Report of the Select Committee on 
Public Prosecutors, Pari. Papers 1854·5 Vot. XII, p.195 
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The development and crystallisation of this perceptual outlook in the Report 
which conceived the role and activity of the police in this way would have produced a 
system of public prosecution which would have reproduced, on a national scale, that 
system of prosecution which had evolved under local control in Liverpool and Leeds 
during the 1840s. It was these systems which the Committee sought to gain both an 
understanding and an evaluation of their advantages since they represented the only 
concrete instances of systems of prosecution not determined by private prosecutors. 
The response of these cities to the system of private prosecution and the attendant 
conceptualisation of both that system, and, the one which they replaced it with 
displayed the way in which this perception of the police, and, the changes in the 
system of prosecution which it engendered rendered the police increasingly 
unproblematic. 
The system in both Liverpool and Leeds had, by the time of the Select 
Committee Report, developed into a situation in which all cases were submitted to the 
Town Clerk responsible for managing prosecutions after the case had been brought by 
the police to the magistrate's court and it had been committed for trial by the 
magistrate(unless it was an important case such as murder, manslaughter etc. in which 
instance the Town Clerk would have the case submitted to him before committal). It 
was at this point that the police' dropped-out' of the prosecution process and the 
Town Clerk would conduct the case either himself, or, by attorneys employed by the 
borough council. Control over the police in these systems was conceived and defined 
by the necessity to secure the exercise of discretion over the conduct of prosecutions. 
The Town Clerk, therefore, replaced the police as the element who now exercised this 
discretionary power of conducting prosecutions. The police were now placed out~ide 
the legal system, as defined by this perspective, since they no longer appeared in the 
role of prosecutor at the trial. 
II~ 
This disappearance of the police from the role of visible prosecutor confined 
the ambit, and hence, legitimacy of the role of the police to that of the collection of 
evidence and the gathering of witnesses. These were not to be the subject of scrutiny 
themselves as this adjustment to the system of prosecution was founded on a notion 
of control focused exclusively upon the severing of the roles of prosecutor and 
collector of evidence flowing, ac; it did, from the desire to strengthen the legitimacy 
and efficiency of the system of prosecution. The Town Clerk and his attorneys now 
conducted the prosecution, and, as the evidence of Henry WaIter, the Town Clerk of 
Liverpool, made clear this was not a disinterested process 
Q.2795 " Are you the judge of the evidence which is requisite?- I am, and I 
also draw all the indictments." 
Q.2799 " There are certain cases I suppose which you do not prosecute, 
because the evidence is insufficient?- Very few; the prisoners are very frequently 
committed on more than one case, and I select the best case. " 
Q.2800 " Supposing a man is brought before you with only one charge, and 
you think the evidence insufficient, you dismiss the cac;e I suppose?- No, I suggest on 
the brief there is not sufficient evidence, but it still goes before the grand jury. " 122 
Since this role was no longer played by the police, who were characterised as having a 
personal interest in conviction, it was now projected as one underpined by the desire 
to establish the truth. Here disinterested I professional ethics I is counterposed to a 
police I practice I which seeks conviction. As Henry Waiter affirmed in reply to the 
Committee: 
122. Evidence of Henry Walter, Town Clerk of Liverpool responsible for managing criminal 
prosecutions, in The Report of the Select Committee on Public Prosecutors, ParI. Papers 1854-5 Vol. 
XII, p.235 
Q.2805 " You are actuated simply by a desire to ascertain the truth, and not to 
procure a conviction?- Certainly. 11 123 
However, what was never questioned or alluded to was the fact that the nature 
and logic of this notion of truth remained entirely dependent upon information with 
which to initiate a prosecution. The Town Clerks did not collect or gather 
information since this was not defined a'i a ' legal' activity and, therefore, within the 
parameters of their operation. It was the police, removed from their role as 
prosecutors, and located and defined as responsible for the' non-legal' task of 
information collection, who were the element who provided the information to the 
Town Clerks. Their role as prosecutors had been removed, but not their control over 
the information which made a prosecution possible and on which the Town Clerks 
were dependent. This control over information, exercised by the police, was not 
thought to be problematic as it was incapable of recognition under the conceptual 
schema within which this system had been produced. Due to the fact that the case of 
the prosecution was seen to be made out by the Town Clerk, this conceptualisation of 
the criminal process portrayed the police as engaged in a simple, uncomplicated and 
unremarkable process in which, due to the attribution of these characteristics to the 
process of collection, the material which wac; accumulated was perceived as a mass of 
information from which the Town Clerk would select and thereby establish the basis 
for the case for the prosecution. That the Town Clerk's ability of select, and the 
selections that would be made, could already be structured or predetermined by the 
nature of the process of collection, under the control of the police, was never 
something capable of being thought from this perspective. 
A concomitant product of this perspective was that the police practice in the 
collection of this mass of information then became something which, since it was 
characterised all unproblematic in itself, did not need any , legal' attention directed 
towards the process by which it was obtained. For, this characterisation of the 
123. Ibid, p.235 
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progress of a prosecution meant that if only attained the status of t legal t when the 
accused appeared before the magistrate as Thomas Ellis, Recorder of Leeds, made 
clear 
Q.215 " As I understand, the preliminary examinations take place always at the 
police office?- Yes; that is to say it is in the same building as the police office; it is 
really in the court. " 
Q.216 " By police officers?- Not the preliminary examinations upon which the 
prisoner is bound over. The examinations which I see are those which go on before 
the magistrate; the police get the heads of them; I suppose they must take down 
memoranda for their own information; they are not technical document'i. " 124 
It was the evolution of the system in Liverpool and Leeds, with it'i 
accompanying conceptualisation which projected a particular t resolution t of the issue 
of the legitimate placing and parameters of activity of the " New Police", which 
represented, for the Select Committee of 1854-5, the realisation of a scheme of public 
prosecution, albeit at a local level. This, with the other evidence collected by the 
Select Committee, was formed, by Phillimore(an M.P. and member of the Select 
Committee) in 1855, into a Bill to establish a system of public prosecution which was 
to be the solution to the role of the police. They had, by assuming the role of 
prosecutors, rendered their status problematic as this activity was seen as an 
interference with the aims of the criminal process. The police had a degree of visible 
social power which needed to be reduced 
" The Crown, indeed, was the nominal prosecutor, but the consequence was 
that we gave to policemen, to a class amongst whom were to be found some of the 
most hardened and profligate of mankind, and over whom incessant vigilance was 
requisite to prevent flagrant and cruel abuses of their authority, we gave to these men 
124, The Report of the Select Committee on Public Prosecutors, ParI. Papers 1854-5 Vol. XII, p.35 
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an unlimited power of pardon and connivance; and we entrusted them with an 
authority which in every country but England was regulated with as much anxiety as 
the functions of the Judge himself. " 125 
Phillimore's Bill failed to be enacted ac; legislation, but the issue of public 
prosecution continued to subsist within the frame of political concerns. Its collapse 
had placed the issue directly on the terrain of Parliamentary concerns. This was 
formalised and institutionalised by the appointment of another Select Committee on 
Public Prosecutors which gave its report in 1856. The inquiry was divided into three 
areas of investigation: the state of the system of conducting criminal cases and its 
failings, the state of the system where public prosecution operates and the assessment 
of proposals of reform submitted to the Committee 126. The evidence was from the 
same persons who had given evidence to the earlier Select Committee and led the 
1856 Committee to conclude that 
" Your Committee are unanimous in thinking that the state of things referred 
to in the foregoing evidence is greatly defective, and urgently requires amendment. " 
127 
The plan of amendment recommended by the Committee consisted of the 
appointment of a national network of agents who were to prepare and conduct the 
pre-trial proceedings. These agents were to be attorneys of not less than 7 years 
standing who were to be paid a government salary and not allowed to engage in 
private practice. They were to have both a reactive and proactive role instituting 
proceedings where no steps had been taken to prosecute, or, take over a prosecution 
which had already been instituted. These agents were then to choose the counsel to 
conduct the case at the Quarter Sessions or Assizes. Supervision of the district agents 
was to be the duty of the Attorney General as, in the Committee's view 
125. Parliamentary Debates, H.C. (3rd. ser.), col. 1651 (1855) John George Pbillimore 
126. The Report of the Select Committee on Public Prosecutors, ParI. Papers 1856 Vol. VII, p.349 
127. Ibid, p.354 
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" any scheme for conducting public prosecutions should centre in the 
Attorney-General, as the state prosecutor, we recommend that these advising counsel 
[appointed on the basis of having had 10 years experience to the same area a~ each 
district agent] should be instructed to communicate with and act under the directions 
of the Attorney-General, forming, as it were, the staff of that officer in the 
administration of Criminal Justice. " 128 
Private interest was, under the existent system, in control of the process of 
prosecution with the administration of justice structured by the self-regarding 
behaviour of individuals. The validity of the state, as condensed in the concept of 
sovereignty and the rule of law, wa~ being subverted by this accretion of social power 
within the sphere of individual action. The state, as conceived from within the 
conceptual framework of Benthamism, was the only entity which could make the law 
through the process of legislation. Its ability to make law entailed its ability to be 
conceived as sovereign, and, this law based state operated in a society which it 
governed, by the use of law, to attain the fundamental background conditions and 
guarantees of peace and security encapsulated in the notion of social order. The 
social order was threatened by those acts designated by criminal law as offences. It 
had to be prevented by punishment which would nave the effect of deterring both the 
individual offender from the commission of subsequent criminal act~, and, all potential 
offenders who would realise that because of the pain that would be inflicted upon 
them, should the actually carry out a criminal act, they should avoid committing those 
considered act~. The practical medium through which offence and punishment were 
to be joined was the criminal process. It wa~ the operation of this which determined 
the degree of realisation of the Benthamite rationale of punishment and social order. 
The most essential interests of society were embedded in this process - its validity in 
Bentham's terms. 
128. Ibid, p.355 
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The control, by private prosecutors, over the initiation of prosecutions 
threatened the conceptual and practical coherence of this Benthamite perspective. 
The failure to apply sanctions when norms were violated undermined the' habit of 
obedience' which formed the empirical link between validity as a system of norm 
creation, under the principle of sovereignty, and as efficacy - the maintenance of 
effective order. The' habit of obedience' is undermined in the individuals who initiate 
prosecutions, and, in those who are accused of the violation of norms since they go 
unpunished under a system which leads to the private individual seeking only her/his 
particular satisfaction through the criminal process. Prosecution was an essentially 
pragmatic operation - a position from which a subsequent bargaining position would 
be strengthened rather than a determined and unswerving desire to bring the accused 
to trial and for that person to be punished. 
Yet, despite this continuing Benthamite foundation of the demands for a 
system of public prosecution the practical configuration of the 1856 scheme attested 
to the increasing severance between theory and practice. The Benthamite project, 
already reduced in its impetus by the redefinition of its aims by the Criminal Law 
Commissioners during the 1830s and 1840s, now subsisted within a political context 
in which compromise determined its operation. The clarity of Bentham's link between 
theory and practice wa') overturned by a political pragmatism in which reality was no 
longer to be the terrain for the realisation of that theory. The theory now 
subordinated itself to a reality made resistant through the recognition of interests 
necessitating the tempering of the process of the unfolding of the central direction of 
the state. 
The interest') recognised as forcing a compromise in the otherwise centrally 
controlled and administered plan of public prosecution were those of the legal 
profession, particularly barristers (counsel), who were to be employed by the district 
agents to conduct ca')es. The Committee were unwilling to concentrate the conduct 
If' 
of prosecutions at the trial in the hands of the advising counsel to be appointed under 
the scheme 129. A' compromise position' was to be achieved in which barristers 
engaged in private practice were still to be an integral part of the new system. The 
Bar, which organised, unified and articulated the collective identity of barristers, wali 
seen by the Committee as an group who were to be recognised within the proposed 
scheme by the retention of a significant element of private social power. The plan 
faltered at thorough-going change based upon complete replacement of a private 
prosecution system with that of a state prosecution system. The changes at a local 
level, wrought by the boroughs of Liverpool and Leeds, in the system which had so 
impressed the Committee of 1854-5 now ceased to be the model to be directly 
implemented on a national scale. 
The attenuation and blunting of the Benthamite project - so clear in the 1856 
Committee's plan - was one aspect of the evolution of the public prosecution issue. 
The other wali the way in which the issue led to a particular conception of the criminal 
process itself in which gaps and lack of comprehension tended to crystalise in an 
increac;ingly permanent framework in which misrecognition became the basis for the 
conception of the operation of certain elements of the criminal process. Many of 
these were to remain to dominate subsequent conceptions of the criminal process 
despite changes in the orientation of the project of prosecution. 
The Committee Report rearticulates the need to deal with the presence of the 
police as prosecutors and propounds the solution in the form of public prosecution. 
The process involves redefinition of the divide between legal and non-legal which is to 
be concretely enacted by the removal of the police from the role of prosecutors, and, 
their replacement by district agents and barristers. The police are now placed firmly in 
the non-legal category outside the legal system thereby having overcome the problem 
that the police posed within this perspective. The identity of the criminal process now 
129. The Report a/the Select Committee on Public Prosecutors, ParI. Papers 1856 Vol. VII, pp,355-
356 
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entails a self-description which does not include the police. However, it failed to 
conceive that this very process of differentiation of criminal process from the police 
entailed not its independence from them, but simply a perceptual transfonnation in 
their interrelation. For, the criminal process remained dependent upon the police for 
the introduction of people into the criminal process, and, the information on which 
their subsequent trial would be based. The inability to conceive this interconnection 
rendered benign the practices of arrest, charge, evidence collection, gathering 
witnesses and the questioning of the accused engaged in by the police. This was to be 
an enduring element of the subsequent conception of the police despite the changes in 
the nature of the criminal process in the 1870s. 
Another enduring element, which emerged in the Report, was the way in 
which the summary jurisdiction was understood and projected. The Report itself 
represented reaffirmation of its neglect by the Criminal Law Commissioners in the 
1830s and 1840s. Summary jurisdiction was defined by the 1856 Report as an area in 
which little intervention would be necessary as the magistrate would have little 
difficulty in dealing with it They were not considered to be offences capable of 
challenging the underlying social conditions of security and peace, but were simply 
irritating interruptions which could be dealt with without difficulty. It was here that 
the' ideology of triviality', identified by McBarnet as an integral part of the modern 
conception of summary jurisdiction 130, had its origin and became increasingly 
embedded during the nineteenth century. It rested upon the projection of indictable 
offences as both more prominent and numerous. Yet, this projection had been cut 
loose from any confonnity with reality by the mid-1840s and 1850s with the reforms 
in summary jurisdiction. These led to an expansion in the numbers of people 
prosecuted, and, an increac;ing preference among prosecutors to utilise the summary 
jurisdiction as opposed to the indictable jurisdiction. As Thomac; Puckle, Chairman of 
Quarter Sessions at Newington, told the Committee in 1856 
130. D. McBarnet, Conviction: Law, State and the Construction of Justice (London: Macmillan. 
1983) 
''-I 
11 How many prisoners, on average, do you try in the Quarter Sessions? Up to last 
year, we have tried something bordering on a thousand annually; but now it is 
reduced, I think, more than one half, in consequence of the summary jurisdiction of 
the magistrate in cases of felony. " 131 
Trial by jury was already a universalist pretension with this two-tier system in place in 
which the majority of cases were dealt with before a magistrate of group of 
magistrates. 
The failure of the Committee's Plan to become enacted by Parliament left the 
criminal process to develop in accordance with the dynamic generated by the 
interaction among its elements. The issue of public prosecution' dropped-out' of the 
Parliamentary view of the next sixteen to seventeen years and with it the focus upon 
the police and their role within the process of prosecution. Over this period the 
tentative pattern of relations between the elements of the criminal process became 
stable, stronger and systematic. Pivotal to this stabilisation and strengthening of the 
evolutionary potential of this interactive system was the relation between the 
magistracy and the police. 
lervis's Acts 1848/9 had, along with the charges in the substantive law relating 
to summary jurisdiction, both expanded and concretely defined the parameters of 
operation of the magistracy. This was the point at which magistrates themselves felt 
obliged to confmn the legaVnon-legal self understanding of the criminal process. 
They self-consciously afftrmed their' legal' role and identity with a concomitant 
emphasis on the ' non-legal' role played by the police. This extended to a denial that 
the police actually took down evidence from witnesses or the defendant which would 
subsequently be utilised for prosecution purposes. 
131. The Report of the Select Committee on Public Prosecutors, ParI. Papers 1856 Vol. VII, p.373 
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" the practice is, that nothing is entered upon the charge sheet, or at the 
station-house, except the bare charge, that no evidence at all is taken down at the 
police station; that the fIrst time any evidence at all is taken down is at the police 
court ... .! have never heard of such a practice of taking down evidence at the police 
station. " 132 
It was the legal system, as defIned and encompassed by those element~ placed under 
the ' legal' category of' evidence '. Police' information was not, and would never be, 
considered to be ' evidence' without external confIrmation of this conceptual status 
through the form of the preliminary examination. It was the magistrate, therefore, 
who was responsible for actively conferring this status upon police' information '. 
This process, tantamount to transposition and translation of one form into another, 
was to be the practice through which relations between magistrates and police were to 
assume regularity; a set of stable, mutual expectations and legitimacy. 
It was clear however, that the willingness of the magistracy to transpose' 
information' into' evidence' rested upon the attribution, by them, of the notion of 
suffIciency to that information. This notion was merely a threshold which the' 
information' had to pass. Hence, the ascription of insufficiency to police' information 
, did not necessarily mean that the case for the prosecution would fail. 
" it frequently happens that... when a case is brought before the justices, the 
justices say, 'This evidence is very weak; have you any other evidence to strengthen 
the case?' The policeman or the constable, or who ever is in charge of the case, says, ' 
Yes, if you will give me a remand for a subsequent day, I can produce it.' " 133 
132. Evidence of Horace Avory, Clerk of Indicttnents on the Home Circuit, in the Select Committee 
Report on Public Prosecutors, ParI. Papers 1854-5 Vol. XII, p.186 
133. Evidence ofWilliam Foote, Attorney, in the Select Committee on Public Prosecutors, ParI. 
Papers 1856 Vo!. XII, p.242 
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It is this type of relationship, developed between the police and magistracy, meant that 
should the case be one for trial on indictment a fIrm prosecution case would already 
have been established at the preliminary examination. The idea that the preliminary 
examination should scrutinise the adequacy of the prosecution case became the joint 
effort, between magistracy and police, to construct an adequate case for the 
prosecution. This then made it more certain that the cases' actual trial would end in a 
conviction at the Court of Quarter Sessions ar Assizes. The success of these cases 
meant that the legitimacy of the police as prosecutors, at this level, would be 
enhanced and strengthened by a continuing and uninterrupted flow of convictions on 
the basis of a strong prosecution case. For, the successful transposition of ' 
information' to ' evidence I entailed the sole basis upon which the courts interpreted 
the adequacy and legitimacy of the prosecution case and hence the prosecutor. 
The filtering by the magistracy of police I information I before sending the ca'\e 
for trial on indictment ensured that the prosecution case had already become I legal' in 
that Chairman of Quarter Sessions and Judges at Assizes regarded the case as being 
sent to them by magistrates and hence having lost nay direct contact with the police 
who were now involved, but not responsible for the case. This' legalisation' ensured 
a favourable view of the case by Chairmen and Judges in which it was unlikely that is 
would not end in a conviction. The Chairman of Quarter of Sessions at Newington 
was adamant that magistrates did not send calles on which there would not be a 
conviction 
" I hardly ever saw a case which, looking at the deposition before the 
magistrates, I thought ought not to have been sent, or where I did not think there wall 
a very good case. " 134 
134. Evidence of Thomas Puckle, Cb airman of Quarter Sessions at Stoke Newington(London) in the 
Select Committee on Public Prosecutors, ParI. Papers 1856 Vol. VII, p.374-375 
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This typification of cases which entered Quarter Sessions and Assizes meant that the 
issue or even possibility of police malpractice never entered the cases. As a result, 
police activities were not seen to be in need of scrutiny as their' information' was 
easily transformed into' evidence I demonstrating the legitimacy of their practices, 
and, the a<;surance of that legitimacy by the preliminary examination of the magistrate. 
This examination meant, to those of Quarter Sessions and Assizes, that cases were 
only begun with this examination and were not in the control of the police, defined as 
outside the' legal' system, but under the control of the magistracy - an element of the 
, legal' system. Police activity was again rendered unproblematic for another part of 
the I legal' system who when faced with the question of police misconduct denied that 
it occurred, or, protested ignorance on the basis that 
" these things may be constantly occurring; but they are not brought to the 
attention of the court. " 135 
This left police practices to develop according to the temporal and social trajectory of 
an cognitive social system securing its identity by differentiation from its social 
environment and reinscribing that difference as the self-identity of its operations 136. 
With this went the characterisation, by the police of crime, criminals and the practices, 
procedures and resources necessary to deal with them. 
While, this wall a process of evolution largely outside the public perception it 
was not one which was outside the knowledge of the institutions of the state, 
particularly the Home Office. The link between the Treasury Solicitor and the 
Metropolitan and County Forces had already been alluded to and continued to 
develop during this period into an increasingly normal and unremarkable practice. 
Contact with the Home Office centred around the requests for extensions to police 
powers or changes in the police role. Until the 1856 County and Borough Police Act 
135. Evidence of Thomas PuckIe, Chairman of Quarter Sessions at Stoke Newington(London) in the 
Select Committee on Public Prosecutors, ParI. Papers 1856 Vol. VII, p.375 
136. As set out in the previous chapter. 
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it took the form of representations about establishing a national force as a compliment 
to the army 137. With the passing of the 1856 Act a national police force was 
legislatively produced. It put an end to such plans and desires of Chief Constables, 
and, with the emerging national character (but not control) of the police came an 
attendant change in the communications sent to the Home Office. They were now to 
centre upon the perceptions of the threats posed by the social environment and the 
extra powers or equipment that might be necessary to deal with this 138. 
The Re-emergance of Public Prosecution: The Failure of Attempts at Reform 
Confronted with the Legitimacy of the Police as Prosecutors in the 1870s 
Public Prosecution re-entered the political system, as an issue, in the 1870s with the 
Bills of 1872 and 1873 which again attempted to establish a system of centrally 
directed public prosecution. The Bill of 1873 had had to be withdrawn because of 
too much business in that Parliamentary session. The issue was, however, considered 
by the Judicature Commission who, in their Fifth Report were to consider the 
advisability of appointing a public prosecutor. 
, The Committee were u!1animously of the view that a public prosecutor should 
be appointed. There should be one Chief Public Prosecutor in London with sufficient 
staff who would direct subordinate public prosecutors in the different districts. The 
public prosecutor was not to involve himself with matters that where 
137. See the evidence of Captain W. C. Harris, Chief ConsL:'lble of Hampshire, in the First Report of 
the Select Committee on the Police, ParI. Papers 1852·3 Vol. XXXVI, qq. 166 and 217 and the 
evidence of Captain McHardy, Chief Constable of Essex, in the Second Report of the Select 
Committee on the Police, ParI. Papers 1852·3 Vol. XXXVI, Appendix No. 7, p.l54 
138. As examplified by the issue of giving the police arms in response to a perceived increase in 
armed burglary in the 1870s and 1880s see C. Emsley, I The thump of wood on swede turnip: Police 
violence in Nineteenth Century England I, Criminal Justice History, 6, (1985), pp. 125-49 
" as a general rule, all cases that are proper subjects at all, are proper ca'ies to 
be conducted by a Public Prosecutor. " 139 
This statement encapsulates the re-defmition of the project of public 
prosecution which had occurred between the 1850s and 1870s. Whilst the proposed 
schemes of the 1850s did not envisage total coverage by Public Prosecution, since 
they- excluded summary offences, the conception of public prosecution was one which 
wa'i articulated as the opposite of and replacement for the system of private 
prosecution. By the 1870's this had changed. Public prosecution was now conceived 
as something to ameliorate the flaws of the private prosecution system not to replace 
it. Public prosecution was now to enhance the present system where this was felt to 
be necessary otherwise the system was to be left alone. As the Commission stressed 
at the outset of its Report, it did not conceive its task to encompass the question of 
" whether of not any improvement could be made in the present course of 
administering criminal justice in England; but had considered the scheme for Public 
Prosecutors as applicable to the existing criminal procedure. " 140 
This meant that the parameters of public prosecution as practice and concept were to 
be circumscribed by the recognition and acceptance of the perogative of the Crown 
and the powers of the Attorney-General as representing it, and, that there was to be 
no interference or diminution in the powers of private persons to bring prosecutions. 
Any public prosecution system would be established and exist concurrently with the 
present procedure, and, if it operated effectively then private prosecutions would 
decline 141 and eventually cease to be instituted. 
139. The Fifth Report of the Judicature Commission, ParI. Papers 1874 Vol. XXVI, p.320. My 
emphasis. 
140. The Fifth Report of the Judicature Commission, ParI. Papers 1874 VoI. XXVI, p.319. My 
emphasis. 
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The Commission's characterisation of the existing system of conducting 
prosecutions indicates the reason for the diminution in scope and dynamic of the 
project of public prosecution. The Commission, for analytic purposes, divided the 
conduct of prosecution into four stages: the investigation to establish whether a crime 
has been committed and, if so, who possibly could have committed it and whether 
there are any grounds for charging any individual; the conduct of the cao;;e before the 
magistracy after the individual has been charged where it will be decided whether to 
commit the person for trial, and whether if they are to be committed whether they are 
to be released on bail, or remanded in custody until the trial; the conduct of the case 
after committal but before the trial, and the trial. They recognised that all four stages 
were, under the present system, conducted either by the police or private individuals 
who could also obtain the assistance of attorneys and counsel 142. 
The Commission regarded the fIrst two stages as legitimately carried out by 
the police. They did not perceive any problem with the police being engaged in these 
practices and only recommended that intervention might be necessary in order to 
afford assistance to the police in these tasks 143. Little was said about the third stage 
with the main objection to the existing system seen to be at the trial stage. Here, there 
was to be found 
" an objection to allowing conduct of the case at the trial to remain in the 
hands of the police. The police are in a great many cao;;es important witnesses, and 
when a prosecutor is also a witness, there is a risk of this becoming biased in his 
testimony. There is reason to fear that in some cases the police are really biased in 
their evidence, and it is quite certain that the counsel for the defence very often 
impute such bias to them. It is therefore desirable that prosecutions should not be 
conducted at trial by the police. " 144 
142.lbid, p.320 
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The tone and approach to the existing system, and, the police presence and 
activity within it differs markedly from the analysis and recommendations of the 
Reports of the 1850s. There, the very presence of the police as prosecutors was in 
itself illegitimate. Their legitimacy was to be based upon the definition of their role as 
'non-legal' with the 'legal' role taken over by public prosecutors. The police were to 
be constituted as outside the legal system. Only in this way was the criminal process 
to be established on a secure basis in which the discretionary power of prosecution 
was located within the purview of the institutions of the state, through the centrally 
organised system of public prosecution. 
Now, the police were included as an unremarkable element in the legal system, 
as covered by the process of conducting a prosecution. They were seen as an integral 
part of it with this recognition based upon a purely empirical notion of legitimacy very 
different from that articulated, and, underlying the Reports of the 1850s. The 
presence of the police as the dominant prosecuting element within the criminal 
process compared with private prosecutors, parish constables and Prosecution 
Associations also provides the criteria for their acceptability - mere, observable 
existence becomes legitimacy. 
The definition/control perspective of the 1850s is replaced with a strategic-
pragmatic calculation of the effectiveness in each of the stages of prosecution in the 
existing system. Police prosecutions are known to take place and the fact that they 
take place no longer appeared to mean that they were a priori wrong. They were 
simply capable of being made less effective due to the conflation of the roles of 
prosecutor and witness that a police prosecution entailed which opened up the 
possibility of an imputation of bias in testimony. This possibility was also the 
possibility of the reappearance of the question of legitimacy of the police and their 
practices. The institutionalisation and routinisation of the police and their practices -
their normality - depended upon this lack of questioning. 
Yet, it was the corn bination of roles entailed in a police prosecution which was 
seen as increasingly straining the ability to maintain the legal fonn of private 
prosecution premised as it was upon a split between the roles of policing and 
prosecution. The introduction of public prosecutors would reduce the police, at trial, 
to the role of witnesses thereby placing them in the same fonnal position a\) a private 
prosecutor. With the removal of the police as witness/prosecutor their collective 
identity, organisation and practice would no longer have visible, legal expression 
thereby enhancing the projection of them as similar to the individual citizen with the 
only difference being that they were merely doing continually and concentratedly 
where any other private individual would do intermittently. 
This represented the majority view of the Judicature Commission with a 
minority view constituted by the Lord Chief Justice of England, Lord Cockburn. This 
minority view is instructive for its reiteration of the theoretical foundation for public 
prosecution, but also the way in which the memorandum has within it a number of 
contradictions which reflected the extent to which even those who still advocated a 
system of public prosecution, issuing from Benthamite principles, were affected by the 
development\) with the existing system of prosecution. Essentially, this concerned the 
dominance over the conduct of prosecutions and the extent to which this was no 
longer an issue of substantial concern in itself. it had now merely become a practical 
question of adjusting the existing system to increase its efficiency. 
The memorandum began by stating that every crime committed is not simply 
an injury to the individual affected by it but also one against the state. Given this 
effect of crime when an offence had been committed 
,~n::" 
" it ought not to be left to the will or the ability of an individual to institute a 
prosecution, but such prosecution should be instituted by, and on behalf of the state, 
through its appointed officer; in other words by the Public Prosecutor. " 145 
The present system, on the view of the Lord Chief Justice, by leaving the prosecution 
to the individual injured meant that prosecutions were conducted according to the 
interests of these individuals alone without regard for the interesto; of the state. Many 
offences were left unpunished, or, if pursued failed from lack of money, legal 
knowledge or care on the part of the prosecutor. 
This represents a standard Benthamite view of the system of private 
prosecution consistent with the outlook of the Reports of the 1850s. Following this 
initial concordance a similar system, to that of the 1850s, would seem to be the 
logical outcome of this perspective. However, it is a measure of the extent to which 
this theoretical horizon had become separated form a determined, coherent reforming 
practice that this was no longer it'i logic. These principles were now subordinate to a 
socio-Iogic of recognition of the legitimacy of the existing system and the role of the 
police within it. 
This is exemplified by the characterisation of the conduct of larceny cases in 
the existing system in the memorandum. These are seen as case in which the 
" proofs are clear, and may be collected without difficulty. The evidence it got 
up, and the witnesses are got together, and brought in the first instance before the 
magistrate, and afterwards before the court by the local policeman. The evidence 
having been given, the prisoner is in the first place committed, and the evidence 
145. The Memorandum of the Lord Chief Justice of England on the Advisability of Appointing a 
Public Prosecutor in the Fifth Repon of the Judicature Commissioners, ParI. Papers 1874 Vol. 
XXN,p.325 
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having been repeated on the trial, a verdict of gUilty is pronounced, the prisoner 
receives sentence, and justice is satisfied. 11 146 
This is seen as an uncomplicated practice which is unproblematic moving as it does 
form arrest to conviction without difficulty. It is, therefore, a type or class of cases 
which can be categorised as simple, namely, the process of prosecution moves from 
its inception with an uninterrupted rhythm. So impressed is Cockburn with this type 
of case that 
11 if all offences were of the simple class just referred to, there would be but 
little necessity for any material alteration in the present system. " 147 
it is the more difficult case in which detection and proof are more problematic that the 
Public Prosecutor is needed to actively intervene. 
This active intervention is called for in order to overcome these difficulties of 
proof of that the case for the prosecution does not collapse because of lack of 
expertise. The degree of intervention is to be dependent upon the difficulty of the 
case, or, rather the difficulty of securing a conviction. 
" What is wanted is the superintendence, control, and direction, whenever 
required, fo a superior capacity and jUdgement" 148 
These functions of the Public Prosecutor depended upon the supply of information 
form eh police and Cockbum's scheme was to place a duty upon the police as soon as 
a crime had been committed, or, a person apprehended to report this to the Local 
146. The Memorandum of the Lord Chief Justice of England on the Advisability of Appointing a 
Public Prosecutor in the Fifth Report o/the Judicature Commissioners, ParI. Papers 1874 Vol. 
XXIV, p.325 
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Public Prosecutor. Magistrate's clerks were to transmit the depositions taken at 
committal proceedings immediately to the Local Public Prosecutor with any remarks 
that might appear to the clerk to be called for. 
The legitimacy of the police in the conduct of simple cases, including their 
prosecution, that makes the nature of Public Prosecution very different form that 
envisaged in the 1850s. As Cockburn stated 
11 I have a high opinion of the police in general. 11 149 
Legitimacy of the police was no longer at issue as they were now seen as an integral 
part of the prosecution process. The practice fa prosecution wall the focus of 
attention, and, it was here that Public Prosecution was to find its domain of operation. 
It was to enhance the operation of the police to ensure that the case for the 
prosecution was conducted adequately, namely, that the model of progress of a 
larceny calle was to be adopted as the ideal for all prosecution cases. The movement 
from charge to conviction was to be made swift, unproblematic and normal since any 
impediment to this process interfered with the effectiveness of the administration of 
the criminal process. 
The police now seen to embody the interests of the state in so far as they 
carried out the practice of prosecution with efficiency. It was the adequacy of their 
practice in the process of prosecution which was to be regulated by the Local Public 
Prosecutor as their divergence from this standard entailed the failure of the realisation 
of the state's interests in the administration of the criminal process. 
The 11 New Police 11 were regularly conducting prosecutions through the 
bringing of complaints and their binding over to conduct prosecutions by magistrates. 
This was accepted by the all concerned in the Judicature Commission what was at 
149. Ibid, p.325 
issue was the maintenance of a particular projection of the criminal process despite 
this reality. The existence of the police was no longer problematic, as it had been in 
the 1850s, for the Benthamite project had largely collapsed as a dynamic, driving 
force in politics. It remained as a repository of concept'S which informed and lay 
behind the dominant political discourse, but ceased to have a direct, determining effect 
upon political practice. The years between 1850 and 1870 had seen the development 
of a set of interlocking practices within the existing criminal process between the 
police magistracy and magistrate's clerks which and become routine and quasi-
institutional. It was the embeddedness of these practices which the Judicature 
Commission recognised even in the minority report of Lord Cockbum. The 
Commission's validation of these practices was evidenced by the change in tone and 
purpose of the project of instituting a system of Public Prosecution. Validation was 
also tied to these practices' efficiency in the realisation of the interests of the state, 
through the administration of case for the prosecution. 
These proposals along with the Bill of 1873 found little strong or widespread 
support outside Parliament. During the Parliamentary recess in 1873 the Government 
circulated copies of the amended 1873 Bill to Judges in the Common Law Courts and 
to Court'S of Quarter Sessions. The judges were either in favour of public prosecution 
in terms of it being means for the more effectual instigation and conduct of 
prosecutions by the police, or, were opposed to it as it wa'i unnecessary given the 
effective operation of the present system 150. 
150. See Letters of the Judges to the Secretary of State on the Public Prosecutors Bill, in the First 
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Baron Brrunwell and Mr. Justice MelIor both support the idea of public prosecution seeing it as a 
useful addition to the work carried out by the police and magistrate's clerks(pp. 333-334). Baron 
Cleasby sees public prosecution as of doubtful assistance in the majority of cases where' either the 
prisoner pleads guilty, or the case is clear, and proved by a few witnesses, and no care is required in 
getting up the case I (p.335). Only the magistrate should decide whether a public prosecutor is 
necessary in any particular case otherwise expensive and inappropriate procedures and machinery 
would be introduced. He rejects the capacity of the public prosecutor to control the police saying that 
the I police would be more influenced by being impressed by the Magistrates a11d the Judge with the 
duty of dealing with every case fairly, and not because thery are in a case, making it a point to carry 
it through. and so to achieve success. ' (p.335) 
Replies form Quarter Sessions were all unfavourable to the ideal of public 
prosecution. They believed that the existing system of prosecution was perfectly 
capable of achieving the required concordance between the interests of the state and 
the practical operation of the criminal process. All that was required in their view 
were a few minor adjustments to the present system. Public prosecution was an 
unnecessary and expensive idea for 
11 the excellence of the police, and the tried experience of the police 
magistrates and their clerks, render the introduction of Public Prosecutors 
unnecessary, whilst the large number of cases(many of them of the simplest 
description) committed for trial would entail an expenditure heavy out of all 
proportion to the benefit.:; which would accrue. 11 151 
The system of prosecution as it had developed with the police coming to play the 
dominant role in the conduct of prosecutions coupled with the judicial examination, 
committal or dismissal of the accused by the magistrates, assisted by their clerks, had 
become the accepted and sedimented process whereby what the courts would treat as 
crime was constructed and constituted. This was a specific articulation of wider 
acceptance of the legitimacy of the police which the 
11 policeman came to epitomise(for virtually the entire middle class) security 
and order, and his assumption of the decisions to charge, investigate and direct the 
prosecution of most offenders gradually became the English practice .... English 
policemen, sometimes bobbies in court, usually Chief Constables instructing their 
police solicitors, evidently stepped into the post, quietly, and as part of the long 
process by which the English police became part of the national landscape in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. The policed society came to be perceived as 
the normal society. And the prosecuting constable, or the solicitor acting for him 
151. The Correspondence of Mr. E. H. Leycester Penryhn, Chainnan of Surrey Quarter Sessions in 
the Public Prosecutors Bill: Correspondence between September 1872 and December 1878 with 
suggestions on the Bills of 1872 and 1873, ParI. Papers 1875 Vol. LXI, p.54l 
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under the supervision of a Chief Constable, came to be taken for granted as part of the 
efficiently functioning modern state. " 152 
It was this legitimacy, of the police, magistrates and magistrate's clerks, now 
unquestioned and unproblematic, which ended any further attempts, after the collapse 
of the Bills of 1872 and 1873, to introduce a system of Public Prosecution into the 
English criminal process. The development and evolution of the' unreformed ' 
criminal process had now become an intrinsic part of the Victorian social order. 
The Prosecution of Offences Act 1879: The Legislative Recognition of Police 
Dominance within the Projected Ideology of Private Prosecution. 
The Prosecution of Offences Act 1879 established the office of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions who was to supervise and intervene in the system of private prosecution. 
The Act, and, the proposed activities and sphere of operation of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions, was not intended to establish a system of public prosecution as 
envisaged by the Bills and Committee Reports of the 1850s and 1870s. 
Far from being a change to the system of prosecution, as had developed by the 
late 1870s, it was, in reality, little more than the legislative recognition, definition and 
regulation of these very developments. This was explicitly accepted by the framers of 
the legislation in the Parliamentary debate over the Bill of 1879. 
Asherton Cross, the Home Secretary of the time, articulated the sentiment..; 
underlying the Bill's nature and objectives. Beginning with the Lord Chief Justice's 
Memorandum, to the Judicature Committee of 1874, favouring the introduction of 
system of public prosecutors on the premise that every offence is an injury not simply 
to the individual directly affected, but to the community or state, Cross did not deny 
152. D. Hay and F. Snyder, 'Using the Criminal L'lw, 1750·1850: Policing, Private Prosecution and 
the State', in D. Hay and F. Synder ed. Policing and Prosecution in Britain 1750·1850 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 46·47 
the validity of this argument(though, he was seemingly unaware of its more 
contradictory nature in view of its setting within the other statements of the 
Memorandum - see above), and, characterised it as the type of argument founding a 
proposal to establish a 
" complete scheme of public prosecution by a Public Prosecutor, and it is a 
scheme to effectuate which several Bills have already prepared; but I am bound to say 
that I can not recommend the House to face the expense of carrying such a scheme 
into practice. I look upon that as an extreme view - as a perfect scheme; but I am not 
prepared to take the responsibility of asking the Hose to adopt the expense which 
would be incurred by it, and I do not think that the results would be equal to the 
expenditure ... Admitting that all these crimes are offences against the State .. .I am 
bound to say, looking at the administration of the law of this country ... that, in the vast 
majority of cases, the present system works quite well enough for all practical 
occasions. I do not propose, therefore, in the scheme ... to interfere in the ordinary and 
usual run of criminal prosecutions, either at Quarter Sessions or with the Petty cases 
at the Assizes; but if this scheme is carried into effect, I believe that, without 
interfering with the machinery at present existing, the general tone and conduct of 
cases will be raised, and that the standard of the conduct of cases throughout the 
country will be equalised .... the wisest course to adopt .. .is only to take up prosecutions 
when it is absolute necessary, in cases of remarkable fraud, or where otherwise a 
failure of justice would occur, and also in every case where prosecutions would be put 
an end to collusively. " 153 
The system of prosecution, as it evolved during the early to mid nineteenth 
century, was now to be left untouched apart from a limited I supervisory I role on the 
part of the institutions of the state, through the activities of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions. Its evolution wa~ now given retrospective legitimacy by this decision, 
153. Parliamentary Debates, HC(3rd ser.), 14th March, cols. 973-976 (1879), Sir Asherton Cross, 
Home Secretary. 
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by Parliament, not to overhaul it according to the residual criteria from the exhausted 
project of Benthamite inspired reform. These criteria themselves were now seen as an 
ideal from which the activities of societal institutions and the practice of their reform 
could now routinely diverge. 
This divergence, in the case of the existing system of prosecution, rested upon 
its perceived effectiveness in which' interference' was unnecessary because 
" as a rule, the present system works remarkably well. Prosecutions go on 
before the magistrates and are undertaken by the police, and then go to Quarter 
Sessions or Assizes, and are directed by the magistrate's clerks or solicitors in the 
various localities. No one complains of the conduct of .. prosecutions. " 154 
There was need only for some degree of mild supervision which contained the ability, 
if necessary, to institute prosecutions. The limits of state, law and prosecution were 
firmly set by this process of establishing the office of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions. 
The state, basing its legitimacy upon the concept of sovereignty, defined itself 
by its exclusive ability to make law through Parliamentary legislation. By the 1870s, it 
had lost, form that Parliamentary system, an expansionary dynamic with regard to the 
system of prosecution, or, what is was essentially equated with, the administration of 
justice. The prosecution system, with the acknowledged and unproblematic presence 
of the police as prosecutors within it, was left to operate according to the logic 
produced by the interaction of the elements which composed it 
With the affIrmation of it~ legitimacy by the state came the reinforcement of 
that logic, and, the tacit acknowledgement that the decision to prosecute, and, hence 
154. Parlimnentary Debates, HC(3rd sec.), 14th March, col. 981(1879), Sir John Holkec, Attorney 
General. 
the sociological validity of the criminal part of the law rested in the exclusive control 
of the police. That this was tacit is attested to by the maintenance of the description 
of the prosecution system as private. It was at this point that the term private 
prosecution ceased to have any basis in reality and moved to the level of ideology. 
This move, and its continued projection, made this an element within an ideological 
frame whose function was to act as the central organising principle whose acceptance 
acted to' pull-in' further elements ofthe ideology. It did more than simply mask the 
concentration of social power, in the hands of the police, by the typification of the 
police as merely a different form of private citizen. With its acceptance came the 
construction of ordinary citizens as empowered actors, and the notion that social 
regulation is not state-inspired or carried through designated state agents(the police), 
but is an ordinary attribute of social relations in which some disputes need to be 
settled through the legal system. 
The change itllelf, envisaged and enacted by the 1879 Act, was merely an 
addition to the operation of the Treasury Solicitor whose role in the system of 
prosecution had begun in the early nineteenth century with the Metropolitan Police 
and increasingly assumed a 'national' focus of action(see above). The Act created a 
the position of Director of Public Prosecutions to split the making of decisions to 
prosecute and the actual carrying out of prosecutions. The Director would make the 
decisions and the Treasury Solicitor would carry them out. This practice lallted only 
until 1884 when, as a result of the Report of the Committee Appointed to Inquire into 
the Office of the Public Prosecutor 1884, the functions of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions and Treasury Solicitor were amalgamated in the office of the Treasury 
Solicitor. 
The Report itllelf, is also important for what it reveals about the workings of 
the Director of Public Prosecutions during this period. Sir John Maule, the person 
appointed to fill the role of Director of Public Prosecutions, exercised an important 
'3'1 
potential through the self-defintion of his role by virtue of the interpretation of the 
parameters of his discretionary powers of intervention provided under the Act 
Maule defined his' rule of operation' of the Director of Public Prosecutions to 
the Committee, as being 
" to give advice in cases of importance and difficulty to justices of the peace, and to 
Chief Officers of Police, who may apply for his advice in such cases, and to other 
persons in his discretion, subject to any special instructions which he may receive from 
the Attorney-General." 155 
He did not perceive the need for any extension to the rules, al) he defined them, al) the 
ordinary machinery for conducting prosecutions was sufficient and applicable. It was 
only where this proved inadequate that his intervention would be called for, or, he 
would conceive himself as legitimately countenancing his intervention. To do 
otherwise would be merely 
" taking out of the hands of other people, and putting into the hands of those 
whom I am authorised to instruct, duties which are capable of being sufficiently 
provided for already. " 156 
The existing system was, therefore, to be left to proceed according to its own logic 
and not to be the subject of the routine, regular and widespread intervention of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions. As Maule himself pointed out 
" The seventh section of the ' Prosecution of Offences Act 1879 " contains this 
material restriction with regard to my interference: ' Nothing in the Act shall interfere 
155. Evidence of Sir John Blosset Maule Q.C., incumbent D.P.P., in the Report of the Committee 
Appointed to Inquire into the Office of the Public Prosecutor, Par!. Papers 1884 Vo!. XXII, p.317 
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with the right of any person to institute, undertake, or carry on any criminal 
proceeding '. Therefore, as long as, people elect to carry on their own prosecutions, [ 
have no legal right to intervene or interpose, and it only when they apply to me, and I 
learn in that way that they wish for my interposition, that that interposition is well-
founded or warrantable. " 157 
This very narrow conception of the possibilities and necessity of intervention was 
compounded by Maule's view that only' important' cases that is, cases of special 
difficulty or magnitude were initially matters for consideration with intervention on 
the grounds of compassion or charity firmly excluded 158. This self-defmition of 
intervention as ' special' and' exceptional' was reinforced by the characterisation of 
the police as the major and nonnal prosecution agency' on top of ' the system of 
private prosecution who would intervene where a serious offence had been 
committed, but the injured party lacked the means to conduct the prosecution 159. 
The presentation of the police within the ideology of private prosecution by Maule 
was tied to the fact that the practice of the Director differed little for the relationship 
which had evolved between the Treasury Solicitor and the police. 
" In principle, I understand, that the present practice does not differ at all fonn 
the fonner practice of the Home Office; it is only that from your having more leisure 
and greater means of carrying it out, the thing is more fully and completely done than 
it could be when it fonned part of the general busin,ess of the Home Office - Yes. " 
160 
This meant that the predominant relation between the Director and the police 
was that of giving advice to the police, when they requested it, on evidence and 
witnesses. A circular was sent to all the heads of the police forces stating that advice 
157. Ibid, p.318 
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would be given on application. This was merely the recognition of the practice which 
had already existed, and, with it went the concomitant recognition of the infonnational 
dependency of the Director on the police. This infonnational dependency was also 
perceived directly by the Director, despite the limited prosecutorial role which he 
proceeded to exercise, as an institutional relation which the police would maintain due 
to the belief, on the part of the police that the prosecution would be taken out of their 
hands 
" They do not particularly desire to make applications which may have the 
result of transferring their bone to another dog? - Yes, that is very true. " 161 
The policy of the police was to ask for advice only in cases where they felt themselves 
unable or uncertain in the execution of the case for the prosecution. These were cases 
of evidential or legal difficulty usually concerning cases outside the ' nonna! ' process 
of prosecution since the substantive offence required a small amount of evidence 
usually from the policeman or policemen, and, was tried before magistrates alone. 
This policy strengthened the tendency of the Director to adopt the narrow self-
definition since this practice had established itself prior to the creation of his office by 
the Act. 
His role as ' supervisor' of the existing system was made entirely reactive in 
this situation of an infonnational dependency. It was limited to achieving a greater 
degree of efficiency in prosecution under the existing system, rather than any more 
dramatic reorientation, or, change in the dynamics of the process of prosecution, and 
the extent to which even this could be produced was entirely dependent upon the 
regularity and consistency with which he was consulted. Regulation was what the . 
Director himself self-consciously operated under rather than exercised over the 
existing system of prosecution. 
161. Ibid, p,324 
The Acts of 1884 and 1908: Change as Mere Ad;ustment 
The Prosecution of Offences Act 1884, embodying the recommendations of the 1884 
Report, amalgamated the offices of Director of Public Prosecutions and Treasury 
Solicitor. There remained a firm continuity of outlook and policy between Maule and 
his replacement, in the newly amalgamated position, Sir Augustus Stephenson. By 
now, however, there had become a further self-consciously articulated limit to the 
exercise of the powers of intervention - financial cost 
" The Director of Public Prosecutions hars or ought to consider not only (when 
a discretion is left to him)what prosecutions he should undertake, and their efficient 
conduct, but also the expenditure of public money involved in his action. It is much 
easier to spend public money than to save it, and with the expectations entertained by 
a portion of the public, who look upon him ars I the Public Prosecutor I, whose duty it 
is, or ought to be, to prosecute in all carses, ars to the effect of the Director's action 
under the new statute, the Director, unless his hands are strengthened by the 
regulations in the interests of the economy, will not only have every inducement to 
spend public money, but will have great difficulty in resisting the pressure of private 
persons seeking to save their pockets at the public cost by taking up carses I for the 
proper conducting of which the ordinary mode of prosecution' is sufficient" 162 
The interests of economy, namely, the theory of political economy was now to 
govern the operation of the new, amalgamated office. Efficiency and legitimacy were 
combined through the mechanism of the expenditure of public money. This process 
of expenditure, determined by a notion of cost-effectiveness tied to the interestrs of the 
tax-paying, property-owning public, wars so strongly inscribed as the guiding principle 
162. Letter from Augustus Stephenson to the Attorney General, Lord Chancellor and Chancellor of 
the Exchequer in Prosecution of Offences Acts 1879 and 1884 including a Copy of a Return showing 
the working of the Regulations made in 1886 for carrying out the Prosecution of Offences Acts 1879 
and 1884, with statistics setting forth the Number, Nature, Cost and Results o/the Proceedings 
instituted by the Director in accordance with those Regulationsfrom the 11th day of June 1886 to 
the 31st day of December 1886, ParI. Papers 1887 VoI. LXVII, p.146 
that it had effected a diminution of even the very limited interventionist perspective 
developed by the previous Director of Public Prosecutions. The accent was now on 
the giving of advice in the conduct of a prosecution. The advantage of this was that it 
did not involve any cast of the public. As Mr. Cuffe, the Assistant Solicitor who had 
the principal share of applications made to the new Director and working with the 
new Regulations (1886) governing the office's operation, admitted 
" I myself. finding from experience the usefulness of this course, have adopted 
it frequently of late. It involves little less trouble than prosecuting to the heads of the 
Department. who deal with the matter, but as against taking the ca<;e up, it saves 
money and the time of clerks. " 163 
With this characterisation of the dominant type of practice engaged in, by the 
Department, form among the options of taking up the case and carrying on the 
process of prosecution, giving advice, and, giving assistance by way of contributions 
to counsel's fees or the expense of expert witnesses, came the admission that the 
Director was 
" not, and is not intended to be, a Public Prosecutor, in the popular sense of 
the word. and in the sense in which it is used in most foreign countries. " 164 
The role of the Director was firmly established as an element of the process of 
prosecution which was entirely reactive with it'i reaction dependent upon its utilisation 
by the police. That reaction itself wa'i very unlikely to involve the actual' take-over' 
of the prosecution by the Director's office. It would instead, in the majority of cases 
be confined to advice which overcame the difficulty experienced by the police, 
magistrates and magistrates' clerks which had prevented it form immediately following 
the path of an ' ordinary' prosecution. The Director's activity became simply the re-
163. Memorandum of Mr. Cuffe in Ibid, p.l72 
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formulation of these cases so that they would be quickly re-inserted into this' ordinary 
, system in which the case for the prosecution would move, without incident, from 
arrest to conviction. 
The only subsequent change to the Office of Director came with the 
Prosecution of Offences Act 1908. It was necessitated by the amount of legal 
business having to be conducted by the Treasury Solicitor's Department, and, the 
Director having to defend appeals in the Court of Criminal Appeal established in 
1907. Practically, it ledto the re-division of Treasury Solicitor and Director of Public 
Prosecutions into separate roles undertaken by separate persons who would conduct 
civil and criminal business respectively. The re-division prompted, ac; it was, by 
internal pressures, did not lead to any change in the practices and conceptualisation of 
those practices on the part of the newly re-created Director. Continuity was 
maintained with the development of the Office, from 1879 onwards, now forming the 
unquestioned background knowledge which determined the way in which policy, and, 
the concrete practice informed by it was formulated and enacted. 
Conclusion 
These minor adjustmentc;, of 1884 and 1908, confirmed and re-asserted the 
confinement fo the institutions of the state to the enactment of substantive law. The 
enforcement of these legislative decisions - the administration of' justice' - wac; 
separate and had a centre of gravity outside the direct control of those institutions. 
The police, ac; the dominant enforcement agency, were responsible for the 
maintenance of law - the reintroduction of legality. It was their practices of 
enforcement which were seen as creating the conditions for the observance of law 
through the expected level of enforcement of substantive criminal law. This 
concentration of the potential to enforce the substantive law, through the discretion to 
prosecute, in the hands of the police was not regarded as being in it'ielf at all 
problematic, or, worthy of consideration once the legitimacy of the police themselves 
had been accepted after the 1850s. Control over the police was not really necessary 
and was made even less so by the dominant ideological projection of the police as a 
different form of private prosecutor. It only became an issue when the police decided 
to exercise the discretion to prosecute which in itself represented only a part of police 
activity orientated towards enforcement. Even here the issue only became prominent 
when the type of substantive offence charged required a quantity of evidence 
exceeding a threshold which would normally be satisfied by the police themselves. 
The gradual, but continual expansion of summary jurisdiction ensured that this was 
increasingly rare with this jurisdiction's expedited procedure and growing familiarity 
between magistracy and police. 
Alongside the attempts to institute a system of public prosecution throughout 
England and Wales, in the nineteenth century, developed a system of prosecution 
increasingly dominated by the police in which the activities of the institutions of the 
state took a relatively unobtrusive role. This developing relation between the Home 
Office, Treasury Solicitor and Chief Constables became the basis for the Office and 
activities of the Director of Public Prosecutions as enacted in 1879 and subsequently 
adjusted. It was this Act which, by its recognition of these developmentc;, legitimated 
them and formally defined the modem mode of prosecution. The dominance of this 
mode of prosecution and with it the growth, embedding and ascendancy of the police 
largely shaped the basis of state action itC\elf in the nineteenth century. 
With the acceptance of this mode of prosecution came the establishment of a 
certain configuration and concentration of social power and its denial under the 
ideology of private prosecution. The exercise and dynamics of this social power, 
particularly that of the police, and the effect upon those subject to it extending form ' 
stop and search '(in reality an arrest) to prosecution never became, except tangentially, 
the focus of attention let alone attempted legislation. The legitimacy of the police role 
in prosecution, as established in the nineteenth century, and confirmed by the 1879 
Act conferred a concomitant legitimacy upon police activity. These was little need, 
therefore, to raise the question of the activities of enforcement conforming to an 
externally imposed normative framework and the nature of that imposition and 
control. Moreover, silent throughout this whole period are the interests and 
perspectives of the defendant who disappears as a substantive issue one the question 
of public prosecution comes to focus exclusively upon the system of prosecution and 
its effectiveness in obtaining convictions. 
CHAPTER THREE 
REMOULDING THE OBJECT OF PROSECUTION: THE POSITION OF THE 
DEFENDANT IN THE CRIMINAL PROCESS DURING THE NINETEENTH 
AND EARLY YEARS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURIES 
This chapter examines the position of the defendant during the period in which the 
criminal process was affected by substantial changes. These changes produced the 
basis for the further development and evolution of the criminal process, and, 
established, as an intergral part of this, a fmnly demarcated position of' defendant' 
which any person' fed-in' to the criminal process, by the decision to prosecute, would 
immediately assume. This more rigorous' fixing' of the position of the defendant was 
part of wider project of alteration and restructuring of the criminal process, in which 
discretion and the relation between criminal law and society were to be profoundly 
rethought and reshaped. This project was dominated by the concern,to make the 
criminal process more efficient. This concern flowed from a perspective which was a 
matrix composed of disciplinary, systemic and efficiency values in which the defendant 
assumed a place as an object to be processed. The trial was to be the predominant 
and critical site for this processing with those activities which brought the defendant 
to trial and the evidence which was to be the basis for the detennination of her/his 
guilt being regarded as pre-trial practices which could have no impact upon the 
outcome of the trial itself. These pre-trial practices came to be ones which were 
increa')ingly carried out by the" New Police" as an integral part of their evolution 
and development during this period. This resulted in the legal system's disengagement 
from controlling and reviewing police practice which, was to be the exclusive 
determination of whether the person was to be ' fed in ' to the criminal process as a 
defendant The period, as a whole, marks a fundamental change in the operation and 
structure of the criminal process. yet, it is a change which manifest') it')elf in the 
introduction, maintenance and reproduction of a fundamentally diSCiplinary practice. 
The fIrst section deals with the position of the defendant in the criminal 
process at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It outlines the procedure that 
confronted the defendant, which depended on what the defendant was charged with. 
and the dynamics of the trial procedure it5elf and its interrelation to the type of 
authority and social power that was exercised during this period. The changes to this 
system, along with the perceptual schema which underlay it, are set out in the second 
section. Here, specifIc attention is given to the 1836 Commission Report on the 
representation of the defendant by counsel insofar as it reveals this more general 
perspective, and, its concentration on the conceptualisation and characterisation of the 
position of the defendant The third section deals with the reality and nature of the 
criminal process in the early to mid nineteenth century. It focuses on the results of 
both this reform process, and, the other attendant reforms and developments within 
the wider criminal process in order to establish the reformed system's logic and the 
position of the defendant in relation to it. The fourth section deals with the 1898 
Criminal Evidence Act which gave the defendant the capacity to become a competant 
witness able to give evidence in her/his defence case. This is presented as part of the 
earlier I programme I of reform and as its essential completion. The section seeks to 
demonstrate that the Act itself had no dramatic impact on the criminal process, in 
terms of a marked expansion or contraction of the defendant's position or capacity, 
because of the nature of the development of the criminal process (particularly the 
expansion of summary jurisdiction) during the preceding part of the nineteenth 
century. With this completion of the t programme I of reform the basis for, and 
parameters of, the development of the modern criminal process were laid. It is within 
this context that the Poor Prisoner's Defence Act 1903, is considered, in the fifth 
section, as it represents the first coherently articulated confrontation between the 
system imperatives of this reformed criminal process and an emergant discourse which 
conceives the defendant's position in terms of rights. The success of the system 
imperative perspective in this debate, and, its shaping of the Poor Prisoners Defence 
Act 1903, is tied to the projection of the trial as the incarnation of I justice I through 
its sole and exclusive detennination of the gUilt of the defendant and the consequent 
neglect of police practice. 
The ' Old' System: Criminal Procedure and Trial in the final period of Ancien 
Regime England 
The type of trial procedure into which the defendant was placed, during the later 
eighteenth century, rested upon the characterisation of the defendant's alleged offence 
by the substantive criminal law. The substantive criminal law - an admixture of 
common law and statute - operated with a binary scheme of classification offences. 
They were either felonies or misdemeanours. Felonies covered those offences 
regareded as being more serious, and, misdemeanours those of a less serious nature. 
a)Felonv Trials 
Felonies had to be prosecuted fonnally and justices of the peace, acting as examining 
magistrates, were to ensure that the trial of a defendant could occur by either 
committing the defendant to goal or by binding over the defendant to appear in court 
when the trial was to be held. Also, justices of the peace would bind over any 
witnesses who were felt to be important, to give evidence at the subsquent trial. The 
trial it~elf would take place either at Quarter Sessions or Assize Courts both of which 
had judges and juries as an integral part of their trhtl procedure. These trial 
procedures placed the defendant within a highly discretionary framework in which 
prosecution and the nature of' legal' evidence were entwined, intenningled and 
regulated by a wider social logic. 
The complainant related hislher description of the' events' and this wa~ 
supported in its material particulars by any wintesses bound over to testify by the 
examining magistrate. The trial judge would intervene in the course of this process in 
order to produce a clear and certain narrative of the alleged' event') '. At the 
conclusion of the prosecution case the defendant was asked by the trial judge whether 
he/she had anything to say about the case set out in the prosecution narrative as a 
whole, or, whether he/she had any questions of address to any of the prosecution 
witnesses. 
It was extremely rare for the defendant to challenge the validity of this 
narrative. For, the defendant was in a weak position within the trial: 
" The impression given by the printed accounts of trials, however, it that few 
prisoners put up a very vigorous defence. Everything was against their doing so in an 
unfamiliar and overwhelming setting and after a long confinement [in the county gaol 
ro house of correction awaiting trial] in which they had no necessary knowledge of 
the precise charge against them. It was of course especially difficult for those who 
had confessed to the crime before the examining magistrate, in particular when the 
magistrate was in court to certify to the authenticity of the confession and that it had 
been given and read to the accused before he signed it. Examining magistrates were 
not often in court, but confessions were still introduced with devastating effect by 
prosecution witnesses. Perhaps even more difficult to surmount was the direct 
evidence of an accomplice. By the mid eighteenth century such evidence was 
normally thought to be insufficient in itself to convict .... But point was still perhaps 
open to dispute: at least there are cases reported in the printed accounts of the Surrey 
Assizes(though they are not of course official or necessarily complete)that suggest 
that some judges allowed juries to convict on the unsupported testimony of 
accomplices. " 165 
Theformal validity of the prosecution case was, therefore, established with 
rapidity by this trial procedure. This' formal guilt' was then confirmed or rejected by 
165. I.M. Beattie, 'Crime and the Courts in Surrey 1736-1753 I, in 1.5. Cockburn ed. Crime in 
England 1550·1800 (London:Metbuen, 1977), 156-176(p.l66). See, for a more detailed account, 
Beattie's Crime and the Courts in England 1660·1800 (1986) 
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an interrogation of the character of the defendant. Fonnal aspects of criminal 
procedure were not ftrmly distinguished from social proximity and relations of rank 
with the result that character witnesses were of central importance to any defendant's 
case. This' character' of the defendant was, in reality, defined by her/his place within 
the community and her/his behaviour within it. The situation of the defendant, within 
the social hierarchy of the communities of the ancien regime, was the source which 
was regarded with the most attention, and, had the greatest effect within the trial and 
upon sentencing. For, they confirmed that the defendant was of' good character " but 
this confirmation, because of the nature of the social order, did not rest upon the 
content of the infonnation it~elf, rather upon the social status of the character witness 
himself. The higher the social status of the defendant's character witness(es) the 
greater the likelihood that their' good character' would be conftrmed ( as well as the 
greater likelihood of the trial judge treating the witness and their evidence a'i credible) 
as it demonstrated, in a social order in which authority and knowledge of the 
community were located in the highly personalised substance of authority of the 
person in the position of clergy, magistracy and gentry, that their ability to remember 
the defendant attested to defendant's status as a respected member of the community. 
Respectability meant individual traits of regular employment, hard work and honesty 
coupled with a recognition and demonstration of herlhis support for the wider social 
order by deference to these individuals whose personalised authority embodied the 
social power exercised and reproduced at the level of the community. 
A lack of place in the community, or, ' bad character' within a community(as 
an essential element of the prosecution case) acted as the confirmation of' fonnal gUilt 
, of the defendant, hence, their' real' guilt 
" inftnitely worse off was the man who had no witnesses at all, no one to 
establish his place within a community, to give him roots. A vagrant could expect 
little mercy if the case against him seemed at all clear; nor could a man who had given 
,51 
his neighbours trouble, especially if the prosecution had made a point of his bad 
reputation in developing the case against him. 11 166 
That this was the logic reproduced by these trial procedures was a result of the 
relation between the trial judge and the jury. The prosecutor entered the legal 
framework in which, to establish a case, a wrong had to be alleged for which a remedy 
was sought The prosecutor had no rights conferred by common law or statute, 
which were capable of being infringed by the alleged actions of a defendant, for this 
would have presumed a concept of legal personality which was alien in the eighteenth 
century. The law was maintained not by action based upon rights subsisting prior to 
or as an integral part of a coherent, unified and universal legal system, but was the 
result of the specific determination of the trial itself. The allegation of the wrong was 
to be redressed by the court thereby creating law, through its decision, after the t 
event t had occured. 
The trial, therefore, dealt with the task of definition raised by the allegation of 
the offence. The allegation of the offence was not, itself, a problem. 
11 The problem lay .... .in showing that a wrong had occured, which required the 
production of correct and convincing evidence. Thus, the law lay in the correct 
allegation of a wrong and in the remedy produced by the court. 11 167 
This meant that the trial judge assumed the dominant role in this process of 
law-making. The parameters of this judicial power were highly discretionary 
reflecting the nature of social power and the legitimacy of political authority in ancien 
regime England. Law and society were intimately intertwined with the legitimacy of 
the of the judge embedded in his person. The foundation of his flowed from his 
166. J.M. Beattie, 'Crime and the Courts in Surrey 1736-1753', in J. S. Cockburn ed. Crime in 
England 1550-1800 (London:Methuen, 1977), 156-176(pp.173-174) 
167. M. Lobban, The Common Law and English Jurisprudence 1760-1850 (Oxford:Clarendon Press. 
1991), p.55 
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person and its logic was, therefore, essentially social. For, it was not governed by its 
conformity to externally imposed legal rules or a core set of principles, but obeyed a 
regularity which issued from judicial practice itself. The law developed from within 
this practice, in which decisions to settle particular disputes were the mechanism by 
which the regularity of this practice was made explicit, and from which a tentative 
body of I rules I could be articulated. These I rules I were not fixed since they did not 
themselves direct or determine judicial practice, but were merely deductions from a 
generally immanent regUlarity of practice. They simply represented an attempt to 
establish an intentional and deliberate coherence, within judicial practice, so that a 
stable expectational framework could be developed with regard to it. this process of 
explication and fonnulation always lagged behind the reality of judicial practice 
directly linked to the dynamics of the surrounding social order through the 
presentation of alleged wrongs by prosecutors seeking a remedy. 
The nature of judicial activity, at the trial, was that of a disposition. Not a 
product of rational, conscious calculation, but the product of a practical sense. This, 
in turn, meant that, formally and in the abstract, in conformity with the rest of the 
common law it presupposed 
" a pennanent capacity for invention, indispensible if one is to be able to adapt 
to infinitely varied and never completely identical situations. This is not ensured by 
mechanical obedience to the explicit codified rule (when it exists) .... But this freeodm 
of invention and improvisation ... should not be discusssed in tenns of spontaneity and 
constraint, freedom and necessity, individual and society ... the feel for the game is the 
social game embodied and turned into second nature ... as society written into the 
body, into the biological individual, [which]enables the infmite number of acts of the 
game - written into the game as possibilities and objective demands - to be produced; 
the constraints and demands of the game ... impose themselves on those people - and 
those people alone - who, because they have a feel for the game, a feel that is, of the 
immanent necessity of the game, are prepared to perceive them and carry them out. " 
168 
The constraints and demands of the trial became, after 1736, both more pressing and 
more specific, with the large number of capital offences created by Parliament. The 
relation between the statute and the common law had always been an uncertain one, 
within the common law tradition as a whole, but their effect upon the felony trial was 
dramatic. They made the substantive law more rigid by increasing the number of 
offences punishable by death. The common law element of the criminal law had never 
strictly specified the punishments that attached to offences 
" for since the system was based on procedures for an infinity of 
circumstances, it was felt that just as what constituted a crime could vary, so could 
the punishment. " 169 
This created a situation in which an increased number of defendants were 
brought to trial, before Courts of Assize and Quarter Sessions, alleged to have 
committed offences which, if established, carried the death penalty 170. It was in this 
context that the relations between the the trial judge and the jury were formed in the 
mid to late eighteenth century. Traditionally, the jury was to be composed to 
individuals who had knowledge of the community in which the alleged offence took 
place, and, particular knowledge of the accused and prosecutor. In practice,.by the 
mid to late eighteenth century, this wal) no longer the case 
168. Pierre Bourdieu, In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology, trans. M. Admnson, 
(Oxford:PoIity Press, 1990), p.63. See also on this Bourdieu's The Logic of Practice, trans. R. Nice 
(Oxford:Polity Press, 1992) 
169. M. Lobban, The Common Law and English Jurisprudence 1760-1850 (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 
1991), p.55 
170. Beattie, in ibid pp.157-8, shows that between 1736 and 1753 a third of all the defendants tried, 
before the Surrey Court's of Sessions and Assize, were alleged to have committed offences which 
were punishable by death. 
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" jurors were drawn largely from the neighbourhood not of the crime but of 
the meeting-place of the court. ... the same jury heard most of the cases throughout an 
entire court session. Prisoners were arrainged in groups of a dozen or more and one 
panel of jurors were charged with them; but most often at the Surrey Assizes when 
the first trials were completed substantially the same panel of jurors were given 
another group in charge ... normally the jury that ended the Assize session differed only 
by a few men from the dozen who had heard the ftrst cac;;e. " 111 
The maintenance of a permanent jury, throughout the court's session, was reinforced 
by the small number of persons from whom potential jurors were drawn. A property 
qualiftcation combined with selection from a limited geographical area produced this 
narrow group. The extent of its size can be gauged from the fact that many potential 
jurors were called upon with a certain regularity leading to a situation in which it was 
rare for any jury to be without those who had already had previous experience of jury 
service. 
Jury practices were given a greater degree of regularity by these developmento; 
which, in turn, were a part of the consolidation of the role of the jury during the 
eighteenth century. Jury practices were brought under further control, while, the 
inviolability of the general verdict was maintained 112. The jury was seen as an 
integral part of the criminal trial, but it was the judge who played the leading role. 
For, it was he who determined whether the prosecutor's allegation of wrong (lodged in 
terms of the commission of a felony offence by the accused defendant)was of 
substance, through his examination of prosecutor, prosecutor's witnesses, the 
defendant and any character witnesses on behalf of the defendant. His view of the 
case was clearly articulated through this process of examination and the judge's 
directions to the jury were equally clearly expressed: 
171. Beattie, Ibid, pp.l64-5 
172. See, for a detailed developmental history of the jury, Thomas A. Green, Verdict According to 
Conscience: Perspectives on the English Criminal Jury 1200-1800 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1985) 
" the judge's directions to the jury were brief, but pointed and leading, if not 
coercive ... the jurors ... deliberated briefly and reached verdicts that largely accorded 
with the bench. 11 173 
The felony trial was characterised by a unanimity between the judge's view and 
directions and the verdict of the jury. As a reSUlt, the time which was spne on the 
routine felony trial was short, with a number 174 being conducted during each day of 
the Assizes or Quarter Sessions. 
The increase in the number of offences of felony which carried the death 
penalty during the eighteenth century, produced a more rigidly defined substantive 
criminal law. The parameters of judicial practice were, therefore, placed within a 
more clearly defined and structured situation. It became a matter of determining the 
applicability of the punishment to the individual defendant rather than, as in the ca<;e 
of the rest of the common law, a variable definition of wrong and remedy tied to the 
immanent logic of judicial practice. The establishment of the defendant'sformal gUilt 
now increasingly entailed the formal applicability of the sentence of capital 
punishment. This led to the increasing stress, within judicial practice, on the 
defendant's character and nature of the offence it<;elf. These elements provided the 
real grounds for the judicial indication to the jury that the defendant should not be 
found guilty, or, for them to exercise mercy. In practice, they tended, to be expressed 
by the judge as a weakness of the evidence on the part of the prosecutor, or, false 
testimony by the prosecutor or prosecution witnesses. The determination of gUilt or 
innocence wa<; now intermarried with the issue of the appropriate sentence. 
The jury was placed in the role of the principle institution of mitigation. 
Guided by judicial recommendation, the jury was seen as possessing a substantial 
173. Thomas A. Green, ibid, pp.270-1 
174. Beattie, ibid, estimates that fifteen felony cases a day was easily within the parameters of the 
Surrey Assizes or Quarter Sessions. This, he further estimates, when seen within the context of the 
other matters which concerned these court sittings, ' ensured that no time was wasted once a prisoner 
was actually put to his trial '(p.166) 
degree of discretion in its own right since it was the institution, in the trial procedure, 
which had the task of ennunciating the trial's view of the defendant through the 
verdict The severity of the substantive law was to be subordinated to the dynamics 
of judicial practice and jury verdicts. The law wa~ applied selectively following a 
judicial logic which demanded the examination of particular circumstances and 
character of the defendant, and, a jury practice which was seen 
" as assimilating the judicial inclination to mitigate the rigours of the law to it~ 
own independent process of deliberation. " 175 
The threshold of proof, which the narrative of the prosecutor and prosecution 
witnesses attempted to fulfil, was exclusively situated within the practice of individual 
trial judges. The location of this threshold was not fixed, but moved according to the 
influence exerted, through the judiciary's system of dispositions and the jury's process 
of deliberation, by the surrounding social order. 
Theses intervened to create a degree of observable regularity between 
perceptions of increasing crime and higher rates of conviction and punishment 
Beattie demonstrates that in 
" the three periods identified ... as years of moderately high crime(beforel739), 
of wartime decline, and post-war increa~e(after 1749)juries can be shown to have 
leaned towards a higer conviction rate when crime was high and to have been more 
favourably disposed towards aquittals when the level appeared to fall; and within the 
limits that it was possible, judge's sentences varied similarly. " 176 
175. Thomas A. Green, ibid, p.287 
176. Beattie, ibid, p.l76. As Beattie points out these variations could be quite drrunatic. Defining 
conviction as both guilty and partial verdicts, of gr:md and petty jury decisions, he produces a more 
general measurement of the willingness to convict according to these periods of crime: 53% before 
1739,47% during the war, 61% 1748 onwards. 
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b )Misdemeanour Trials 
Misdemeanours represented a very diverse collection of offences which related to 
property, public order and' morality'. Unlike felonies where formal prosecuton had 
to be ensured; and; it was illegal for the victim to ' compound I the felony by accepting 
damages from the perpetrator in return for an undertaking not to pursue the 
prosecution, misdemeanours were typified by a discretionary decision over both the 
decision and method of prosecution. 
" While the indictment was the only legally recognised method of prosecuting 
felonies, misdemeanours could be(and were frequently)prosecuted using less formal 
procedures. Plaintiffs could choose form informal mediation by a justice of the peace, 
binding over by recognisance, and summary conviction(with punishment by either fine 
or commitment to a house of correction). These alternative procedures .... were used 
far more often than indictments for prosecuting misdemeanours. Since each 
procedure involved different facets of the law and resulted in contrasting costs and 
consequences, the choice of procedure was important and it allowed plentiful 
opportunities for social considerations to influence legal strategies. " 177 
The potential prosecutor was presented with two ways of initiating the 
processing of her/his complaint. An indictment could be presented to the next sitting 
of the petty sessions, but this necessitated the prosecutor waiting for the indictment to 
be approved by the grand jury before it could be proceeded with. Alternatively, the 
justice of the peace could be contacted outside the sessions by the potential 
prosecutor. This enabled a wider choice of potential procedures to the prosecutor as 
the justice of the peace had more modes of dealing with the matter outside the 
sessions, and, these could bring pressure on bear on the accused far sooner than by 
proceeding by indictment. The justice of the peace heard the complaint and decided 
177. R.B. Shoemaker, Prosecution and Punishment: Petty Crime, and the Law in London and rural 
Middlesex c.J660-1725 (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.8 
whether it had any merit, and, if so, woudl intiate one of three modes of procedure: 
informal legal mediation, binding over by recognisance or dealing with the matter 
under their summary jurisdiction 
The link between the particular misdemeanour offence alleged and the modes 
of procedure available to deal with them was not governed by formal rules. Most 
procedures were available to deal with any of the misdemeanour offences that existed. 
The link between them was supplied by the interpretative practices of the justices of 
the peace, unless the prosecutor proceeded by indictment where it centred on those of 
the grand jury. 
" Despite the increasing specificity of the criminal law during this period, there 
was ample scope for flexibility, and in practice many offences were interpreted very 
broadly. " 178 
Proceeding by indictment was the most expensive 179 way for a potential 
prosecutor to initiate action in a misdemeanour offence compared with the other 
modes of procedure that were available. During the eighteenth century it came a 
mode of procedure which was to concentrated specifically against peace and property 
offences, particularly those of allsault This increasing focus and concentration upon 
certain categories of offence by those who proceeded by indictment was linked to a 
period of considerable expansion of the summary jurisdiction of justices of the peace 
in the eighteenth century. It came to utilised more frequently as an alternative to the 
other, more formal legal procedure of indictment which was available to the potential 
prosecutor. The justices of the peace were empowered to deal summarily with 
offences when authorised by statute. This allowed them individually or in pairs to 
convict defendant~ without the need for wither a jruy or referral to Quarter Sessions. 
The offences which could be tried in this way overlapped with many that could also be 
178.Ibid, p.40 
179. See, Shoemaker, ibid, p.140ff., for a detailed description of the procedural costs which the 
potenti.:'lI prosecutor faced when initiating a trial by indictment. 
tried by indictment, and, were punishable by a sentence of a fine, whipping, or 
placement in a house of correction. 
The justice of the peace wa'i the locus of power and authority within this 
region of the criminal process. The degree of activism of an individual justice of the 
peace determined to a great extent the rate and regularity with which prosecutions 
were allowed to proceed, and, the mode under which they would be dealt with. The 
disposition of the justice of the peace was the real principle which governed the 
degree of intervention, of this area of the criminal process, into the surrounding social 
order. Therefore, the pattern and logic of this intervention was a social one which did 
not concern itself with conformity to express, explicit and formulated rules. It was the 
product of a highly personalised form of social power and authority whose boundaries 
and parameters were exclusively determined by the intentions of the individual justice 
of the peace. The predictability of teh actions of the justice of the peace, or, from the 
potential prosecutors perspective, the degree of co-operation that wa'i afforded, was 
essentiall y based on 
" a generative spontaneity which a')serts itself in an imporvised confrontation 
wtih ever-renewed situations, it obeys a practical logic, that of vagueness, of the 
more-or-Iess, which defines one's ordinary relation to the world. " 180 
This type of practice was characterised by a practical sense which moved from case to 
case at the level of allegation of wrong to punishment without consideration or 
attention to the concept of general law. It remained vague and indeterminate because 
it wa., not deliberately differentiated from its surrounding environment by clear 
conceptual boundaries or procedures. This made it extremely sensitive and attentive 
to the demands to the surrounding society in which the capacities of this region of the 
criminal process were entwined with its fluctuating perceptions of 'criminality' and ' 
180. P. Bourdieu, In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology, trans. M. Adamson 
(Oxford:Polity Press, 1990), p.78 
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disorder '. The potential prosecutor's experience of the flexibility of this part of the 
criminal process was one moment of this. 
Misdemeanour offences placed the defendant in an environment which was 
even more attuned to the demands of the individual prosecutor and the variability of 
the societal concern with crime than that of the felony trial. If proceeded against by 
indictment the defendant would commonly plead guilty when it was fIrst issued, or, at 
subsequent sitting of the sessions. The regularity with which this was done, by 
individual defendants, was directly linked to their position in the social structure. For, 
" [r]egardless of their actual gUilt or innocence, defendants had good reason to 
plead gUilty to misdemeanour indictments: the prohibitive cost of a jury trial. At 12s., 
the minimum court fees for defending a plea of not guilty amounted to more than a 
week's wages for most lower-class defendants. These fees would be reduced to four-
fifths, and the number of appearances in court cut in half, by pleading gUilty. " 181 
This link between poverty and pleading guilty was perceived by the justice of the 
peace at the petty sessions and they gave further encouragement to it by offering 
defendants the expectation of a lower fine if they pleaded gUilty. This applied to both 
those who pleaded guilty and those who subsequently did so, as Shoemaker 
demonstrates when the amount of the defendant's fine after a plea of gUilty is 
compared to that given after a defendant had been convicted by a jury at the petty 
sessions. 
" In sum, the most striking feature of the verdict of defendants indicted for 
misdemeanours in Middlesex is the large number of gUilty pleas, which account for 
two-thirds of all verdicts, and the high proportion of small fines meted out to 
defendant<; who pleaded gUilty. " 182 
181. R.B. Shoemaker, ibid, p.l52 
182.lbid, p.l55 
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Despite the cost involved in prosecution by way of indictment there was, therefore, a 
high probability of obtaining a conviction if the case was taken through to the final 
verdict It was a situation in which the defendant had few options(which, in turn, 
declined if the defendant was poor). Formal gUilt could be established ea~ily, a~ with 
felonies, at any subsequent trial of the indictment, and, since none of the offences 
carried the death penalty this area of the criminal process maintained, in conformity 
with the rest of the common law, a high degree of flexibility in regard to both the 
definition of misdemeanour offences and the applicable sentence. Once placed within 
the system, the defendant was unlikely to be found innocent, if he/she could afford the 
expense of a trial, and was encouraged by the system itself to plead gUilty. 
The summary jurisdiction of the justice of the peace was even less of a fonnal 
procedure. It rested entirely on an approach to a justice out~ide the formalities of the 
petty sessions. The process of initial consultation between the potential prosecutor 
and the particular justice of the peace determined the availability of the summary 
procedure in each case. If the summary procedure was afforded to the prosecutor this 
was tantamount to conviction of the defendant. For, the move from consultation and 
assessment of the potential prosecutor's case by the justice of the peace to the 
selection of the mode of procedure was immediate and rested entirely with the 
intentions of the justice of the peace. Depending upon the type of misdemeanour 
offence, conviction was based merely on the justice's view of the case after 
consultation with the potential prosecutor, or, with the additional testimony of one or 
two witnesses under oath. The defendant played no part in the actual process of 
determination of her/his own guilt other than as the named individual alleged to have 
committed the offence. Her/his existence apart from this was of no relevance to the 
summary procedure. The immediate and informal nature of this mode of procedure 
wher4e punishment followed directly upon conviction was unconcerned with the 
defendant's own case or version of events. It~ logic and orientation were structured 
to the demands of prosecution. The practices of the justice of the peace, which 
determined the gUilt and punishment of the defendant, provided a very adaptable 
mode of social control which could be used by groups of prosecutors, parish 
constables or informers. The reorientation of this practice from the settlement of 
individual disputes to the disciplining of the underclass of the ancien regime, occured 
in relation to those misdemeanour offences which were victim less and concerned with 
matters of public order and ' morality '. 
" Prosecution of offences such as ' idle and disorderly' conduct, nightwalking, 
prostitution, and keeping or frequenting an unlicensed or disorderly alehouse 
(offences which were thought to be the roots of serious crime) fluctuated as public 
and official concern about these offences waxed and waned. As victim less offences, 
they were most likely to be prosecuted at the instigation of parish officers or 
informers, and both had many reasons not to apprehend or report offenders. When 
justices or respectable inhabitants of a neighbourhood demanded action against these 
offences, however, the fact that most such offences could easily be prosecuted 
summarily facilitated concerted campaigns of arrests and prosecutions of the 
community's underclass of vagrants, beggars and unemployed. " 183 
C)The Criminal Trial in the context QfAncien Reeime Society 
The felony and misdemeanour trial procedures of the eighteenth century were ones in 
which the trial judge and justice of the peace, respectively, operated according to a 
purely practical logic in which their decision-making, flowing from the the fact that 
legitimate authority was equated with the particular individual who held the position 
of the judge or justice of the peace, reflected the intentions, perspectives and concerns 
of the individual incumbent The substance of authority of the person was the form in 
which social power was legitimate, and, hence the regUlarity and consistency of their 
decision-making was not based, or founded upon, their degree of conformity to a set 
of general, formal legal principles. Law and society were, as a result, not highly 
183. R.B. Shoemaker, ibid, p.313 
differentiated since the selection and decision-making of these individuals did not 
occur in accordance with a set of explicit rules established to achieve, by their 
imposition and articulation, regularity, and predictability in these trial procedures. 
This found its concomitant expression in the substantive criminal law. It was neither 
viewed, nor did it fmd expression as an abstract, universal form which imposed a duty 
whose actual content was arbitrary and contingent and had no essential link with this 
form. For, society was not conceived as being maintained and reproduced merely on 
the basis of the functional indispensibility of legal norms as an abstract, universal 
form. The criminal law evolved in accordance with a judicial practice which viewed 
human society as a heirarchy having a natural origin and truth. The human individual 
was not regarded as an abstract, universal subject within a society in which human 
relations were essentially contingent and any law was possible. It was a social order 
in which society was the established I constitution I of Anglican Church and State and 
from this reality could be inferred a divine order and origin of the State 184. The 
society was, therefore, projected as essentially static and unchanging because the 
social hierarchy was of divine origin. This was articulated in the form of I an 
argument from design' 
11 classically in Paley's Natural Theology(1802): from the watch we infer a 
watchmaker, and so on through the whole natural realm, including the State and 
political affairs. The proper(and divinely ordained)function of things(including 
political institutions)could thus still be inferred from their actual functions:a doctrine 
of powerfully conservative implications and one which was used by Paley and most of 
his contemporaries to conserve the established constitution in Church and State. I 
Law and order I meant to them, its successful defence. 11 185 
184. See on this I.C.D. Clark, English Society 1688·1832:Ideology, social structure and political 
practice during the ancien regime (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1986), chapter 2, pp,42· 
118. 
185. Ibid, p.80. William Paley was an imporL'Ult represent.'ltive of the Anglican c1ergy(l743-1805; 
Fellow and Tutor of Christ's College, Cambridge, 1766-76; Archdeacon of Carlise, 1782-d.[Clark, 
p.57, n.47] ) who with others(WiIliam Jones, Samuel Halifax, Richard Watson, Rev. John Whitk'lker, 
Dr. Samuel Horsley), articulated, what Clark terms, the social theory of elite hegemony. 
The increase in the number of felony offences which carried the death penalty, 
from 1736 onwards, was part of the maintenance of this social order. The t threats" 
to which these capital statutes were a response, were perceived as a challenge to the 
material interests of the aristocracy and gentry, but the framework, within which these 
, threats' were conceived, was one in which the material and religious were one. 
Theft of wood from enclosed land, poaching or the stealing of crops/vegetables from 
a landowner's property did not merely represent an offence to the invidual affected, it 
also challenged a divine, heirachical social order founded upon social subordination 
and political obedience. It was a sacred constitution defended by the death penalty as 
Assize sermons made clear. Individuals were reminded of the intimate connection 
" between religion and government; that the latter flowed originally from the 
same divine source with the former, and it was, at the beginning the ordinance of the 
Most High." 186 
This then made the trial judge and the justice of the peace, not a civil person of 
authority who acted as an ally to religion, but rather a minister of God, whose 
individual incumbents were acting with God's authority invested in their person. 
It wac; here that the source and nature of the power and authority of judges 
and justices of the peace, coupled with the delineation of the position of the 
defendant, were located. The central position and dominance of the trial judge and 
justice of the peace in felony and summary trials was the corollary of the subordinate 
position of the individual accused who was subjected to this form of power and 
authority. It is the very dependence of the accused on the judge or justice of the 
peace that constitutes the defendant as a subject of the law by her/his subjection to 
this authority. This authority of the judge and jsutice of the peace translated itself into 
186. George Home (1730-92); Fellow of Magdalen 1750-; President 1768-;chaplain-in-ordinary to 
George III 1771-8]; Dean of Canterbury 1781; Bishop of Norwich 1790, Clark, ibid, p.22l, n.60), 
Discourse XXIV, 'The Origin of Civil Government', in Discourses on Several Subjects and 
Occasions, 4vols (Oxford, 1787,1793,1799,1803,1824,1827), n, 434. Quotation from Clark, ibid, 
p.223. This was originally an Assize Sermon. 
a form of power that was founded upon itself and hence was without limit.;;, other than 
those which were produced within the practical field of its operation. The trial, 
whether for felony or misdemeanour, had the same way of viewing the defendant - the 
defendant's position was a function of this power structure. The way in which he/she 
was treated at the trial, as an object of prosecution and knowledge, linked the trial to 
the wider totality of social relations and power structure of ancien regime England. 
The defendant was observed and scrutinised at the trial (the process of scrutiny itself 
varied with the felony trial being far less cursory than the summary trial of a 
misdemeanour, by a justice of the peace). This process was one moment of the 
general form in which knowledge was generated in ancien regime England. In a 
hierarchical society, whose gradations defined the place of the individual, the practice 
of human observation formed the basis upon which the dominant strata sought to 
maintain their position within the upper position within the hierarchy. However, it 
was not exclusively generated within, and confined to, these dominant strata 
themselves, but extended over the whole of the hierarchical social structure. It was a 
form of knowledge which was closely focused upon social reality and never 
considered the individual person as an entity who occured prior to this social 
structure. As an individual was never perceived 
" a.;; a being deriving his essential regularities and characteristics from within. 
Rather, the individual is always observed in .... society in his social context, as a person 
in relation to others. It 187 
This process of observation was concerned to generate enough information to 
form a description of the individual. The prosecution narrative was, therefore, both 
an allegation of an individual act of transgression of the parameters of the social 
order, and, the basis from which the accused could be placed within the social order. ' 
Character' was the particular definition given to this knowledge within the trial 
process. Since it was a form of knowledge which arose from within the social order 
187. N. Elias, The Court SOCiety, trans. E. Jephcott (Oxford:Blackwell, 1983), p.l04 
its' truth' or credibility, at the trial, was not viewed as independent of that social 
order. Hence, the information supplied by character witnesses for the defendant at a 
felony trial was preceived as having greater weight, or, ' truth' in direct conformity 
with the position of the character witnesses within the social order 188 
The way in which the defendant was viewed and managed by the modes of 
trial in the eighteenth century wa4i one aspect of, or, I materialisation' of the wider 
political and philosophical conception of the subject within ancien regime England. 
The individual was held to be subjected to the power of another. It is this which 
makes her/him a subject, and, had nothing to do with the notion of an equation 
between the subject and the question of right The subject is defined by her/his place 
within a system of internal and external powers. He/she is not primary and self-
constitutive, but always and already belongs to a social order in which the defmition 
of the subject is equated with the definition of obedience. Obedience is to the King 
and God as the pinnacles of this system, but it is alos in existence throughout the 
society in a hierarchy of social relations of dominance and 
subordination(master/servant, landlord/tenant, clergyman/congregant, 
magistrate/subject, employer/worker). So common were these relations held to be 
that they were projected as the divinely ordained model of the social order, and, 
hence, the natural and proper order of things. 
The proper function and operation of things and political institutions were 
directly inferred fonn their actual operation in which the society and institutions were 
not the product of free, human action, but the conformity and entwinement of God's 
will with the extant political institutions. The origin of the State is, therefore, divine. 
The individual subjected to the power of another is represented as a collectivity in the 
fonn of set of subjects within a hierarchical social order linked by obedience. 
188. See, D. Hay, 'Property, Authority and the Criminal Law', in D.Hay, P. Linnebaugh, E.P. 
Thompson ed. Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth Century England (London, 
1975),17-63, on the way in which this intermeshed with and reproduced the hegemony of 
aristocracy, gentry and Clergy, and, hence, the social order. 
" Obedience is the principle, identical to itself along the whole length of the 
hierarchical chain, and attached in the last instance to its transcendental origin, which 
makes those who obey into the members of single body. Obedience institutes the 
command of higher over lower, but it fundamentally comes from below: as subditi, 
the subjects will their obedience. And if they will it, it is because it is inscribed in an 
economy of creation(their creation)and salvation(their salvation, that of each taken 
individually and of all taken collectively). Thus the loyal subject ... (he who' 
voluntarily', 'loyally', that is actively and willingly obeys the law and executes the 
orders of the legitimate sovereign) is necessarily afaithful subject. He is a Christian, 
who knows that all power comes from God. In obeying the law ... he obeys God. The 
fact that the order to which he ' responds' comes to him from beyond the individual 
and the mouth which utters it is constitutive of the subject. " 189 
This conception of society and the social structure persisted into the first two 
decades of the nineteenth century. It persisted, despite the challenges which 
confronted it, of the unrest and social disorder of the early years of the nineteenth 
century, coupled with the growing influence of non-Anglican religious groups and 
radicalism. These events and developments merely tested it. What led to its demise 
was the differentiation of the executive element of the state apparatus from the 
legislative element This development was the product of the fundamental changes, 
between the 1780s and the 1 820s, in the relation between the landed elite and political 
authority. It led, in the late eighteenth and early ninteenth centuries to the dissolution 
of a conception, by those concerned with the substance of governmental policy, which 
saw the landed elite and Anglican church as the sole and exclusive interestc; which 
were to be maintained by the conscious attention of the executive. They were placed, 
instead, within an increasingly influential perspective which regarded them as Qll.£. 
interest among a number of others. These interestc; had now to be reconciled because 
the executive was ceasing to regard the landed interest and the clergy as the focus and 
189. E. Balibar, 'Citizen Subject' in Who Comes After the Subject?, E. Cadava, P. Connor, J-L. 
Nancy (London:Routledge, 1991), 33-57(p.41) 
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detenninants of governmental policy. In the executive's conception of society, they 
no longer embodied society, which was now perceived as a social system whose 
survival and continuance depended upon policies which maintained the overall system, 
in which, the landed interest and clergy constituted one of its elements. Order in 
society was to be ensured by attempting to maintain the conditions of social stability 
in manufacturing and agriculture. The French Revolution dominanted the thinking of 
the executive. Not simply it consequences for the social system ac; a whole, but the 
understanding of its causes in order to prevent the condititions of possibility for such 
an ' event' in England. Economic policy was therefore orientated to the preservation 
of the social system by the prevention of famine and scarcity. 
" An adminstrative detennination to ensure' a sufficiency of supply at steady 
and moderate prices' motivated succesive governments. For the hunger had helped 
to topple feudalism in France(where Huskisson had lived between 1783 and 
1792) .... Since then, a long war, with its fonnidable if largely futile blockade, a 
precarious peace, a realisation that in the last fifty or sixty years Britain had become a 
net corn importing country, the dramatic growth of population ac; highlighted by the 
first two censuses of 1801 and 1811, and actual deaths in 1795, 1797, 180011, 1812-
in short, ... Malthus's terrifying spectre haunted the ministerial imagination. " 190 
Economic policy was, therefore, animated by the need to maintain law and order. 
What was feared most was the coincidence of economic crisis and social and political 
tension. 
" At the Home Office, Sidmouth wa~ forever inquiring anxiously about the 
forthcoming crops and prospects for employment. He believed that the ' instinct~ of 
disaffection' were fundamentally economic, though they might have to be 
manipulated by incorrigable demagogues before bursting into revolt. Ministers 
190. B. Hilton, Corn, Cash, Commerce: The Economic Policies of the Tory Governments 1815-1830 
(Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1980), p.20 
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"-
dreaded the coincidence of dear bread and urban unemployment for social reasons. " 
191 
Food supply being paramount was dissociated from an eternal link with the landed 
interest. This was the bal)is for the conflict and dissociation between the landed 
interest and the executive. The Corn Laws of 1815 were seen by the landed interest 
as the continuation of the executive's support for, and conception of, the position of 
the landed interest. It wal) regarded by them, as a permanent and long-term 
commitment to maintain agricultural prices and hence agricultural profitl) - the 
material foundation for the landed interest. The executive's support for protection 
presented al) in conformity with the interests and conception of the landed aristocracy 
and gentry was essentially pragmatic. To them, it was a transitional measure whose 
continuance rested on its ability to guarantee and safeguard food supplies, not the 
maintenance of agricultural profits through the extension of cultivation. 
Any tendency towards increased protection for the landed interest was 
removed with the Agricultural Select Committees of 1820 and 1821 192• They 
" killed all hope of increased protection. Henceforth, any initiative for changes 
in the corn law was to come from itl) urban opponents, whom the Report encouraged, 
while agriculturalist~ had to fight to keep what they already possessed ..... Meanwhile, 
for the' official' or' administrative' Tories, this long masterly document settled the 
future of corn law strategy - an ever-open and progressively freer corn trade, and 
increasing reliance on imported food. " 193 
191. Ibid, p.79 
192. The Select Committee on Petitions on Agricultural Distress and the Mode of Ascertaining 
Prices of Corn in Maritime Districts under existing Corn Laws ParI. Papers, 1820 (255) 11.10 1. The 
Select Committee on Petitions Complaining of the Depressed State of Agriculture of the U.K. ParI. 
Papers. 1821 (668) DU. See also the reaffmnation of this position in the First Report of the Select 
Committee to inquire into Allegations of Petitions complaining of the Distressed State of 
Agriculture of the United Kingdom 1822 (165) V.l and the Second Report 1822 (346) V.9 
193. B. Hilton. Ibid. p.I07 
I~J 
This break in official agricultural thought in 1821, which loosened the 
correspondence between the material interests of the aristocracy and gentry and the 
government's policy, was to be one moment in a far more democratic dissociation in 
the later 1820s in the form of the repeal of the Test and Corporation Actc) (removing 
restrictions upon those of Protestant religion, but who practiced outside and did not 
recognise the legitimacy of the Anglican Church) and the repeal of the restrictions 
imposed on Catholics. Both of these were seen by the aristocracy, gentry and clergy, 
as sundering the connection between the Church and State, and, hence the ' 
established constitution '. Hence, 
" [t]he years of 1800-1832 witnessed, then, not so much the progressive 
advance of a liberal mood shared by all as the gradual numerical erosion of a social, 
religious and political hegemony from without, and a fmal and sudden betrayal from 
within. In that process parliamentary reform played a subordinate part ... .Interest in it 
as a political issue, never at very high level, waxed and waned; in the 1820s it almost 
died away entirely. Relatively few men at any time had hailed it as an obvious 
solution to society's manifold problems. Throughout the first decades of the 
nineteenth century, Emancipation and Repeal took a great and growing, precedence 
over Reform: Catholic and Protestant Dissent counted for much, democracy little. 
Far from Emancipation being' an aspect of the reform question " Reform waC) a 
consequence of the shattering of the old order by Emancipation." 194 
The collapse of the' old order " in which aristocratic power was entrenched in a 
unitary society, with a State of divine origin initimately related and entwined with the 
Anglican Church, led to a restructuring and reorientation of the social order and its 
institutions. Among those, which became the object of this focus of reform, was the 
criminal law. The nature and type of reform of both the substantive and procedural 
194. J.C.D. Clark, English Society 1688-1832 (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1986), 
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aspects of the criminal law of the' old order' was to determine the foundations of the 
system, and the place of the defendant within it, for the nineteenth century. 
Remoulding the Criminal Law:Criminal Law Reform Under the Criminal Law 
Commissioners 
a)Positionine the Defendant.- The Consideration of the Representation olthe 
Defendant bv Counsel in the Second Report by the Commissioners on the 
Criminal lAw 1836 
It was during the consideration of this specific issue that the Commissioners would 
establish the status and position of the defendant in the remoulded criminal law. The I 
old system I, as part of the ancien regime, produced the defendant's position a') the 
pure effect of its own social power, as a result of the conjunction of the mode of 
authority and the individual person in the form of the judge and justice of the peace. 
The defendant was the subject of this power not merely in the sense of being affected 
by it externally, but that her/his position had no independent, stable existence it 
depended upon that social power for its creation. This mode of authority became the 
object of attention of the Commission through their consideration of the adequacy of 
the trial judge to act a') the defendant's representative at the felony trial. 
The I Old System I had not allowed counsel representing a defendant at a 
felony trial to address the jury directly. This was in contrast to misdemeanour cases 
where counsel could address the court of the accused. With the increase in the 
number of capital statutes in the later eighteenth century and early ninteenth century, 
until their reduction by Peel and Russell, this meant that a defendant on trial charged 
with a felony, which if proven carried the death penalty, could not be effectively 
represented by counsel; whereas; a person charged with a I minor I misdemeanour 
offence could be. This I anomaly I of the Common Law was the expression of the 
emergence of lawyers with the criminal process. The I Old System I had operated, 
before their apperance, on the principle that the defendant could not give evidence, 
that is, take the oath and having given evidence be cross-examined on it This was 
based on the principle that no one could be convicted unless the proof was so 
convincing that it excluded the possibility of a defence. This principle wa~ rendered 
problematic with the emergence of the possiblity of legal representation for the 
defendant and was diminished by confining full legal representation to a particular 
class of offence. This I resolution I of the problem by the Common Law was the point 
of entry for the Commission into the wider question of the position and status of the 
defendant at the criminal trial. 
The consideration of the position of the defence counsel at a felony trial, led 
them to pose the question of the basis on which the practice of the defence counsel 
addressing the jury could be allowed. This was to be their focus of attention on the 
matter, and, it ba~is was to be evaluated in terms of whether it would tend to the 
discovery of truth, and, if this answer to this intial consideration was affirmative, then 
it still had to be considered whether the advantageousness of the speech by defence 
counsel was offset by any inconvenience inseparable from the practice. 
The Commission decided that because of the nature of the legal system it~elf, 
which differs from the rest of society, that some statement and explanation should 
follow the proof of the facts in a criminal ca';e. Where this is a trial by jury, it 
becomes even more important for the Commission that 
11 ample means should be afforded for enabling them to come to the correct 
conclusion. 11 195 
195. Second Report by the Commissioners on the Criminal Law, ParI. Papers 1836, Vol. XXXVI, 
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The evidence of the accused was, therefore, established as essential to ' justice' and, 
as a result, it also became essential that he/she should be heard in the manner most 
likely to be effectual - by her/his counsel. For, without this ability to be represented, 
the efficacy of the defendant's evidence would be placed in a context in which 
" the privilege would frequently be illUSOry. " 196 
This analysis led the Commission to the conclusion that it was jusifiable for the 
defendant to be represented, irrespective of the type of offence with which he/she was 
charged. The defendant was viewed as being incapable, in comparison with a lawyer, 
of stating a case, arguing against false witnesses and arguing against circumstantial 
evidence. When the defendant was confronted by a trial in which these were 
necessary, then, in the Commission' view, 
" it is manifestly of little use to allow him the privilege of a speech to the Jury. 
" 197 
The recommendation that the defendant have the capacity to be represented by 
counsel throughout the criminal process also flowed from an analysis of the judicial 
role in the' Old System '. This was the existent site of the creation of the defendant's 
position in the criminal trial and representation by counsel was, in principle, 
antithetical to the type of power and authority which the judge currently exercised at 
the trial. For, it produced a guaranteed space, in the structure of the trial, for the 
existence of the defendant, which was independent, and separate from, any 
recognition conferred by the trial judge - the sole source of the present' position' of 
the defendant 
196. Ibid, p.188 
197. Ibid, p.188 
This re orientation, and, redefinition of the position of the judge and the 
defendant, within the trial, produced by the Commission, took place through an 
interrogation of the capacity of the trial judge to act as counsel for the defendant By 
locating the process of investigation on this preceptual terrain, the Commission 
immediately occluded the possibility of considering the genesis of the position of the 
trial judge as one which was rooted in within the social relations of the ancien regime. 
The trial judge was assumed to have operated in this capacity throughout the ancien 
regime, and, he was to be held incapable of exercising it through a comparative 
assessment of the his position and capabilities with those of a defence counsel 198. 
This assumption brought with it, a5 a necessary corollary, that the trial process under 
the' Old System' did accord independent recognition to the position of the defendant, 
but that this was prevented from its full realisation by various t anomalies t and ' flaws 
'. This, in turn, projected the Common Law foundation of the criminal process as in 
itself unproblematic and free from domination. Its origin is given the appearance of an 
immuntable and natural event which, as a result, need not it5elf be the subject of 
attention. This confers upon the trial, and, the relation between the judge and the 
defendant an equally rigid, unhistorical and natural appearance. It reduces the relation 
to one of pure formalism which renders it incapable of being comprehended as a 
particular insitutional expression of the totality of social relations. 
This whole construction of the nature of the trial, and, the relation between the 
defendant and the trial judge, with its analytical moves and political logic, wa" the 
particular expression of the nature of the' programme t of legal reform in which 
It Bentham's theoretical views could be used to make sense of an autonomous 
substantive system. It is this division of thinking, between Bentham's concepts and 
198. See, in particular the evidence of Sir F. Pollock and W. Ewart, pp. 195-6. 
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common law context, which explains much of the impetus behind, and, the nature of, 
law reform ... " 199 
It simply reformulated the Common law, through the process of clarification by rules, 
and readjusted the position of the trial judge by allowing the defendant to be 
represented by counsel though out the criminal process. This was no longer the trial 
structure of the' Old System " but neither wac; it a profound break with that system 
and itc; perception of the position of the defendant. For, in this remoulding of the 
criminal trial the defendant remained an object of prosecution, merely changing the 
form in which that status, ac; an object, was constructed. It ceases to be the effect of 
the practices of the trial judge and now becomes one which evolves through the 
evidence collated at the trial form the defendant and the prosecution. The' uncertain' 
practical logic of the trial judge is replaced by the rules of evidence which are 
presented as emancipated from the' anomalies' if the ' Old System '. This change, 
however, is not connected with the attempt to rethink the position of the defendant, 
but with the readjustment of the legitimacy of the criminal process. 
" When it is considered that Criminal justice in this country is administered 
principally through the medium of the popular tribunal[thejury], it will be at once 
perceived how exceedingly important ifis, not merely that the administration of 
Criminal Justice should be moderate and just, but that it should appear to be such to 
those to whom, as Jurors, duties so important are confided. " 200 
In other words, the legitimacy of the criminal law is not sought to be based upon the 
concordence of formal procedures and material claims to justice from the perspective 
of the defendant, but solely and exclusively on rules of formal procedure. The legal 
decision confers validity upon the criminal process, and, has validity conferred upon it, 
199. M. Lobban, The Common Law and English Jurisprudence 1760-1850 (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 
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but that decision itself. These is no need for any further legitimation as it is provided 
by the factual existence of the process and the operation of it'S procedure. 
b)The Concgptual Legacy of the Commission: Fixi",: the Asymmetrical 
Distribution of Social Power within the Conception of the Criminal Process 
The general perspective of the Commission was one in which the position of the 
defendant quickly slid, and, hence disappeared, into a consideration of the totality of 
available evidence and the justification for retaining any obstacle to its increased 
availability and amount. The trial was presumed to be the site in the criminal process 
that was free from domination, and, the evidence elicted within the trial was an object 
which was simply contemplated in order to arrive at a verdict. 
, 
Underlying this, was a conception of the social world which assumed that it 
was a universe of symbolic exchanges and that all action within it was merely 
communication whose meaning was to be discerned by means of a code, language or 
culture - here the rules of evidence. The truth was, therefore, founded and 
determined by the free exchange of information at the trial guaranteed by the benign 
background conditions of these rules of evidence. Once the existing I anomalies I had 
been removed, then the trial was presented as a sphere free from domination and any 
kind of coercion. For, with the defendant, prosecutor and judge now incapable of 
influencing the outcome of the trial there was no space for the exercise of arbitrary 
power by anyone of them over any of the others. 
This perspective project'S the unification of the discursive practices at the trial, 
through the imposition of the rules of evidence, as one in which language is never 
seen as an object of action and power. Action is presented as a pure act of 
communication, and, social interaction as symbolic, but it thereby forgets 
1-=1" 
" that the relations of communication par excellence -linguistice exchanges -
are also relations of symbolic power in which the power relations between the 
speakers or their respective groups are actualised. " 201 
This forgetfulness enabled the trial to be presented as an end in it'ielf, an almost' 
formal exercise' whose dynamics are purely internal. 
Equally internal and benign, on this presentation, are the rules of evidence 
themselves which provide the legitimate foundation and authority of the trial. They 
are viewed as representing a mere clarification and unification of the trial proceeding. 
Yet, they achieve far more than this for they provide the conditions of possibility for 
I 
the split between the criminal process and the surrounding environment. This 
differentiation is effected and reproduced by these rules because, by processing 
information, they either confer value upon, or, devalue the information which they 
operation upon. This, then, reduces the possibilities of meaning of the information 
and enables it to be dealt with by the criminal trial process itself. These rules do not 
have to produce a consensus nor do they need to produce an agreement upon the 
ascription of value to the information. This, in turn, allows the criminal system to 
maintain a stable, system-specific abstraction from the environment. The rules of 
evidence prestructure 
" the perception of choices, the way of posing questions, incentives to explore, 
preferences and so forth .... As a result, the environment appears contingent for the 
system. " 202 
The information which is ' ordered' by these evidential rules, is generally 
produced orally by the prosecutor, defendant and their respective witnesses. This 
201. P. Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, trans. G. Raymond and M. Admnson, ed. J.B. 
Thompson (Oxford:Polity Press, 1991), p.36 
202. N. Luhmann, The Differentiation of Society (Columbia:Columbia University Press, 1982), 
p.l72 
means that the process of evaluation of that information is not one based merely upon 
the purely formal analysis of linguistice utterances. The claim to be heard and 
believed depends upon a social process of recognition. 
" The question of performative utterances becomes clearer if one sees it as a 
particular case of the effects of sym bolie domination, which occurs in alllinguistie 
exchanges. The linguistice relation to power is never defined solely by the relation 
between the linguistic competances present. And the weight of different agents 
depends ... on the recognition ... the they receive ... Symbolic imposition ... can function 
only if there is a convergence of social conditions which are altogether distinct from 
the strictly linguistic logic of discourse. " 203 
By separating the act of speaking from the rest of the social field, the Commission 
sought to present this act of speaking as having an existence which wa"l independent 
from the dynamics of the criminal process. The recognition of the position of the 
defendant could then be projected as being guaranteed an independence and status 
because herihis information was not seen to be intimately related to the trial itself. 
This perspective was provided with a ' material' element, onto which it could 
project itself, by the representation of the defendant by counsel. The defendant, being 
unable under the existing rules of procedure to act as witness in her/his defence, wa.." 
in the new schema of the Commission, able to delegate the conduct of his case to a 
lawyer. This, then, enabled the trial to be presented as resting purely on the 
presentation of the case, and, hence on the allocutionary skill and ingenuity of the 
defendant's lawyer. The lawyer is thereby accredited, as an individual and in his 
speech, with the power which forgets its origin and possibility in the structure of the 
criminal process. 
203. P. Bourdieu, ibid, p.72 
" The real source of the magic of perfonnative utterances lies ... .in the social 
conditions of the institution of the ministry of the ministry, which constitutes the 
legitimate representative as an agent capable of acting on the social world through 
words, by instituting him as a medium between the group and the social world; and it 
does that, among other things, by equipping him with the signs and insignia aimed at 
underlining the fact that he is not acting in his own name and under his own authority. 
" 204 
This was to be reinforced by the lawyers themselves who acted within this space as if 
their position and capacities were solely the product of their individual linguistic 
competence. This, in itc;;elf, wac;; 
" also one of the manifestations of competance in the sense of the right to 
speak and to power through speech. There is a whole dimension of authorised 
language, its rhetoric, syntax, vocabulary and even pronunciation, which exists purely 
to underline the authority of it') author and the trust he demands. In this respect, style 
is an element of the mechanism .... through which language aims to produce and 
impose the representation of its own importance and thereby help to ensure its own 
credibility. " 205 
The exclusive focus, by the Commission, on the trial as the sole site of the 
operation of the criminal process necessarily dissociated the trial from the collection 
of witnesses and evidence. These were, thereby, characterised as activities which no 
more than a practical and unremarkable relation to the trial and its detennination of 
gUilt or innocence of the defendant. The decision to prosecute, and, the stages up to 
the conduct of the trial became an unproblematic, external territory which surrounded 
the trial. This I outside I realm was not conceived or seen to have the potential to 
affect the outcome of the trial itself. The projection of the trial as purely 
204. P. Bourdieu, ibid, p.75 
205. Ibid, p.76 
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communicative entity depended not only on the neutralisation of all power relations 
within the trial, but also upon the denial of their existence in the decisions and 
practices which resulted in individual's being' fed-in' into the trial. 
These conceptual devices were interlinked to provide the Commission's 
definition and demarcation of the dynamics of the trial process and the position of the 
defendant within it effectively determined the dominant perception of the criminal 
process throughout the nineteenth century. This perceptual framework transcended 
the legislation of 1836 which accorded the defendant the ability to be represented 
irrespective of the type of offence which with which he/she was charged. It structured 
the interpretative horizon through which the criminal process was understood. The 
position of the defendant was fixed within its analytical framework and this entailed 
that subsequent consideration of this position would take place from within the terms 
which it had constructed. This meant that the position of the defendant was 
considered exclusively from the point of view of the trial, and, the issue centred 
around her/his representation at the trial and her/his ability of give evidence rather 
than an unsworn statement from the dock. 
The form in which the Commission constructed the trial as an object of 
analysis, which, in turn produced this definition of the position of the defendant, 
related to a wider conceptualisation of the character of society. It was see,n as a 
mechanical system whose smooth functioning and internal harmony was hampered by 
the friction of I anomalies I and arbitrary personal influences. With the removal of 
these element\), the machine-like social system would find its natural balance and 
would run itself without the need for substantial adjustment or alteration. This 
process was guided by the desire to make the ' the constitution' more secure by 
linking the harmonious operation of the social system with itc; , organic' unity. It was 
not concerned with changing the position of the defendant other than as an effect of 
the revitalisation of the criminal process as an element of the social system. The logic 
'fl ;1 
of that social system was the imperative not the consideration of the particularity of 
the defendant's position. 
The Commission provided the perceptual framework within which the 
development of the criminal process could be shaped by the imperatives and 
tendencies of the elements which composed it These developments would be 
perceived as the natural, unproblemative evolution of the criminal process because the 
belief in the legitimacy of the criminal process was founded on a purely empirical 
basis. The continued existence of the criminal process was sufficient for its legitimacy 
because its authority was purely procedural - simply making a decision according to a 
formal procedure. 
With the dominance of the police as the sole agents of law enforcement, the 
expansion in summary jurisdiction and the development of the legal profession this 
perceptual framework, installed by the Commission, became ideological in another 
sense. It now operated not simply as a theory which was a reflection of a particular 
conceptual construction of the criminal process, but as a description of a reality to 
which it bore little relation. 
The Remoulding in Practice: The Configuration of the Criminal Process in the 
Later Nineteenth Century 
The ' natural' evolution of the criminal process, which had been the foundation of the 
Criminal Law Commissions' conceptual framework, was in the later nineteenth 
century, intimately connected with the development, and interrelation between, the 
various elements that composed it. The tendencies and dynamiCS of these elements 
were to be the motive force behind this evolutionary change. 
"3;1 
a)The Police 
The County and Borough Police Act 1856, created the preconditions for the police to 
be able to assume control over both the enforcement of the criminal law and the 
decision to prosecute. The police were, therefore, placed in a position in which they 
could determine who was t fed-in t to the criminal process for trial. As a result, social 
control and the operation of the criminal process became increasingly tied to the aims 
of police practice 206. 
With this dominance of the police within these areas the trial was immediately 
placed in a position in which its independence and claim to be the exclusive site of 
gUilt deteremination, based upon the rules of evidence, ceased to be a true description 
of its character and existence. Police control over the conduct of prosecutions(which 
wa~ recognised as legitimate which this role was brought into question with the issue 
of the establishment of centralised, state control over the conduct of prosecutions 
207)meant that the criminal process was dependent upon the police for both the 
initiation of prosecutions and the nature, character and quantity of information which 
would be the basis of the prosecution case. This produced a situation where the 
prosecution was now conducted by a social system - the police- rather than being the 
result of numerous separate decisions of individual, private prosecutors. Therefore, 
the object of prosecution now became tied to the goals of a social system, and its 
collective practice. The area presented as external to the trial, and, hence unimportant 
and unremarkable continued to be characterised in this way by an exclusive 
concentration on the purely formal nature of prosecution which continued (with the 
failure of the attempts to institute a system of public prosecution)to be brought by 
individuals. The relation of the parties at the trial- an individual prosecutor and an 
individual defendant with their attendant witnesses - wa~ held to represent and define 
the nature of the totality of proceedings leading up to the trial. Hence, the sphere 
206. See previous chapter on the Police where this is dealt with in more detail. 
207. See previous chapter on the System of Prosecution where this is dealt with in more detail 
outside the trial was still projected as one which was free from domination and nay 
kind of coercion, and, it had to be if the other element of this conceptual framework -
the centrality of the trial - was to be maintained. 
b )Summary .lurisdiction 
Summary jurisdiction had not been the object of the Criminal Law Commissioner's 
attention. They were much more concerned with indictable offences and trial by jury 
which had the effect of presenting them as the only jurisdictional and procedural 
region of the criminal law of any interest of concern. It became the focus of attention 
only in the 1840s with Jervis's Acts208 which readjusted this area in accordance with 
the dominant perspective on the criminal process this meant that the Common Law 
basis was retained, but its form was altered in order to be subsumed under rules. The 
authority and scope of operation of justices of the peace was now expressed in 
legislation rather than in the implict practical logic flowing form the activities of the 
incumbant justice. The structure of the trial itself, however, wa.;; not fundamentally 
changed. The trial process still consisted of prosecutor, defendant, their respective 
witnesses and the justice. As with the trial for a felony before a judge and jury, there 
was little change in the substantive position of the defendant. It was simply aformal 
redefinition, merely re-locating the ba.;;is on which the defendant was an object of 
prosecution. Moreover, the reason for this redefinition was a by-product, rather than 
a central consideration, of Jervis's Acts. For, these Acts concentrated upon, and 
sought, the re-orientation of the function and scope of action of the justice of the 
peace of which the position of the defendant had been a creation. 
Summary jurisdiction, in its modified form, presented a far simpler procedure 
for prosecution. Not only in the sense of the amount of time and the cost to the 
prospective prosecutor in comparison with the trial at Quarter Sessions or Assizes, 
208. On this see the previous chapter on the Police and D. Freestone and lC. Richardson, 'The 
Making of English Criminal Law (7) Sir John Jervis and his Acts', Criminal Law Review (Jan. 
1980),5-16. 
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but also the greater degree of certainty of conviction that this procedure offered. 
Under the ancien regime, this trial procedure wa~ to deal with misdemeanour offences 
only. However, legislation fonn the 1840s onwards, fundamentally altered the 
parameters of summary jurisdiction by allowing the justices to deal with certain 
felonies by the mode of summary trial 209. This had a major impact on the 
distribution of criminal ca",es within the criminal process with the nineteenth century 
characterised by a marked and continuing increase in the number of cases dealt with 
summarily, and, a concomitant reduction in the number of cases dealt with at Quarter 
Sessions and Assizes. The periods of greatest decline were after the 1855 Act and the 
1879 Act 210. The character and pace of this change was equally dramatic at the local 
level, 
" Reference to the Quarter Sessions minute books of both Bedfordshire and 
Nottinghamshire shows the dramatic decline in ca~es brought before these courts in 
the second half of the century. At Epiphany Sessions in the middle years of the 
century, for example, the counties were hearing on average about 20 and between 30 
and 40 cases respectively; by the late 1890s these numbers had fallen, generally, to 
less than half a dozen in both instances. At the same time the number of ca",es heard 
summarily, was soaring; at the Epiphany Sessions by the mid 1860s Bedfordshire was 
209. The Acts which this change were: The Juvenile Offenders Act 1847(two magistrates could try 
offenders up to 14yrs old, with their consent, cbarged with simple larceny or a felony punisbable as a 
simple larceny), The Juvenile Offenders Act 1850(this basic jurisdiction was extended by increasing 
the age of offenders to sixteen), The Criminal Justice Act 1855(with the consent of the accused, all 
simple larcenies could be dealt with up to the value of 5s. Also, by the motion of the justices 
themselves they could decide to deal summarily with a simple larceny! theft form the person!larceny 
as a clerk or servant), The Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879(Justices could now deal with all indictable 
offences by children under 12[except murder]. The range of offences capahle of being dealt with by 
the consent of 12-16yr olds was extended. Adults who pleaded guilty could be dealt with summarily 
for a similar number of offences as children between 12-16 with no limits on the value of property. 
Of their own motion they could nowtry all cases wbere property did not exceed 40s. in value), The 
Summary Jurisdiction Act J 899(Of their own motion justices could now try offences of obtaining 
money/goods under false pretences to the value of 40s. All offences committed summarily by 12-
16yr olds, with consent, could now be dealt with summarily). 
210. L. Radzinowicz and R.Hood, The History 0/ English Criminal Law and it Administrationfrom 
1750,5 vols (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1990), V(l990), pp.618-622, note that in the years 1854-1857 
the number of committed for trial declined by 57% from 21,000 to 9,000. While those charged with 
indictable offences but tried summarily increased from 3,000 to 35,000. Between 1879-1881 there 
was a decline of 10% in committ.tls for trial from 10,000 to 9,000. While those cbarged with 
indictable offences but tried summarily increased from 35,000 to 46,000. 
recording around 50 and Nottinghamshire 100 cases under the Criminal Justice 
Act[ 1855], with another half dozen or so under the Juvenile Offenders Act[ 1847]. In 
addition they were also filling, respectively, around 150 and around 300 other 
summary convictions for assault, drink offences, malicious damage, game offences, 
highway offences, vagrancy, etc. " 211. 
This meant that by the 1860s the majority of criminal prosecutions were being 
tried summarily before justices of the peace. The number of defendants who were 
actually tried before a trial judge and jury was small and becoming increasingly smaller 
throughout the nineteenth century. Therefore, the concentration, by the Criminal Law 
Commissioners, on the trial before ajudge and jury, and its presentation ars the almost 
paradigmatic form of trial in the criminal process, had, by the 1860s, become an 
inaccurate portrayal of the reality of the criminal process. 
Despite this inaccuracy, this theoretical framework retained its position as the 
dominant interpretative perspective upon the criminal process. Certain elements of 
this intial framework were merely adjusted in order that these changes were not seen 
to challenge the validity of the framework as a whole. Moreover, the coherence of 
this framework it(telf wars not one that needed to be purely theoretical, that is 
internally consistent, because its claim to coherence was political, that is, its ability to 
generate acceptance of the real operation of the criminal process by constructing a 
theory which, in turn, constructs a consensus. 
In terms of the theory, it entailed the defintion of all those calies that were 
tried aummarily as ' minor " unremarkable cases, and, the small number of cases which 
came for trial by jury as exceptional, and, hence' serious' cases. The differing 
structure of each mode of trial could then be presented as a function of the nature of 
the calies which were dealt with. However, by following this route the theory 
211. C. Ems!ey, Crime and Society in England 1750-1900 (London:Longman, 1987). p.l68. footnote 
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confront';; the possibilty of the lack of universality of the rules of evidence and 
representation of the defendant which had both been central elements of the Criminal 
Law Commissioners framework. The formal universality of the criminal process, 
articulated by the Commissioners, is undermined by the changed character and 
dynamics of the criminal trial process. The permanent shift of the majority of criminal 
cases to summary trial and the absence of' strict' legal proof, coupled with the 
greater certainty of prosecution and punishment only fixed more clearly and 
rigourously the position of the defendant as an object of prosecution to be processed. 
This pattern of operation of the criminal process could only be ignored by the system's 
disengagement from any concern with the particularity of the defendant'S position as 
something which subsisted prior to the system itself; the dominance of process of 
process, efficiency and disciplinary values within the system, the lack of review or 
control over police practice by the system and the empha';;is upon the' serious' 
offence before the jury as the real site of' justice '. 
c)The Legal Profession 
The Criminal Law Commissioner's recognition and legitimation of the legal 
representation of the defendant, throughout the criminal process, was merely a 
universalisation of an already existing potential within the criminal process developing 
since the 1750s. Their increasing presence in the criminal process, though admittedly 
small, was bound up with the constitution of lawyers as a profession which was a 
parallel development during this period 212. By the time of the 1836 Act, the lawyers 
themselves had split into two mutually exclusive professional groups -
banisters(counsel)and solicitors(attorneys). Despite their growing collective presence 
within the legal system as a whole, the majority of their activities were bound up with 
212. See, for a det1iled description of this process of the development of the conditions of possibility 
of the English legal profession, W.J. Reader, Professional Men: The Rise of the Professional Classes 
in Nineteenth Century England(London:Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1986) and B. Abet-Smith and R. 
Stevens, Lawyers and the Courts: A Sociological Study of the English Legal System 1750-
1965(London:Heinemann, 1967) 
civil matters, particularly property, with very few of them regularly and consistently 
involved in criminal matters. 
With the other changes in the criminal process, the 1836 Act was very quickly 
rendered problematic. The Act itself had given a fonnal right to legal representation 
by counsel but had made no provision for its actual realisation by enabling the poor, as 
of right, to obtain counsel. For, the relation between counsel and client envisioned by 
the Act, was still to be a private, fee-paying one. This rendered itpurely formal since 
the majority of criminal defendant's were without the means to exercise that right 
The Commission's logic for the generalisation of this practice - the defendant's 
evidence as an integral part of the trial and the necessity for its adequate presentation 
- disappeared amidst the changes in the criminal process it"ielf. The summary trial 
procedure, with the justices(magistrates)dealing with both matters of law and 
fact(unlike the indictable trial procedure in which these matters were embodied in 
separate elements - the judge and jury), became the site where the police prosecuted 
the majority of cases, of which, an increasing number were based upon offences 
whose general wording left their practical definition to the police themselves. The 
dominance of the summary trial fonn, within the criminal process, coupled with the 
control of law enforcement and the conduct of prosecutions by the police, produced a 
structure in which the majority of trials consisted of little more than the policeman 
giving evidence, perhaps with the addition of one or two witnesses. This was deemed 
sufficient to ensure a conviction whatever the defendant presented in herlhis defence. 
Therefore, there was little scope, within this structure which dealt with the majority of 
'criminal cases, for legal representation of the defendant to achieve much on herlhis 
behalf. Once this mode of trial was characterised as dealing with' minor' and 
unexceptional matters, the necessity for legal representation it"ielf, in accordance with 
the 1836 Act, was not seen to be an important element of that trial procedure. From 
the profession's point of view too it offered few financial incentives or chances to 
18' 
establish or re-vitalise a career with a successful defence case which would gain wide 
pUblicity. Therefore, very few defendants wer represented in the cases which were 
tried summarily. 
Attention was therefore concentrated exclusively upon the small number of 
trials which reached the higher courts. This reinforced the dominant view of these 
cases a'i the I serious I and hence real criminal ca'ies. They were dealt with by a form 
of trial with a separation between those who tried the facts and those who tried the 
law - the jury and the judge respectively; and; it was the arena in which the great 
majority of criminal lawyers operated thereby strengthening the notion of this region 
of the criminal process as the one in which guilt or innocence were determined by 
means of procedures that were attentive to the seriousness of these matters. 
Moreover, the type of offence which was dealt with at this level tended to be ones 
where the quantity and type of evidence necessary to obtain a conviction was not 
satisfied by the evidence of individual policemen. This meant that the possibilities of 
challenge and contestation of the evidence offered by the prosecution were much 
greater than in the lower courts, and, hence created a space for a practice which could 
be presented as inhering within the individual lawyer, and, testifying both to the 
benefit of legal representation and the competance of the legal profession as a whole. 
Despite the availability of this demonstrative space to the legal profession, the 
majority of defendant'i who were tried under this mode of procedure were 
unrepresented when they reached the trial. A system of I dock briefs I had evolved 
during the nineteenth century under which the defendant, in open court, could ask to 
be represented by an unnamed counsel then present in court. He/she had no right to 
ask for a specific barrister by name, he was merely chosen at random, by the 
defendant, from those attending court on that particular day. In essence, this 
supposed I right I comprised little more than a few minutes conversation between them 
prior to the trial. 
" such dock brief defences[were]really a caricature, and almost invariably 
end[ed] in conviction. " 213 
Alternatively, the trial judge, of his own motion, would ask a barrister to undertake 
the representation of the defendant gratuitously with much the same result 
The only other source of advice available to the defendant, apart from that 
which was provided indirectly by religious denominations, was that provided by Poor 
Man's Lawyers Meetings which were set up during the later nineteenth century and 
were located predominantly in the major cities. They were run by volunteer lawyers 
with little co-operation or co-ordination between the various Poor Man's Lawyer 
Meetings. Only a small percentage of people were able to get advice at these 
meetings with the number of people receiving advice, together with the amount of 
time given over to each individual who was able to get advice, declining with the 
number of people who turned up to each meeting. With the result that 
" probably the average time given to each person at a large meeting[was]five 
minutes. " 214 
These meetings could be held independently by lawyers, or, in London they could be 
part of the Settlements established during the nineteenth century. These were 
organisations of social workers formed to give education and social services to the 
poor. They were located in poorer areas or slums, and some offered regular Poor 
Man's Lawyer Meetings. However, as with the other Meetings there was no co-
operation between the various settlement"l and there little organisation of the service 
itself with the advice being generally unsophisticated and unreliable. 
213. Gurney-Champion, Justice and the Poor in England (London:RoutJedge, 1926), p.52 
214. Ibid, p.18. 
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" Essentially, it is haphazard, unorganised charity, depending, for its value 
upon the particular lawyer giving the advice, or much more upon his private 
circumstances, and the amount of time he can spare for charity. " 215 
These three developments in the criminal process- the growth of police control 
over law enforcement and prosecution, the summary trial coming to deal with the 
majority of criminal cases, and, the configuration of the legal profession - all added 
impetus to and reinforced the development of a criminal process in which the position 
of the defendant was simply readjusted according to the internal criteria of the 
criminal process. The criminal process was developing into a system in which 
detection, trial and punishment were more coherently and consistently linked together 
with the I excesses I of the highly individualised nature of the ancien regime being 
replaced by an I anonymous I process which presented itself as free from all excess and 
violence. 
Each aspect of this process was more distinctly demarcated and conducted by 
different elements each with its own set of practices and perspectives upon the 
criminal process. It was the maintenance of their coherence which became the goal of 
the system. This could only be produced by its adaptability to the, demands of those 
element'S which composed it, and, the generation of a stable yet alterable framework 
of expectation for the elements that composed it. These developments necessitated 
the independence of the criminal process from the defendant's interest as an 
irreducible, invariant anchor for the legitimacy of the criminal process. The basis of 
this legitimacy, therefore, come to rest on the mere act of decision-making, that is, 
selection and validity became inseparable. The guarantee of the legitimacy of 
authority became one of pure legality in which there was no claim or recourse to a 
foundation of legitimacy out'Side the procedures of the legal form itself. 
215. Gurney-Cbampion, ibid, p.29. 
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The ability of the criminal process to develop in accordance with these 
tendencies must be sought in the dominant political and legal characterisation of 
society and the criminal process. The nineteenth century saw modest extensions of 
the franchise in the Reform Acts of 1865 and 1885, but neither sought, or, were 
conceived with the intention of effecting universal suffrage. That is, individuals in 
society were not considered in the position of real equality, in which their mere 
identity as human beings was sufficient, in itrself to found their admittance to the 
public realm of politics. Given that political participation was the basis for the 
formation and application of decisions(it both confirms the identity as being 
responsible for their votelchoice and unifies individuals), then, the norms which were 
produced by this process, were the emanation of the collectivity(composed of 
individuals who participate in it)and each individual would be submitted to the laws of 
the State. Obedience becomes transformed into being subject to the law, or, rather a 
subject of the law that must be applied and executed uniformly and universally. It is, 
however, at this point that an antimony becomes possible as these individuals have a 
status whcih both places them above any particular law because they WOUld, 
otherwise, cease to be the source of legislation, and, subjects them to the law because 
of the imperative character of the norms which they formulate which this necessarily 
generalisable applicability. The reconcilliation of these two aspects can only be 
produced by their effecting their identity, namely, on the presumption of the real 
equality of all individuals that compose that society. Only if an individual had exactly 
the same rights as any other can their existence as simultaneously above and under the 
law occur. If this relation is denied, or, fails to be created then the institution of 
society ceases to be founded upon a claim to equality. Equality cannot be limited as 
once anyone is not equal then equality ceases to be applied. 
In the nineteenth century, therefore, there was little attempt to base society 
upon an idea of the universality of citizenship, and, the incremental political changes 
were not themselves a gradual extension of equality as it had, to be coherent, to 
immediately concern the universality of individuals. What wall at issue, therefore, was 
the play of power and validation of domination. Hence, those excluded from the 
realm of politics were subject to a social system over which they had no control and 
whose legitimacy was not seen to rest upon the generation of their consensus. They 
did not participate in the formation and application of decisions, and, were only under 
the law - the objects administration. This institution of society provided the 
prerequisites for the development of these tendencies within the criminal process and 
its subsequent structuration in accordance with them. The continuance, in parallel 
with these developments, of the conceptualisation of the criminal system as one 
centred upon the trial, it')elf characterised as composed of judge and jury, with all 
other elements of the criminal process external and unimportant, found it') last 
legislative expression, in the nineteenth century, in the Criminal Evidence Act 1898. 
The Criminal Eyidence Act 1898: Settling the Last Outstanding Matter Within 
the Dominant Conception of the Criminal Process 
The Criminal Evidence Act 1898 accorded the defen4ant the right to give evidence in 
her/his own defence. The defendant was now a competant witness with the capacity 
to give evidence, on oath, during the trial. The ability to give evidence, under the 
terms of the Act, was to rest in the sole discretion of the defendant. The defendant 
could not be made to give evidence, he/she was not to be a compellable witness. 
While this measure was implemented at virtually the end of the nineteenth century, 
conceptually, its foundation is in the overall' programme t of change within the 
criminal process in the nineteenth century, and, various attempts were made 
through tout the nineteenth century to remove the disqualification upon the defendant 
from giving evidence. In itself, the Act did not represent a profound change in either 
the operation of the criminal process as a whole, or, the position of the defendant 
within it. 
"'i 
a)The Parameters of the Debate over the 1898 Act.' Rearticulating the Dominant 
Perspective 
The discussion of the issues and the proposed Bill leading up to the Act of 1898, by 
both proponents and opponents of the measure, concentrated upon the necessity of 
change from the persepective of the criminal process as a whole. Opposition or 
support rested upon a divergence of opinion over whether the criminal process was 
currently operating in conformity with it') own systemic values. Proponents argued 
taht the system was not operating effectively enough, and, opponent') that change was 
unnecessary as the system was working perfectly well. This shared systemic 
perspective, of both proponents and opponents is strongly illustrated in the case of 
Herbert Stephen, a barrister and clerk of Assize of the Northern Circuit, who was the 
major opponent of the measure. He wrote a number of letters to the Times, articles in 
magazines and a book arguing against the measure. His book defends the unreformed 
system as being perfectly adequate in pursuing its purpose and being without any need 
for reform. 
" It is generally admitted that competance to testify is pretty sure, in a certain 
number of cases, to lead to the conviction of guilty persons who might otherwise 
escape. This appears to me to be of no considerable importance. According to the 
Criminal Statistics published by the Home Office for 1894, the proportions of persons 
tried for indictable offences who are convicted is no less than 82 per cent .... we do 
very well as we are .... [and there can be]no concern as to the efficiency of our methods 
of trying such prisoners as come before the courts." 216 
The debate over the proposed change was not conceived, nor focused upon, the 
defendant other than as an object of prosecution. The particularity of the defendant's 
interest is equated with and subsumed by the concern with evidence and proof at the 
trial. Therefore, the defendant's position is only considered as an effect of the criminal 
216. H. Stephen, Prisoners on Oath: Present and Future (London:Heinemann, 1898), pp.l3-14 
"Si 
process whose values are those orientated to the maintenance and reproduction of the 
system itself. 
This perspective was reinforced by the definition of the trial - the indictable 
trial with judge and jury - which both the proponents and opponents operated with. 
That this formed the common argumentative terrain related to both the enduring 
interpretative horizon of the Criminal Law Commissioners, and that fact that previous 
exceptions to the rule(that defendants could not give evidence in their own defence), 
under the criminal law (The Explosives Act 1883 and The Criminal Law Amendment 
Act 1885), concerned offences which were only triable on indictment. The indictable 
trial was considered to be the site of' justice' with the full complement of procedural 
and evidential characteristics of the criminal law in operation. Therefore, the 
defendant's interest was already realised and in consideration with these' devices '. 
This focus upon indictable trials was linked to the dominant conception of 
evidence and the trial process in which the trial, and rules of evidence that operate 
within it, represent the central procedural practice of the criminal process. The 
narrowness of this focus and definition, in turn, produces a complementary exclusivity 
of concentration on the particular elements which comprise the trial process. The 
rules of evidence become the ba.;;is of the identity of the criminal process because they 
are held to differentiate it from the surrounding social environment This 
differentiation is also presented as the exercise of control over this social environment 
by presenting the information sought to be utilised by the prosecution and defence as 
a radically different paradigm from that of the rules of evidence. 
The changes in the nature of prosecution produced, by the appearance and 
predominance of the police, cea~e to be a concern of this perspective because thi~ 
positing of the initial incommensurability between police information and legal 
evidence capable of being adduced at the trial. This incommensurability is further 
11~ 
represented as the difference between truth and the pragmatic demands of police 
practice which is maintained and guaranteed by the process of I translation I of police 
information into evidence in the legal system. While the police may be dominant 
agents of arrest and prosecution this perspective denies both the informational 
dependence of the trial on police practices of information collection, and; their ability 
, to affect the nature and logic of these practices. 
b) The Effect of the Act in Practice.' Little Chanee in the Dynamics and Structure 
of the Criminal Trial 
The operation of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898, within the structure of the criminal 
trial, did not initiate a dramatic change in the configuration and character of that 
process. The majority of cases were dealt with by the mode of summary trial where 
most trials amounted to little more than the defendant being confronted with primary 
police evidence. In this situation, the ability of the defendant to give evidence simply 
meant that the formal status, and the place within the proceedings, of anything that 
he/she said was altered. The capacity of the defendant to cross-examine the 
prosecutor, which the Act also conferred, presumed that this was in ito;;elf sufficient to 
equalise the institutional positions of prosecutor and defendant, and, lead to the 
presentation of the complete nature of the case. This presumption flowed from the 
other important element of the dominant perspective, namely, the assertion of the 
private, individual character of prosecutions which denied that this form had become 
an empty facade once the police gained control over the conduct of prosecutions 217. 
The lack of difference which the measure made to the position of the majority 
of defendants wac; mirrored by its insignificance for the police as prosecutors within 
the criminal process. The redefinition of the position of the defendant, which the Act 
produced, had a negligible impact upon the way in which the police operated. For, 
being trial centred in its approach, and viewing the whole process of enacting crimmal 
217, See, for more det.:'til, the previous chapter on the System of Prosecution. 
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proceedings as one between individuals, it did not perceive any divergence in the 
rationalities of action of the police and the defendant. Both were seen to act in 
accordance with the set of external rules of the criminal procedure, and, because of 
this conformity, there was no disparity in their power or capacities. It did not 
differentiate between the observance of law and the enforcement of law as it 
presumed that both were actions guided by norms. 
However, the enforcement of law is not in itself activity which is normative. It 
is concerned with the maintenance of law and the reintroduction of legality. 
" Enforcement is thus not observance, but is action of a different kind, wh,ich 
on its part may again observe or not observe norms. " 218 
In other words, law enforcement entails an essential selectivity in its practice in 
accordance with its own criteria of judgement, values and work techniques. The 
rationality with which the police operate is orientated with respect to specific premises 
of action and concrete results. The fulfilment of concrete tasks serves as the primary 
criterion for judging actions and decisions. Efficiency 
" is no longer defined as I following the rules " but the I causing of effects '. 
From the standpoint of the concrete tasks and the purposive action action required by 
them, the administration[here the police] must consider its own inputs and premises as 
contingently dependent upon criteria of instrumental suitability. It is efficient ot the 
extent that it succeeds in doing precisely this. The premises of administrative action 
are no longer rules to be imperatively complied with, but are instead treated as 
resources which are to be weighed from their standpoint of their adequacy for specific 
tasks. " 219 
218. N. Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law (London:Routledge, 1972), p.207 
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This presumption of the rationality and character of police activity and practice, with 
which the Act operated, entailed a general trust in the police together with an inability 
to perceive the possibility of the disparity between the defendant and the police either 
existing, or, being able to be reproduced at the trial. Hence, the disengagement from 
exercising any form of control over police practice external to the trial, and, the 
concomitant freedom of the police to operate according to their own organisational 
values which were the source of the power to define an individual as the object of a 
prosecution. 
The Act, therefore, made little significant difference to the operation and 
dynamics of the criminal process which had evolved during the nineteenth century.· 
The defendant was not placed, despite the redefintion of the status to be accorded to 
his information should he/she chose to be a witness in her/his defence, in a position 
which reduced or attenuated herlhis location within that criminal process as an object 
of prosecution. The criminal process had now taken on the configuration whic wa to 
characterise it during the majority of the twentieth century. The concerns of the 
dominant perspective, initially articulated by the Criminal Law Commissioners, were 
now fully realised with the passing of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898. The abstact 
legitimacy of the criminal processhad been established to the satisfaction of the 
dominant perspective with the result that the criminal process itself, as a societal 
insititution, was no longer conceived as being problematic. With this conferral of a 
background level of societallegitimacy, the strength of the values generated within 
the criminal system wer themselves reinforced. This, in turn, meant that the 
positioning of the defendant as an object of prosecution within the criminal process, 
which was a necessary effect of these values, was also reinforced. This conferred 
upon the criminal process the capacity to resist change, considered to be antithetical 
to these systemic practices and values, which had cohered together by the end of the 
nineteenth century, while at the same time adapting and adjusting element') to increase 
its presentationallegitimacy. This is clearly visible in the debate over the Poor 
Prisoner's Defence Act 1903. 
The Poor Prisoners' Defence Act 1903: A Change in Systemic Presentation 
The developments in the criminal process, during the nineteenth century, had meant 
that the representation of the defendant had remained at a purely symbolic level of 
generalisation. By the beginning of the twentieth century the meaning of access to 
legal representation by counsel, set out in the 1836 Act, was increa<;ingly constested 
with the assertion that it remained purely formal and incapable of realisation without 
financial provision by the State to ensure the effectiveness of this right. The 
emergence of this challenge represented the first wave of reform of a developing 
access-to-justice movement in which the problem is enunciated as one in which the 
gap, between the real exercise of the right and it') potential universalisability of 
application, is characterised as unmet legal needs. These can be met or satisfied with 
the greater accessibility of lawyers. 
" The focus here is on the procedural availability of lawyers to the poor, rather 
than specifically on the substantive goal of enforcing rights afftrmatively. " 220 
To the extent, however, that this first wave had a predominant focus upon the trial it 
attested to its weakness as an articulation of an alternative perspective and 
programme. For, to invest the trial with this degree of centrality in the definition of 
access-ta-justice, to the extent of closing the perspective around it, brought with it a 
number of assumptions which were shared with the dominant perspective from which 
it sought to distance it')elf. This points to the continuing' hegemony' of the dominant 
perspective due to its presence within the framework of its opponents and hence the 
weakness of that opposition. In spite of this, the first mode of reform aimed at . 
220. M. CappeIIetti and B. Garth, ' Access to Justice as a Focus of Research " in The Windsor 
Yearbook of Access to Justice, 1 (1981), ix-xxv(p.xi). See this also for the characterisation of the 
subsequent waves of the access-to-justice movement 
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making rights more effective was strongly resisted, and prevented from being realised, 
by the institutional embeddedness of antagonistic systemic values within the criminal 
process. 
a)The Committee on the Poor Prisoner's De.fence Act 1903.'Ridzt;s Transformed 
into Presentational Leeitimacy throueh Systemic Resistance 
The Proceedings and Report of the Committee show the collapse and relegation of 
this universal, rights-based approach to the defendant's position when confronted with 
the articulation of systemic values of efficiency and speed in the conduct of 
prosecutions. 
The Solicitor-General of Scotland was the only person giving evidence to the 
Committee who adopted a position founded upon a rights-based approach to the 
question of the defendant's representation. He was immediately questioned by the 
Committee over this foundation for his position in terms of the delay that it might 
cause in the conduct of trials. He saw this as an irrelevant consideration 
11 it does not seem to me ... that the chance that the trial would be longer should 
be used as an argument against having what I regard as a proper form of trial, namely, 
that a man who is on trial on a criminal charge should be properly defended. 11 221 
Every other witness who gave evidence, however, did not start with the same 
perceptual foundation in regard to the question of the representation of the defendant. 
Their resistance to universal reprsentation, as well as their acceptance of some form of 
State provision of funds to enable defendants to be represented, rested upon a 
perspective which considered the maintenance of the operation of the criminal system 
as the sole focus of attention. The large majority of cases were seen as not presenting 
221. Evidence of the Solicitor-General of Scotland in The Minutes of Evidence of the Proceedings of 
The Committee of the Poor Prisoners' Defence Act, ParI. Papers 1903, VoI. VII, p.61O 
a need for the defendant to be represented because the existing system dealt with them 
adequately. Moreover, that any notion of universal representation for the defendant 
was unworkable as was argued in the evidence presented to the Committee by, Sir 
Harry Poland, from the Committee of the County of London Justices, on which he 
had served as chairman, that the proposed Bill 
" is absolutely unworkable at the County of London Sessions, having regard to 
the fact that over 2,000 prisoners are committed for trial at those Sessions in the 
course of the year, namely over 1,700 at the 24 Sessions held a short intervals at 
Clerkenwell and over 500 at the 12 Sessions held at Newington. 11 222 
Not only is the volume of business within the criminal system regarded as incapable of 
accomodating such a right, but the provision of the right would reduce the number of 
those who pleaded gUilty. These are cases which are seen as ones in which the gUilt 
of the defendant is so obvious that they simply plead guilty at the fIrst opportunity 
with the trial as pure fonnality. However, the proposed Bill was seen as undennining 
this capacity of the system of elicit these gUilty pleas. 
11 all those persons [those who plead guilty] were to be furnished with a copy 
of the depositions and a fonn to fIll up that they might have solicitors and counsel to 
defend them. That would be an inducement to them to avail themselves of the liberal 
and enlightened profession of the law to get them off, instead of their pleading 
guilty .... .! think it would be most undesirable ot practically tell a man, considering the 
kind of men they are .. .' Do not plead guilty, here is a solicitor and here is counsel for 
you, and you had better take your chance ' .. ." 223 
The defendant was an object to be processed by the criminal system in accordance 
with the internal, systemic values of effIciency and discipline. The defendant was not 
222. Evidence of Sir Harry Poland in, ibid, p.614. The Resolution in its entirety forms an appendix 
to the Report 
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to be given the capacity to interfere with the stucture of this process, and, the 
dominance of these process values to which it gave expression. 
Yet, the provision of legal representation for defendant who was poor was not 
totally excluded by this perspective. It was only to be admitted in certain 
circumstances whose definition was to be confined to the criminal process itself, by 
locating the provision of this representation within the discretion of the justices of the 
peace(magistrates). Therefore, it was to be subsumed under the dominant process 
values of the criminal system. Institutionally, it could be presented a~ ensuring that 
representation was tied to the merits of the case which the justices would be in the 
best position to decide because of their contact with all cases that entered both the 
indictable and summary jurisdictions. Moreover, it gave presentationallegitimacy to 
the criminal process because of its ability to provide this representation to poor 
defendants. As Mr. Justice Channell' Letter to the Committee states 
" My main reason for thinking that the object of the Bill is desirable is that .. .it 
would tend to increase confidence in the fairness with which justice is administered. " 
224 
The concern with presentationallegitimacy flowed from the trial centred perspective 
of the Committee and the evidence which it took. The proposed Bill sought the 
representation of defendants who were poor only at the Courts of Quarter Sessions 
and Assize, and, the focus of the Committee and the evidence which it collected, 
never challenged this initial reduction in the scope of the generalisability of the right to 
representation. This focus of the Committee ensured the reaffirmation of the triviality 
of summary jurisdiction, both in terms of the offences that were tried there and the 
mode of trial it~elf. The Courts of Quarter Sessions and Assizes were concomitantly 
confirmed in their status as the central sites of the practical enactment of justice in 
their trial of ' serious " indictable offences. With this, went the validation of an 
224. Mr. Justice ChanneU's Letter to the Committee in, ibid, p.64l. 
exclusively trial- centred approach to the question of the position of the defendant 
centred upon the rules of evidence, which defmed the initial admissibility of 
information at the trial; and the techniques of examination, cross-examination and re-
examination which sought to establish the veracity of the prosecution and defence 
cases. It also, thereby, reproduced the externalisation of, and, disregard for police 
practices of evidence gathering and witness collection. In the evidence given to the 
Committee, this disregard wa~ more than an implicit consequence of the predominant 
perspective. It was an explicit element of this perspective and testified to the 
institutional legitimacy which the police themselves had by the beginning of the 
twentieth century. 
This was typified by Mr. Justice Grantham, who states, at the beginning of his 
evidence to the Committee: 
" I wish to impress upon the Committee that from my experience the police, as 
a rule, are very honest in their endeavours to assist prisoners charged with crime, 
there is no desire on their part to get convictions, and if you throw more responsibility 
upon them, and let them know that the state has always expected them to do what 
they could to investigate everything on behalf of the prisoner they would do so still 
more then they do now." 225 
This articulation of the institutional legitimacy of the police was characterised by its 
strongly abstact nature such that it was incapable of being undermined, or called into 
question by particular instances of practices which were considered to be contrary to 
legality. This is clearly apparent in the evidence given by Mr. Buzard K.C., Recorder 
of Leicester when he is asked about the degree to which the defendant is in an inferior 
position in relation to the police, he replies that 
225. Evidence of Mt. Justice Grantham in, ibid, p.656 
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11 in getting their evidence together, and so on, no doubt they are, to a very 
considerable extent, in the hands of the police, but my experience is that the police do 
their durty very fairly, and the higher officers in the force in the big towns are certainly 
very to the prisoners and desirous that their cases should be brought fairly. 11 226 
This restates the predominant view of the institutional legitimacy of the police which, 
in turn, flows over into the characterisation of the general tendency of police practice 
in the conduct of prosecutions. The strength of this belief in their institutional 
legitimacy becomes apparent when he is asked whether he has had any experience of 
innocent defendants being convicted before him. 
11 I do not think that any innocent man has been convicted before me except 
once, and then I discovered it within about an hour, and he received a free pardon. 
That was through somehow or other facts being kept back by the police which 
ought to have been disclosed, and which were disclosed to me afterwards. That is 
the only case that I ever remember of any innocent man being convicted before me. 11 
227 
This incident was not seen as challenging his belief in the institutional legitimacy of the 
police. It'i effect is already determined by this perceptual framework which places it 
as an isolated incident, quickly discovered which has no explanation other than its 
mere occurrence as an event Police practice, which secures its legitimacy from its 
more abstract legitimacy, remains similarly unaffected by this' event '. 
b>Wider Rqmifications 0(1903 Committee 
The Committee proceedings, and the subsequent report on the Poor Prisoners' 
Defence Bill, produced a dual effect They rendered the provision of representation 
226. Evidence of Mr. H.C. Buzard, K.C., Recorder of Leicester, in, ibid, p.646 
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for defendants who wer poor into a merely fonnal right The equality between all 
defendant ... , which the rights-based discourse had aimed at, was transmuted into a 
symbolic equality which placed defendant ... in a relation of reputed equivalence. This 
fonnal equality was given an origin of production and articulation within the criminal 
process itself by transferring the grounds of representation from the unversality of 
right to the variable, internal, systemic ground of the merits of the case. The 
particularity of the merits of the case could then be used to deny any a priori equality 
between defendants. 
This, in turn, attested to the validation and reinforcement that was given to the 
systemic values of the criminal process and the dominant perspective within which 
they were placed. Representation of the defendant who was poor did not apply, under 
the 1903 Act, to the magistrates' court where the vast majority of criminal cases were 
being dealt with. It was confined to the Courts of Quarter Sessions and Assizes. 
That small percentage of defendants who were tried on indictment and eligible for this 
representation could not have it as of right, but had to apply to the magistrate at the 
pre-trial committal proceedings to be given a certificate for legal aid for the defence. 
The granting of the certificate depended upon the disclosure of the defence case. On 
the basis of the disclosed defence, the magistrate would then decide whether there 
was something special in the nature of the defence, or, from the interests of justice to 
justify the granting of the legal aid certificate. The foundation of the social identity of 
the criminal process was, therefore, reaffinned with as it') necessary corollary the 
definition of the defendant as an object of prosecution to be processed by the criminal 
system. The activities of the police who controlled the who controlled the initial 
decision to prosecute, through their exclusive ability to arrest,. charge and prosecute, 
had their institutional legitimacy reinforced by the Committees' proceedings. 
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Conclusion 
The change within the criminal process, intitiated and substantially completed, during 
the nineteenth century, did not alter the substantive content and character of the 
position of the defendant The criminal process did not develop in accordance with a 
concept of progress or humanity whose advance could be demonstrated in an 
increased recognition and embedding, within the procedural mechanisms of the 
criminal process, of an autonomous definition and logic of the defendant'S position. 
The reform' programme I of the nineteenth century, encapsulated in the Criminal Law 
Commissions between the mid 1830s and 1840s, was exclusively focused upon a 
systemic view of the criminal process in which consideration of the particularity of the 
defendant's position disappeared ac; the foundation for the analysis and articulation of 
both the reform' programme' and its supporting conceptual framework. 
This conceptual framework was to be the dominant perspective upon, and 
explanation of, the operation of the criminal process throughout the nineteenth 
century. Its resiliance is shown by its survival, in a modified form, despite the 
recognition that the development of particular element ... within the criminal process, 
later in the century, which placed its theoretical coherence and validity in question -
the control by the police over law enforcement and the conduct of prosecutions, the 
transfer of the majority of criminal cao.;es from trial by indictment before judge and jury 
to summary trial before magistrates, and, the very small number of lawyers engaging 
in criminal work a ... a whole together with their concentration upon trial by indictment. 
The adjustments within the dominant perspective, necessitated by these 
changes, produced a durable, transposable and adaptable framework through which 
the criminal process could be presented and projected. The central element, on which 
all others in the framework rested and from which they gained their internal 
coherence, was the trial. The Criminal Law Commissioners had presented this as the 
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only important part of the criminal process. The rest of the criminal process wac; seen 
as of ephemeral importance and incapable of affecting the outcome of the trial itc;elf. 
The externalisation of the other elements of the criminal process was predicted upon 
the presentation of the rules of evidence in operation at the trial as the mechanism 
throught which all other pre-trial proceedings and events were controlled. Anything 
that occurred outside the trial was, therefore, neutralised and rendered ineffective at 
the trial itself. The was the sole and exclusive site of the application of law with its 
proceedings equated with the realisation and enactment of 'justice '. For, the 
defendant and prosecutor were placed in identical positions because their cases, and 
the information that they sought to adduce in its support, were regulated by external 
rules of evidence which operated in accordance with' justice' since they were not tied 
to, or, produced by either of the parties. The trial was based upon the totality of 
evidence presented from which the gUilt or innocence of the defendant could be 
independently determined. 
The exclusivity of this focus was also tied to an exclusive utilisation of the trial 
by indictment as the insitutional expression of this conception of the operation of the 
criminal process. The functional differentiation of judge and jury, as triers of law and 
fact respectively, at the indictable trial provided a degree of procedural complexity 
which could be equated with a basically impersonal, disinterested trial process. The 
background legitimacy of the trial was on this bac;is assumed with any hinderances to 
the defendant regarded as ' ambiguities' or' anomalies' which were not the expression 
of deeper, structural processes, but merely of accidental and spontaneous occurence. 
With the focus located upon the trial the only hinderances to the defendant here were 
capable of recognition. Therefore, the position of the defendant is only seen to be 
compromised, by the Criminal Law Commissioners, to the degree that he/she lacks 
legal representation. 
This represented a benign characterisation of the previous historical 
development of the criminal process in which the trial judge wa'i viewed as 
functionally inadequate to provided legal representation for the defendant. What this 
ignored, however, was that the trial judge did not represent the defendant in any 
sense. The trial judge in the ancien regime had never operated in this capacity since 
the whole structure of the trial, at this period, was predicated upon the absolute 
personal authority of the trial judge whose decision-making practice accorded with an 
irreducibly particularistic logic and social authority. The defendant's position was not 
an independently fixed and formally demarcated one, but existed solely as an effect of 
the absolute personal power an authority of the trial judge. Therefore, the mode of 
authority exercised by the trial judge was not ba'ied upon the representation of an 
already existent interest, but actually brought this interest into being since he was 
invested with the sole power of recognition of the defendant's institutional existence. 
This indifference to the deeper nature of the ancien regime trial was linked to 
the wider transformation and reformulation of Bentham's philosophical and 
jurisprudential project which was reduced to an exercise in transposing the former 
practical logics of the criminal trial, and criminal process, into a coherent, rule-based 
form which was presumed to make public and universal the previously hidden 
regularities of the operation of that criminal process. The project of codification 
which the formed the essential link, in Bentham's view, between the theory and 
practice of philosophical radicalism was rejected, thereby, transmuting the whole of 
Bentham's project into a programme of readjustment of the existent system of 
Common Law. With this went the reject of the universal conference of Citizenship 
based upon positive law, and, the retention of an increasingly ambiguous origin of the 
political and social status of individuals which continued to vacilate between a notion 
of the subject which stresssed it'i institutional independence, and, one which located 
its existence solely as an institutional creation and whose content and possibilities of 
development were institutional concerns. 
The Criminal Law Commissioners, thereby, reaffirmed the continued 
subordination of the defendant to the criminal process a~ an object of prosecution, 
while shifting the ground of this subordination from a purely personal mode of power 
and social authority to an impersonal, supposedly rule-bound social system. This 
transposition of the defendant's position produced a greater fixity in its institutional 
definition, but the essential nature of this position as an object of prosecution 
remained unaltered. The alterations that occurred were in the interrelations between 
the elements of the criminal process itself. 
The evolution of the criminal system from the mid-nineteenth century onwards 
only served to reconfirm and reinforce the defendant as an object of prosecution, and, 
the inability of the trial to afford the defendant an alternative recognition of her/his 
status. Once the police gained control over the process of law enforcement and 
prosecution the only way that the trial could continue to be portrayed as the sole site 
of gUilt detennination was by the stress on the rules of evidence as sufficient 
mechanism of control over police practice. This failed to recognise that with the 
confinement and redefinition of the authority and powers of the justices of the 
peace/magistrates, by Jervis's Acts 1847, the trial became dependent upon the police 
for the number and type of cases brought for trial and the infonnation upon which the 
prosecution was based. The judges and magistrates could not initiate prosecutions 
themselves nor were they capable of gaining knowledge of the degree to which the 
police presented the totality of evidence available to them in each case that they 
prosecuted. The profound asymmetry of relations between the police and accused 
was not addressed during the whole of the nineteenth century because it was never 
recognised as existing given the stress upon the trial as the exclusive site of' justice' 
and the concomitant externality of pre-trial activities. 
The universal right to legal representation which the Act of 1836 had created, 
in reponse to the Criminal Law Commissioners' Report of the same year, remained 
purely fonnal until the Act of 1903 which recognised a limited right to legal aid for 
defendants who were poor. The vast majority of defendants were unrepresented 
during the nineteenth century, and, were tried under the summary jurisdiction which 
. rapidly expanded from the 1850s onwards. The summary mode of trial lacked the 
institutional differentiation between law and fact of the indictable mode of trial, and, 
the rules of evidence were far less fonnalised. This provided a mode of trial which 
placed few procedural obstacles in the way of prosecution gaining a conviction 
against the defendant since most offences consisted of the presentation of a case in 
which the police defined the nature of the offence it ... elf. 
From the moment that the defendant was arrested they were consistently 
disempowered throughout their passage through the criminal process. The defendant 
remained an object of prosecution to be processed through the criminal system to the 
trial where a guilty verdict was sought by the police by means of building a case to 
achieve a conviction against the defendant 
The criminal system continued to develop into a coherent mechanism during 
the nineteenth century. By the time of the Poor Prisoners' Defence Act 1903 a 
coherent articulation of internal, systemic values of efficiency and discipline had a 
developed which were embedded enough to supplant the attempt to render effective 
the right to representation of the 1836 Act and an attendant rights-based conception 
of the defendant's position within the criminal process. The 1903 Act represents the 
criminal system's ability to maintain it ... elf and its systemic values while adopting 
certain adjustments to the fonn of its operations to enhance its presentational 
legitimacy. 
The nineteenth century, therefore, marks the emergence of a different 
configuration of the criminal process whose refonn is not directed at the weakness or 
oppression of those invested with authority, but the ineffectivity of the existent system 
of authority. The adjustments and alterations to this mode of power and social 
authority are the real foundation of the changes in the position of the defendant who 
continues to be a product of that authority as a disempowered object of prosecution. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE CREATION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL: A PROCESS OF 
RELEGITIMATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH SYSTEMIC IMPERATIVES 
The creation of the Court of Criminal Appeal, in the ftrst decade of the twentieth 
century, is looked upon as a further institutional expression of the development of a 
more just and fair criminal process. The appellate body is projected as providing the 
defendant with the ability to challenge the decision of the court of fIrst instance, and, 
hence produces greater scrutiny and uniformity within the criminal process as a whole. 
Not only does it, as an institution, embody certain principles, but it is seen to 
have wider importance in the hi')tory of the development of the criminal process. Its 
creation is linked to the presentation of this developmental history as the unfolding of 
a concept of progress. It symbolises the movement of the criminal process, through 
time, towards the realisation of an increasing degree of conformity between the 
concept of progress and its expression in the reality of the criminal process. 
The nature of this prespective, and, it') presentation of the Court of Criminal 
Appeal becomes apparent when it is contrasted with an examination of the actual 
events, precedings and debates which formed the parameters within which the 
structure of the appellate court was determined. Through this examination it becomes 
clear that the creation of the Court of Criminal Appeal had little to do with a 
conception of progress of justice which took as its focus, and, conceptual foundation 
the position of the individual accused. The criteria which shaped the appellate court's 
creation were internal, systemic ones which had developed in accordance with the 
evolution of the elements of the criminal process during the nineteenth century. 
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The fust section deals with the Committee Reports on the miscarriages of 
justice in the cases of Adolf Beck and George Edalji. It sets out the analysis of each 
of the Committees and seeks to demonstrate that their construction to the nature of 
the cases was presented by them in such a way that the I mistakes I were located in the 
administrative action of the Home Office, and that the solution was simply to adjust 
them without the need for a Court of Appeal. This meant that public pressure did not 
lead to the creation of the Court of Appeal. As the second section shows, it was 
exclusively determined by the institutional needs of the Home Office and the criminal 
process insofar as this was a part of that system. The third section deals with the case 
of (R v Gowlett), decided by the Court of Appeal in its first year of operation, and 
seeks to show that the Court refrained from intervening in the case, despite the actual 
judgement in the case, because of propensity to validate a trial process that was 
recognised as defective in oreder to avoid the risk of a challenge to the legitimacy of 
the criminal process. 
The Genesis of the Court of Appeal: The Cases of Ado.f Beck and George Edalii 
A) TilE BECK CASE 
i)The factual circumstances of the case 
In 1877, John Smith was convicted, at the Old Bailey, for committing frauds upon 
women whereby he obtained articles of jewellery and money. His method was to 
introduce himself as a titled aristocrat of wealth and offer the position of mistress to 
the women concerned. He would suggest that she required a new outfit and would 
write out a cheque to a well known outfitters drawn on a non-existent bank. He 
would, at the same time, on some pretext, borrow an article of jewellery or some 
money which he would disappear with. The name that he assumed for these frauds 
1/'t 
was' Lord Willoughby '. He was convicted and sentenced to 5 years penal servitude 
and remained in prison until April 1881 when he was released on licence. 
Towards the end of 1894, the police began to receive complaint~, from 
women, that they had been defrauded by a man who called himself' Lord Wilton " or, 
, Lord Wilton de Willoughby '. The methods that were being used to defraud these 
women were exactly those that had been used earlier in the Smith case. The 
description that the police had been able to compile, from the information of the 
women who had been defrauded, varied considerably, but all the cheques that had 
been given to the women seemed to be in the same handwriting. Initially, the effort~ 
of the police to find the person thay believed responsible were unsuccessful. On 16th 
December 1895, a women called Ottilie Melsonnier, who had been the subject of one 
of these frauds the previous month, happened to come across Adolf Beck in the street 
and began to claim that he was the man who had defrauded her. He protested that he 
had never met her before and tried to move away from her, but he pursued him along 
the street until they met a policeman from whom they both sought assistance. Adolf 
Beck was taken, by the policeman, to the police station where a charge was entered 
against him. He was identified, after being charged, by two women as the man who 
had defrauded them, and then sent to the police cells. Then, when the police had 
contacted the large number of women who had lodge complaint~ about being 
defrauded by , Lord Wilton " or, , Lord Willoughby " these women 
" were then in the ordinary way[Le.an identification parade where Beck would 
stand with other men]given the opportunity of seeing Mr. Beck, with a view to 
a~certain whether they could identify him as the man who had defrauded them. " 228 
Beck was then remanded in Holloway Prison and subsequently taken from prison to 
undergo a further indentification parade, and, after this was brought before the 
magistrates court and committed for trial. The ca'ie, apparently generated some 
228, The Committe of Inquiry into the Case of Adolf Beck, ParI. Papers 1905, Vo!. LXII, p.470 
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publicity, and, as a result a man got in touch with the police to say that Beck was in 
fact the ex-convict Smith. This information led the police to find ex-policeman 
Spurrell who had arrested Smith in 1877. 
" He swore positively that Mr.Beck was Smith, and was confirmed in his 
opinion by another officer who had been concerned with the Smith case. " 229 
Beck was then re-committed for trial and was tried at the Old Bailey in March 
1896 where he was convicted and sentenced to 7 years penal servitude. While in 
prison, Beck petitioned the Home Office, several times, to exercise the Perogative of 
Mercy on the grounds of mistaken identity and mistrial, but was refused. It wall only 
when Beck's solicitor addressed a letter on his behalf, in may 1898, that the Home 
Office actually made inquiries into the case. During these, the Home Office . 
discovered that in 1879, while Smith was in Portland Prison, he had been examined 
and found to have been circumcised. On the ballis of this information, the Home 
Office consulted the judge in the case, and, came to the conclusion that it would not 
interfere with the conviction. It merely alloted a new number and letter which 
indicated that he was a prisoner without previous convictions. The Home Office did 
not inform the Director of Public Prosecutions, or the police that Smith had been 
examined by the prison authorities. In July 1901, Beck was released on licence. 
However, in April 1904 Beck was again arrested on a similar charge to that by which 
previously he had been convicted, and sent for trial. The trial judge, despite Beck's 
conviction, felt certain misgivings about the case and postponed sentencing to allow 
further inquiries to be made of the police and the prison services. These did not yield 
anything, in the trial judge's view, which was solid enough to withold sentence. 
Therefore, Beck was again committed to prison. It wa<; not until the arrest of Smith, 
later in 1904, on similar charges, based on acts committed while Beck wa<; in custody 
that any further enquiries were made into the case. The Home Office had not been 
aware that Beck had been arrested and tried a second time until Smith was taken into 
224. Ibid, p.470 
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custody. These eventually led to the release and pardon of Beck for both the 1896 
and 1904 convictions. 
The matter did not rest with this, however, as a journalist on the Daily Mail, 
George Sims, took up the issues resulting from the Beck case - the possibility of a 
conspiracy against Beck - and demanded a Committee of Enquiry into the case as a 
whole 230. Sims' demands were subsequently taken up by the Daily Telegraph a few 
days after the publication of Sims' first article on the Beck case. The Home Office 
responded by offering Beck £2,000. This was immediately taken up by all the 
newspapers who now consistently criticised the Home Office, and, insisted that it 
pointed to the validity of the initial allegations of Sims by demonstrating the desire to 
dispense with the matter without further enquiry while at the same time 
acknowledging, through the offer of a substantial payment, that it was in some way at 
fault, or responsible for the events. Beck, himself, refused the £2,000 and the Home 
Office then offered to establish an internal enquiry into the matter to be headed by a 
police officer, who had been instrumental in obtaining Beck's conviction, and that he 
should make further enquiries into all the events surrounding the Beck case. This 
proposal was attacked by Sims in the Daily Mail, and, in the Daily Telegraph on 
August 22nd. Both articles viewed the internal enquiry al) an attempt to construct a 
means of enquiry which would re-legitimate it through a cursory investigation and the 
narrow terms in which the enquiry would be drawn. Both these papers and the rest of 
the press demanded that nothing more thatn an enquiry headed by a member of the 
judiciary would be sufficient. 
230. The first article that George Sims wrote on the Beck case was on August 16th 1904, and be 
continued to publish articles in the Daily Mail on the issue until the beginning of September when 
Akers-Douglas, the Home Secretary, appointed a Committee of Enquiry into the Beck case. As a 
result of the events of the Beck case, the Crimes Club was founded by Arthur Lambton, which 
included George Sims among its members, and, Churton Collins who attempted along with another 
member, Conan Doyle, to do what Sims had for Beck in the later case of Edalji in 1907. See, for 
more information on the Crimes Club, The Unknown Conan Doyle: Letters to the Press 
(London:Secker and Warburg, 1986), 
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Eventually, on 9th September 1904, the Home Secretary, Akers-Douglas, 
perceived that in order for the Home Office to be placed in a position where it would 
be re-legitimated the only option was to establish a Committee of Enquiry into the 
Case of Adolf Beck. 
WThe Committee oflnguiry into the Beck Case.' Re-Leeitimatine the Home Q(fice 
The Committe states at the outset of its Report that it had defined the parameters of 
it') investigation widely 
" We construed our mandate as giving us the largest possible discretion in 
fixing the limits of our Inquiry. " 231 
This meant that what was produced, as a result of this enquiry was to be a clear 
reflection and articulation of the underlying perspectives upon the operation, and, 
interrelation of the elements of the criminal process as revealed and defined by the 
Beck ca'ie. For, given this intial statement of the interpretative freedom that they 
wereto enjoy, the only parameters of the inquiry were those produced by the 
Committee members own combined perceptual schema, through which they analysed 
the criminal process. 
When the Committee set'i out on its inquiry and the areas of the criminal 
process with which it is going to concern itself, it becomes clear that the Committee i'i 
intent upon drawing a particular conclusion from the Beck case. The Committee 
states that it wants to discover 
" if possible, the cause not only of the original miscarriage at the first trial, but 
the subsequent failure of the reviewing authority to detect the flaw and redress the 
wrong. This latter inquiry seemed to us the more important of the two, since the 
231. The Committee of Inquiry into the Case of Adolf Beck, ParI. Papers 1905, Vol. LXII, p.469 
judges, however able and experienced, are fallible, and evidence as to identity based 
on personal impressions, however bona fide, is perhaps of classes of evidence the least 
to be relied upon, and therefore, unless supported by other facts, an unsafe basis for 
the verdict of a jury. These elements of uncertainty cannot be eliminated from any 
system of jurisprudence. But it ought to be possible, not to say reasonably certain, 
that a miscarriage arising in the first instance from one or both of these causes 
should be capable of redress by the reviewing authority. Does our system provide 
with reasonable certainty for the detection and redress of miscarriage arising from 
either or both such grounds? " 232 
By this decision, the Committee immediately reaffirmed the dominant 
perspective upon the criminal process which viewed the trial a':i the sole site of 
determination of the gUilt or innocence of the defendant. Those element':i of the 
criminal process which exist prior to the trial are, by rea':ion of this very externality, 
not seen to be important, or, as a possible source of practices which could have 
produced such a miscarriage. Everything which is pre-trial, therefore, is not 
considered to be an object of possible inquiry, or, discussion(other than through a 
statement of the reasons for a lack of inquiry into this area), and, hence because it will 
not be a focus of attention it will not be a possible target of criticism. This, in turn, 
means that pre-trial procedures and practices, particularly those of the police, have 
both their legitimacy and unremarkable character reaffirmed. 
The police, as the element responsible for law enforcement and the initiation 
and conduct of prosecutions in the criminal process, are thereby, left unscrutinised, 
and, the possibility that they might be in some way responsible for the miscarriage of 
justice, as a result of the position that they occupied in the criminal process, is 
categorically denied. This is explicitly affmned by the Committee when they turn their 
attention, briefly, to the police in the Report. 
232. The Committee of Inquiry into the Case of Adolf Beck, ParI. Papers 1905, VoI. LXII, p.471. My 
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This, itself, was a product of the Committee's denials of any police 
involvement in, or, responsibility for the miscarriage of justice in the Beck case. 
Moreover, their denials were seen, by them, to be necessitated as a result of what they 
saw as the 
" vague charges that were suggested rather than asserted against them by Mr. 
Beck." 233 
Beck, himself, was stated, by the Committee, to have had no evidence with which to 
support his assertions. The assertions were explained, by the Committee, as a ' 
conspiracy theory' which Beck had produced because of the circumstances to which 
he had been subject where 
" The mistake seemed too gigantic to be explicable on any other hypothesis. " 
234 
Despite this classification of Beck and his evidence, the Committee went on to further 
deny the culpability of the police in the Beck case. They stated that they had all the 
police officers before them, who were involved in the arrest and identification parade, 
as well as Mr. Dutton, Beck's original solicitor, who all confirmed that the process of 
idenfication had been properly conducted235. They also denied that the police were in 
any way interested in obtaining the conviction of Beck. This, they believed, was 
established by the fact that, in relation to the initial arrest of Beck, in 1896, 
" the evidence ... shows that though the police were looking for the criminal 
they had failed to find him, and that his first arrest was brought about on the personal 
initiative of the woman Melsonnier. " 236 
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The lack of police interest in the conviction of Beck, to which the Committee believed 
that this pointed, was reinforced by their inability to fmd any motive for such 
suggested action. For, 
" the evidence of the men themselves and their superior officers satisfied us 
that their conduct throughtout was dictated by nothing but a sense of duty, and 
perfectly correct. It requires no sinister hypothesis to explain the unreliability of 
evidenc~ of identity based on personal impressions, and it would seem that there was 
some slight resemblance in fact between Mr. Beck and Smith. " 237 
It was, therefore, evidence form the police themselves as to the nature of their 
own activities which convinces the Committe that they played no significant part in 
producing the miscarriage of justice. This, then, is the source of the Committee's 
previously articulated view that the miscarriage of justice was the result of the trial 
situation and the subsquent activities of the Home Office as reviewing authority. The 
Committee's particular construction of police activity in this case, which is also used 
to confmn its broader parameters of inquiry, and, the conclusions that it draws from 
them, becomes clear when the content of the evidence that Beck gave, and, from 
which the Committee drew the above conclusion, is examined. 
Beck' evidence to the Committee concerns the methods by which the police 
proceeded against him. It alleges that the police had already decided that he was the 
individual responsible for the frauds, and actively' constructed' a case against him in 
order to establish this. The process of I construction " Beck believed, started form the 
moment that he was taken to the police station after Ottilie Melsonnier had sought the 
help of a police constable when she alleged that Beck wa'i the man who had defrauded 
her. 
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At the police station, where Beck was taken to the charge room, the duty 
Inspector(whose function it was to decide whether an allegation against an individual 
was sufficient to justify charging that individual with an offence for which they would 
be prosecuted), did not take down Beck's statement in relation to the allegation made 
by Ottilie Melsonnnier, but did take down the statement made by Ottilie Melsonnier. 
Beck was then detained by the police, and, about five minutes after this 
" two other women came in and said" Yes, that is the man " } said, " } have 
never seen these women in my life before. " } was locked up. " 238 
While still in police custody, having been charged with the offence, an 
identification parade was organised in which Beck stood in amongst some other men, 
and two other women picked Beck out as the man who had defrauded them. The 
police then started the process of initiating criminal proceedings against Beck by 
taking the ca<:;e to Westminster magistrates court. The magistrate remanded Beck in 
custody, in Holloway prison, to await committal for trial. During this period, a 
second identification parade was organised by the police. 
" } was again put amongst some men, and a woman came and stood there, and 
was asked, " Can you see the man? " She said, " No; } believe it is the man standing 
there." " Well put your finger on him, " said the policeman, but she would not. He 
then took her umbrella and almost put it on me. [After this,]} was brought before the 
magistrate three or four times and committed for trial. A number of about twelve 
women said that I was not the man. They had the same cheques in their possession 
and had been similarly defrauded, but the police did not produce them or give my 
solicitor or me their names or addresses to enable me to do so .... One day there were a 
lot of women in the yard and apart from six who said I was the man there were at 
least twelve who said I was not. " 239 
238. Ibid, p.l15 
239. Evidence of Beck in, ibid, pp.l15-116. 
The allegations that Beck made were not about the character of the 
identification parades themselves, but related to the wider point of the active 
construction of a case against him by the police who simply used the witnesses who 
identified him and chose to ignore the others who did not. The police then refused to 
let Beck of his solicitor have the names of other witnesses, thereby, ensuring that the 
pOlice case against Beck was the strongest one possible. 
The Committee's view, of Beck's evidence and allegations, as a t conspiracy 
theory' could only be taken, given their actual nature, if there was a prior 
presumption of the legitimacy of the police position, and, as part of this, a particular 
definition of the nature and rationality of their practices. The Committee's definition 
presented police practice as one engaged in a process of law enforcement which was 
guided by an active conformity to legal norms, and, whose nature was without 
possible effect on any subsequent trial. What Beck's evidence did was to challenge 
this by pointing to an underlying rationality to their practices which was goal-
orientated, namely, to build as strong a case as possible against an individual 
defendant in order to secure a conviction. Police practice, as presented by Beck, was 
one which constituted both substantive criminal law and criminal procedure as the 
material environment within which they had to operate, and, which would be utilised 
or ignored according to the degree of assistance or hinderance it offered to the 
attainment of the goal - the accused's conviction. With this, the framework of the law 
was morally neutralised, and transformed into a set of resources whose adequacy to 
the goals of the police was the sole issue. 
This, the Committee was not prepared to accept as the logic of police practice 
which Beck's evidence pointed to would have undermined not only the basis of the 
institutional legitimacy of the police, but would also have challenged the dominant, 
trial centred perspective through which the criminal process was analysed, explained 
and understood. The neutralisation of Beck's own evidence, by means of its 
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characterisation as a ' conspiracy theory' was, therefore, essential to the foundation of 
the Committee's explanation, of the causes of the miscarriage of justice in the Beck 
case. 
This rested on locating their origin at the first trial, and, in the subsequent 
actions of the Home Office as the reviewing authority. The first trial, however, was 
not seen, by the Committee, as having a great degree of responsibililty for the 
eventual miscarriage because of what it saw as the inherent difficulties of identification 
evidence. This then enabled it to pass on to the activities of the Home Office as the 
major source of the mistakes in the Beck case. However, in order to be able to do 
this the Committee had to utilise the trial centred perspective with ito; concomitant 
externalisation, and, denial of the importance of the pre-trial activities of the police. 
The utilisation of this perspective was obvious in the way that it dealt with the 
question of identification evidence. Their characterisation of this type of evidence as 
always being one which wao; intrinsically problematic meant that the cause of this was 
located in the personal fallibility of the individual witnesses who gave such evidence. 
This, in turn, meant that the mistaken identification of Beck was presented not as the 
result of structural defects in the criminal process, but of the contingent, irreducibly 
particular' flaws' of individuals such a lack of memory. This absolved the trial from 
any implication that it was structurally incapable of adequately protecting the 
eqUilibrium between defendant and prosecutor by means of the rules of evidence; and; 
the trial judges' mistake became a purely singular, individual act equally dissociated 
from any implication in,or, link with notions of structural weaknesses and their 
potentially resultant ao;ymmetrical power relations. 
What this sought to ignore, and, which was integral to Beck's evidence, wao; 
that the police had, in their construction of the prosecution cao;e, carried out a prior 
process of selection of witnesses who were to give identification evidence. This had 
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been done on the basis of selecting only those individuals, in the minority, who would 
identify Beck positively while ignoring ahd, therefore, excluding from the trial the 
substantially large number of witnesses who denied that Beck was the man who had 
defrauded them. This meant that the police, before the trial even took place, had 
knowledge available to them which strongly cast doubt on the likelihood that Beck 
wa'i the alleged perpetrator of the frauds. Those individuals who gave identification 
evidence, for the prosecution, at the fIrst trial were, contrary to the Committee's 
characterisation, selected on the grounds of their very capacity to give this evidence in 
order that the prosecution case, as a whole, would be strengthened. 
The Committees' creation of a perspective in which the steps taken by the 
police, in the preparation of the prosecution, effectively disappeared was necessitated 
by their desire to place the main focus of attention upon the Home Office. The Home 
OffIce was seen by the Committee as having dealt defectively with the Beck ca'ie 
when he applied to them for the perogative of mercy to be exercised. Initially, Beck's 
applications to the Home Office were rejected, but when his solicitor wrote to the 
Home Office they actually undertook to investigate the ca'ie. This investigation, in 
1898, elicited the fact that Smith was circumcised and Beck was not, and, therefore, 
as far as the Committee were concerned, conclusively proved that Beck was not 
Smith. The Home OffIce consulted the judge who had presided at the first trial, and, 
informed him of this. However, they failed to make clear that it was a documented 
fact, but implied that it was a suggestion of Beck's solicitor. 
The conclusion that was reached between the judge and the Home OffIce was 
that Beck should not serve out 
" his term and no answer was given to his petition except that he was accorded 
a new number and the mark indicating a previous conviction was withdrawn. " 240 
240. Ibid, p.472. 
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This decision, coupled with the failure of the Home Office to communicate this 
discovery of conclusive proof that Beck was not Smith to the Director of Public 
Prosecutions, or, the police was, for the Committee, the origin of the mistake that 
produced the miscarriage of justice. For, 
.. the mistake that was made by the Home Office involved two consequences; 
it led to Mr. Beck's continued detention in prison; it indirectly led to his re-arrest and 
conviction in 1904." 241 
By placing the major responsibility for the miscarriage on the Home Office, 
the Committee, proceeded to examine the workings of the Home Office Criminal 
Department as these are presented as the source of the mistakes in the Beck case. 
The Committee finds that the Department had an organisational structure in which a 
system of delegation was in operation. Simpler cases were dealt with by subordinate 
officers, and, the more difficult ones were passed up to the Permanent Undersecretary 
who, in turn, used his discretion in consulting the Secretary of State. The Secretary 
of State was always consulted in capital cases. The root of the problem they find, 
after having examined the Department's analysis of Beck's application, was that the 
Department lacked the necessary expertise to deal with criminal ca<;es since the staff 
were not all trained lawyers. As a result, it was for the Committee, of 
" the highest importance that the persons upon whom these duties are 
devolved should, at every link in the chain be trained lawyers. " 242 
Not only was it a problem of personnel structure and recruitment policies of the 
Criminal Department it wac; also an informational one as well. There should have 
been a free circulation of information between the various elements in the criminal 
process. In the future, changes should be made to institutional practice so that 
241. Ibid, p.479. 
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" different public authorities be brought into co-ordination so as to make it 
impossible that material information acquired by one of them affecting a particular 
prisoner should not be placed before all. " 243 
This, thereby, significantly altered the characterisation of the miscarriage. It 
was presented as a purely institutional matter, for which no one person or group of 
persons could be held responsible, since the sole source of the event<; lay in the flaws 
in the technical-bureaucratic procedures of the Home Office Criminal Department 
which the staff merely conformed to in their decision-making. It was thus transposed 
into a problem of the rationality of the administrative organisation the Home Office 
Criminal Department. The focus, of the Committee, was concomitantly reduced to 
the lack of conformity between the Department's own structures and processes, and, 
the external demands of both individual applicants seeking the exercise of the 
perogative of mercy and other elements of the criminal process. With this 
construction of the problem, came the simultaneous need to establish an eqUilibrium 
between the internal mode of operation of the Department and the external demands 
to which it was subject. It became a matter of adjusting the structure and processes 
which composed the admininstration of the Home Office Criminal Department. 
This necessitated not only the disappearance of the police from the focus of 
attention of the Committee, but also, and equally essentially, a concentration upon, 
and particular characterisation of, the administrative organisation and processes of the 
Home Office Criminal Department. In order to present the Department as the 
exclusive site of the miscarriage it had to be projected as the origin of the mistake; 
and; that these were purely the result of defects in the internal structures and 
processes of the Department itself. It wa<; thus confined to the question of dealing 
with a discrepancy between the Department's administrative structure and the function 
that it was suppposed to carry out in relation to the rest of the criminal process. 
243. Ibid, pA83. 
To produce this explanation, however, the Committee h~d to make the 
presumption that adequate criteria for administrative action in the Department were 
both conceivable and practicable. For, only then could the ' problem' become one of 
the deficiency of the Department whose solution depended on the discovery and 
introduction of these adequate criteria. However, this depended on the further 
presumption that the Department's adminstrative action could be characterised as a 
legal-bureaucratic form of administration in which action wa') subsumed under 
premises. The Department had to be presented al) engaged in pure bureaucratic 
administration. This meant that it was operating at all times with a set of clearly 
defined legal norms which were its sole foundation for action, and, its decision-
making wal) simply the regular application of these legal norms. Over time, this 
process of norm application was al)sumed to produce a systemic values of precision, 
stability, stringency, discipline and reliability. Because of the premises of 
administrative action were tied to pre-given norms; the norms which were applied 
were never able to be expanded, modified or avoided by the staff themselves. On this 
view, the premises of action were irrevocable with administrative action characterised 
by obedience to legal norms, that is , with legality as an integral part of its mode of 
operation. This, in turn, rested on the conception of the strict separation of politics 
and administration in which the apparatus engaged in the continuous application and 
realisation of norms was conceived to be completely distinct from the process which 
produces the norms forming the action premises of the apparatus. 
The Committee's explanation of the Department's operation becomes 
problematic when it is compared with evidence given to the Committee by Sir 
Kennelm Digby, Permanent Undersecretary to the Home Office, as to the practice of 
the Home Office Criminal Department. From this, it is apparent that the legal-
bureaucratic model, projected by the Committee, does not adequately characterise the 
Department's administrative activities. 
ur I 
The practice of the Department when it received applications from prisoners, 
friends, solicitors and persons interested in the cases of individual prisoners was to set 
the large majority of them aside on the basis that they represented a mere repetition of 
an earlier plea, insufficiency in the grounds of disputing sentence or conviction, or, 
were of a frivolous nature. This filtering process still left 
" a great mass of petitions which put forward pleas which are prima facie 
reasonable and have to be considered on their merits. " 244 
If the application arose from a summary conviction then the Department 
obtained the evidence in the case from the magistrate who had tried the calie, and, also 
sought the magistrate's opinion on the case. Sometimes, a report from the police on 
the ca<;e wa'i requested, especially if it had been dealt with by the Metropolitan Police 
Force. If it had arisen from a conviction at Courts of Quarter Sessions or Assizes 
then a report of the evidence was obtained from the trial judge(including the judges 
notes in capital ca'ies). The Department then reviewed the evidence and decided 
whether there was a substantial ground for inquiry into the case, or, whether it should 
be dismissed as the application misrepresented the evidence, or contained only 
statement'i which were irrelevant to questions of the prisoners' guilt 245. 
This review was, however, governed by the Department's perceptions of the 
external functional demands of the other elements of the criminal process. The 
concrete results of the Department's administrative action came to determine the 
suitability of the rules which governed the structure and processes of it'i administrative 
activities. As Digby states, 
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" if the Home Office ..... were on slight pretexts to criticise verdicts and attempt 
to re-open cases, it would soon loose the co-operation ofthejudicial bench, which 
is essential to the carrying out of its function ... " 246 
Administrative efficiency, thereby, ceases to be conceived as the following of rules. It 
is now defined as the causing of effects - the fulfilment of concrete tasks. Because the 
co-operation of the judiciary is deemed to be part of the task of the administrative 
action of the Department must be structured in accordance with the maintenance of 
their co-operation. Therefore, the rules which were supposed to be the sole 
authoritative source of the action premises of the Department are contingent. They 
are produced, followed or ignored in accordance with their instrumental suitability for 
this task. The schema which guides the reviewing activity of the Department is 
consciously constructed with the intention to ensure judicial co-operation. As a 
result, the Department 
" will not re-open a case merely because someone sitting' in the Home Office, 
who has not seen the prisoner and the witnesses, and, not heard the cross-
examination, feels, on reading the printed evidence, some doubt .. " 247 
The staff act in accordance with this because 
" the judge who has seen the witnesses and heard the examination and followed 
the whole case in open court is in a much better position to form an opinion than the 
Home Office. " 248 
The choice of criteria of administrative action must conform to this imperative. As a 
result, it produces a normative schema in which very strong grounds are required in 
order to 
246.Evidence of Sir Kemielm Digby in, ibid, p.331. My emphasis. 
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" induce the Home Office to take any action in a case when a piea of 
innocence is urged and no fresh evidence is available beyond that submitted at 
trial ...... the broad principle remains that the case will not be re-opened merely in order 
to re-consider evidence which has already been examined at trial. If the plea is that 
the verdict is wrong, and if no new material evidence is offered, nor any means 
suggested by which new evidence can be obtained, the petition will, in ordinary 
circumstances be refused. " 249 
Applications based, on what were defined as I technical grounds I, were likely to be 
rejected. This meant that such events as the improper admission or rejection of 
evidence, or, misdirection of the jury were considered I technical grounds I and were 
not, by themselves, sufficient to engender Home Office review or intervention 250. 
The administrative organisation and action of the Home Office Criminal 
Department was, therefore, geared to the satisfaction of the external demands of the 
rest of the criminal process. Its internal mode of operation was the result of the 
implementing rules which were adjudged to be adequate to the fulfilment of this 
concrete task. Premises of administrative action were at the disposal of the 
administration it~elf; action was not tied to rules or I inputs I which could not be 
expanded, modified or avoided. The institution which realised the rules, in 
administrative action, also produced the rules as well. The clear separation between 
action premises and their application was blurred, and, with it, the split between 
politics and administration. The Department, therefore, did not engage in an 
independent review of the rest of the criminal process. It viewed its activities as 
dependent upon the maintenance of co-operation of the rest of the criminal process 
and constructed its mode of review in accordance with this. With this self-consciously 
functional role adopted by the Department in its administrative practices the I 
problems I of the Beck case were not the product of the structure of the 
249. Evidence of ibid, p.332. 
250. Evidence of ibid, p.332. 
la. 
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administration itself. For, it was the structure and demands of the rest of the criminal 
process which had bound the Department to a specific mode of operation. The 
criminal process was, thereby, immunised against later challenge. 
The Committees' explanation of the Departments' administrative action did not 
fit with the description given by Sir Kennelm Digby. This was because this 
description did not confonn with the way in which the Committee had constructed the 
Beck case. They had disconnected it fonn any link to police practice, and, instead 
channelled and confined it to a problem in the structure of the Home Office Criminal 
Department's administration. This meant that the identification of the origin of the 
miscarriage, and, the elaboration upon its nature, by the Committee, then effectively 
acted as a process of re-legitmation for the Home Office Criminal Department. The 
events which occurred in Beck's case while serious are, in the Committees' view, 
simply indicative of gap in an otherwise smooth functioning system which is easily 
remediable and preventable by various adjustments to the existing system. It is 
prevented from representing a fundamental or profound challenge to the criminal 
process and the elements that compose it. 
This construction was dependent upon the definition of its operation as legal-
bureaucratic, namely, a continuous application of rules without regard for their effect 
upon the environment This ignored the possibility that there was a relation between 
the elements of the criminal process was structured in accordance with systemic 
values and practices generated from their interaction. This narrowing of the focus of 
attention, simultaneously limited the parameters of conceivable change. The 
Committee did not perceive the calle as placing in question the foundations of the 
criminal process, or, necessitating major institutional change". The creation of a Court 
of Appeal was seen, by the Committee, as unnecessary 
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" adequate protection for innocent persons can be secured without the erection 
of a new Court of Appeal. tI 251 
Public pressure may have led to the establishment of the Committee, to review 
the administrative activity of the Home Office Criminal Department, but it did not lead 
to a recommendation that a Court of Criminal Appeal should be established to replace 
the activity of the Home Office. The Committee managed, by the definition and 
construction of the Beck case, to reduce the permissible terrain of reform to a 
question of administrative-technical adjustment to the institutional procedures of the 
Home Office Criminal Department. This created a space in which reform could be 
justified and exclusively underpined by the purely institutional concerns of the 
elements of the criminal process because they had been exonerated, by the Committee, 
from any responsibility for the events of the Beck case. Through this shift, to the 
Home Office, there was, in turn, the neglect and denial of the significance of police 
practice, and, the failure to recognise the continuous influence it had on the passage of 
a case through the criminal process. 
This explanation and the conclusions that followed from it, outlined by the 
Beck Committee, were subsequently utilised in the Committee Report on the Edalji 
case. It reaffirmed and reinforced the initial considerations of the Beck Committee by 
articulating a viewpoint orientated towards the securing the legitimacy of the existent 
criminal process without the need for substantial reform. 
B) THE EDALJI CASE 
VThe factual situation 
There had been a number ofinstances of horse wounding in the area in which Edalji 
lived. These had created a I considerable feeling in the neighbourhood '. The police 
251. The Committee of Inquiry into the Case of Adolf Beck, ParI. Papers 1905, Vol. LXII, p.483. 
had sought to find the person(s) involved, but their initial effort\) had not led to the 
apprehension of the individual(s). They were therefore, 
" anxious to bring the offender to justice. " 252 
The police had decided to undertake nightime patrols and surveillance of the 
agricultural areas in which the previous offences had been committed. One of the 
policemen engaged on this, became suspicious of Edalji when he was observed 
walking, at night, across fields in one of these areas. The police continued to observe 
Edalji as he was regularly taking walks at night, and, after another offence occurred, 
they decided to search his home the day after. 
Here, they found a jacket, waistcoat and a pair of trousers that were damp 
and muddy. The jacket and waistcoat were also alleged to have had horse hairs on 
them. A pair of boots were found which were taken to be those that had made the 
footprint\) in one of the fields in which the previous offences had occurred. No proper 
measurement of the boots nor of the footprints was ever made by the police to enable 
a comparison to be made. They also found four razors, of which, one was damp, and 
taken by the police to have been freshly washed. These discoveries, by the police, led 
them to arrest Edalji and charge him with the commission of the offence. 
When these offences had begun, and, throughout the period of the police 
investigation into them, they had received a number of anonymous letters about the 
offences. These were compared with Edalji's handwriting, and, taken to have been 
written by EdaIji. These letters then became part of the evidence on the assumption 
that Edalji was responsible for the commission of all the previous offences as well. 
While Edalji was on remand in prison awaiting trial another horse wounding 
occurred. This led the nature of the prosecution case to be changed. EdaIji was now 
252. Papers Relating to the Case of George Edalji. ParI. Papers 1907. VoI. LXVII, pA03 
alleged to have been part of a gang of persons who had carried out these horse 
woundings. However, the police subsequently arrested a man, Mr. Green, for the 
commission of this offence, which took place while Edalji was in prison. He had no 
knowledge of Edalji, and, at the trial the prosecution did not present any evidence to 
substantiate this new characterisation of the nature of Edalji's involvement in the 
offences with which he was charged. 
Edalji, charged with feloniously wounding a horse, was convicted at the trial 
and sentenced to 7 years penal servitude. While Edalji was in prison, after his 
conviction, a further two offences of horse wounding occurred in the area. 
He made an application to the Home Office Criminal Department seeking the 
exercise of the perogative of mercy. This was initially refused. Edalji's case, 
however, came to the attention of the a Group called the Crimes Club founded in 
1904. Two of its members, Churton Collins and Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, took up the 
case and published articles in the Daily Telegraph 253 which sought to cast doubt on 
the correctness of Edalji's conviction. These articles, a'i in the Beck case, were rapidly 
taken up by the rest of press. They demanded that the conviction against Edalji be 
overturned, and, for an investigation into the circumstances of the case in order to 
establish who or what was responsible for the miscarriage. 
Unlike the Beck case, these demands were complied with almost immediately, 
and, a Committee was established to examine the Eda1ji case. 
253. The most comprehensive of these it that published in the Daily Telegraph on 9 January 1907 
entitled' The Case of George EdaIji: Special Investigation by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. ' 
;nThe examination of the Edalji case.· A Conce.ptual concordance with the Beck 
Committee. 
The Edalji Committee began their inquiry by focusing upon the practice of the police 
in the case. They clearly state that, in their opinion, those policemen who were 
involved in the case undertook the process of the collection of evidence . 
" not for the purpose of finding out who was the guilty party, but for the 
purpose of finding evidence against Edalji, who, they were already sure was the gUilty 
man." 254 
Police practice was characterised as aberrational since it had strayed from the logic 
that was supposed to govern police practice, namely, an investigation in which the 
guilt of those under investigation is not an apriori presumption, but merely a 
conjecture whose truth is tested by the investigation itself. The Committee did not 
attempt to go beyond this initial analysis to find an explanation for this particular 
occurrence. The conditions which enabled it to arise, therefore, remained inexplicable 
and were not interrogated further. This meant, in turn, that the logic which the 
Committee supposed governed police practice went uninterrogated as this occurrence 
was not seen to put it into question. The concentration of law enforcement in the 
hands of the police was assumed to place an obligation upon them which was enacted 
in a disinterested process of evidence collection. The strength of this assumption 
becomes obvious when it cannot be rendered problematic by the occurrence of the 
events in the EdaIji case. The question of whether and for whom the police assemble 
evidence and control its content is never adequately raised. For, to do so would then 
have placed police practice not as aberrational and contingent, but as within the 
parameters of standard police practice. 
254. Papers Relating to the Case of George Edalji, ParI. Papers 1907, Vo!. LXVII, p.403 
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Police practice was produced from an antagonism underlying the 
concentration of the process of law enforcement in their hands. With sole 
responsibility for the arrest, charge and prosecution of individuals 255 there was a 
constant tension between securing the accused's conviction and ensuring that the 
individual was treated fairly in this process. The police resolved this tension by 
concentrating solely upon the necessity of securing a conviction with fairness towards 
the individual accused perceived as an impediment to its achievement. The definition 
of an individual as a I suspect I by the police set in motion the process of investigation. 
Because belief in the individual's guilt preceded the process of investigation and the 
collection of evidence there was an inherent tendency to link the view taken of the 
offence and its presumed perpetrator with the investigative strategies themselves. The 
collection of evidence through investigation was, therefore, not a disinterested process 
in which assumptions were tested, but an effort motivated by the task of proving the 
individual's guilt. Police practice, orientated by the goal of securing a conviction 
against the individual accused, led to the building of the strongest case possible 
against that individual. 
Police practice created a situation in which the task of securing a conviction 
determined the selection of the charge, the presentation of the case and the choice of 
witnesses. They determined the nature and amount of material that was provided at 
the trial on the basis of a prior belief in the accused's guilt, and, were predisposed to 
reject, or, ignore evidence which challenged this. 
Police practice in the EdaIji case was not an unique occurrence, but was a 
particular instance of general police practice. By presenting it as exceptional and 
hence inexplicable police practice was presented as one of the irreducibly particular 
conditions of the factual situation of the Edalji case. It was not seen to be a necessary 
product of the logic of the police practice of law enforcement. This characterisation of 
255. See the previous chapters on the Police and the System of Prosecution for a more detailed, 
historical expL'mation of this. 
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police practice entailed the reaffIrmation of the background institutionallegitirnacy of 
the police. The construction of the case as I peculiar I had as its necessary, though 
implicit, corollary that the majority of calles were ones in which the evidential material 
produced was not guided by the desire to convict the individual accused. 
The Committees' decentring of the police from the main focus of attention in 
the Report was reinforced by the shift of attention to the trial. The evidence against 
Edalji was considered predominantly in terms of the rules of evidence, and, the finding 
of the jury in relation to the material with which they were presented in the case. The 
evidence collected form Edalji's house wall regarded by the Committee as 
circumstantial, and, the footprints introduced by the police were seen as having a 
11 value ..... as evidence[which] is practically nothing. 11 256 
They doubt whether this would, in itself, have been sufficient to secure the conviction 
257. 
In their view, the anonymous letters were the additional element which led to the 
conviction. They accept that they were written by Edalji, but state that their 
evidential value depended upon the assumption that the offence with which Edalji was 
charged wall one of a series of outrages all committed by the same person. This was 
placed in doubt while EdaIji was in prison awaiting trial, and, the Committee stress 
that, when examined, the letters do not 
11 have anything like the evidentiary weight which ha.1i been attributed to them. 
Their value depends on the contents of the letters themselves ..... We think it quite as 
likely that they are the letters of an innocent man. 11 258 
256. Papers Relating to the Case of George Edalji, ParI. Papers 1907, Vol. LXVII, pA06 
257.lbid, pA06. 
258. Ibid, pA07. 
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On this basis, they conclude that 
11 in our opinion, the conviction was unsatisfactory .... we cannot agree with the 
verdict of the jury. 11 259 
The circumstances in which the investigation was conducted, and, the 
evidence wa'S collected were, thereby, rendered increasingly peripheral. For, the trial 
was presented as the central site of guilt determination where the evidence was 
independently analysed and considered by the jury. The Committee made the 
attendant presumption that the prosecution case was, by this means, subject to 
scrutiny because the jury, as the ultimate decision-makers on the facts, ensured the 
propriety, and, hence legality of the prosecution ca'Se. The prosecution, therefore, on 
this view, was subject to regulation. However, the nature of this regulation was not 
examined further by the Committee despite their own admission that the jury had 
failed to scrutinise the case carefully enough. The effectiveness of this constraint was, 
therefore, not placed at issue by the Committee and the mistake of the jury was 
attributed to its very uniqueness, particularly, the anonymous letters. 
The Committees' presentation of the general dynamics of the jury in the case 
occluded the trial's dependence upon police practice for the content of the prosecution 
case. The cases which were tried were' fed in I solely by the police since the process 
of law enforcement was concentrated exclusively in their hands 260. The trial dealt 
with material which was predominantly provided by the police. As a result, it was 
informationally dependent upon the police; and; the information which was provided 
was produced by a continuous process of selection. For, the police had control over 
the process of charging, the presentation of the case and the selection of witnesses. 
The case against the accused was constructed in order that it was as strong as 
possible, and, this entailed a recognition of the necessity of itl! presentation at the trial. 
259. Ibid, p.40S. 
260.See, for more detail on the historical development of this during the nineteenth century, the 
previous chapters on the Police and the System of Prosecution. 
Police practice was attuned, by the goal of securing a conviction, to the need to 
ensure that the case was constructed in such a way that it would be immune from later 
challenge at the trial. 
The ' mistake' of the jury in the case then becomes explicable not a') an 
exceptional or peculiar entity, but the reflection of the structural deficiency inherent in 
it') capacity to act as a constraint upon police practice. The dependence of the jury 
upon the material produced by police practice was compounded by the 
misrecognition, by the rules of evidence, of the conditions of production of this 
evidence. These consisted of an asymmetrical power relation between the individual 
defendant and the police. However, the maintenance of the form of private 
prosecution in the criminal process, throughout the nineteenth century 261, meant that 
there was no clear recognition, within the legal form itself, of the link between the 
state, police and the practice of law enforcement. Hence, the jury trial continued to 
present, in its form, the defendant and prosecutor as individuals whose pre-trial 
interaction was not founded upon any asymmetry that could not be neutralised by the 
trial it'ielf through the compliance, by both parties, with the trial procedures, rules of 
evidence and the scrutiny of the jury. With no conception of the social power of the 
police; and; its continual, institutional existence and reproduction there arose no 
perceptual space, within this schema, in which the defendant's position could be 
conceived as in need of particular recognition or extra protection. 
The Committees' construction of the' mistakes " made by both the police, and, 
at the trial, as aberrations presented the general operation of the criminal process as a 
whole as un problematic. There was no need, therefore, to investigate the adequacy of 
the criminal process it')elf because the origin of the causes of Edalji's case were not 
seen to be located there. This reafftrmed the legitimacy of the criminal process since 
the case, as a peculiarity, was not the product of normal institutional practices. 
261. See, for more detnil the previous chapter on the System of Prosecution. 
This unusual, contingent and particular character of the Edalji case, presented 
by the Committee, which had as its necessary corollary the inexplicable I mistakes I of 
the police and the jury, enabled attention to shift to the Home Office Criminal 
Department. This construction of the nature of the case, at the lower levels, made 
possible the continued projection of the Home Office Criminal Department ali an 
independent, reviewing authority. 
This view of the Home Office was not undennined by the Committees' 
assertion that the Home Office was incorrect not to intervene in the case 262. For, 
their analysis of the Memorandum, prepared by Sir Kennelm Digby, ali to the practice 
of the Home Office, which was presented to the Beck Committee, led them to the 
conclusion that the lack of intervention in the case was itself a ' mistake '. The 
Memorandum, a'i a description and explanation of the parameters of that practice, was 
seen as establishing that Home Office administrative action was geared to the 
comprehensive scrutiny and review of criminal cases 263. The' mistake' of the Home 
Office, given the interventionist parameters of its administrative action, was simply 
one of the misrecognition of the type of ca'ie with which they were dealing. It was an 
isolated instance of the misapplication of administrative norms to a particular case. 
For, this wa'i a 
" very exceptional case, which [should have been] considered in an exceptional 
manner." 264 
The partiality of this interpretation of the Memorandum was revealed in the 
above analysis of the Beck Committees' Report; and; with this definition of Home 
Office administrative action, the conceptual concordance between the Edalji 
Committee and the Beck Committee was explicitly visible. As was its underlying aim 
262. See, for the analysis of the Home Office role and operation in the case, Papers ReL'lting to the 
Case of George Edalji, ParI. Papers 1907 Vol. LXVII, pAOS 
263. See ibid, pAOS 
264. Ibid, p.408 
of re-legitimating the existing criminal process through each Committees' construction 
of the explanation for these cases. 
C)THE CONCEPTUAL LEGACY OF THE BECK AND EDAUI 
COMMITTEES. 
The occurrence of these cases, and, the' public' pressure that they generated through 
the press, was seen to represent a challenge to the whole of the criminal process. The 
institutional legitimacy of the criminal process, which had remained an implicit, 
background assumption was, a~ a result, made problematic. It could no longer exist 
a'i a largely unarticulated and tacit presumption since the cases had made it') very 
existence as an unreflective presumption questionable. Both of the Committees were 
assumed, by those in the press, to represent a form of independent investigation into 
each of the cases which would establish the nature of the causes and the responsibility 
of the criminal process; and; the attendant changes that were necessary. 
However, the construction of the cases of Beck and Edalji in the Committee 
Reports produced a explanation which reasserted the legitimacy of the existent 
criminal process. This was done, in both Reports, by the subtle transfer of focus from 
the police and their practices to the trial, and, the exercise of the perogative of mercy 
by the Home Office. This description proscribed the ambit of possible criticism; and; 
at the same time, transmuted even this confined critical potential into the task of 
adjusting these administrative deficiencies in the existing system. 
This was not produced by chance, as the construction of both the cases 
entailed an active denial of the social power of the police and the dependence of the 
rest of the criminal process upon the dynamics of their practice. This active denial 
flowed from an undiscussed presumption which lay behind Committees's 
investigations, namely, the creation of the motivation necessary for the maintenance of 
the legitimacy of the criminal process without the need for major alteration or reform. 
The creation of the Court of Criminal Appeal did not, therefore, originate in 
the Reports of either of the Committees. Neither of them recommended it~ formation, 
nor, was the conceptual schema that they produced attentive to the need for its 
creation. These Reports were the repositories of the dominant self-imagery and self-
explanation of the workings and purposes of the criminal process. Their explicit 
rearticulation and reaffIrmation of this perspective formed the basis on which the 
operation of the criminal process was to be understood. It also allowed the criminal 
process to continue without change being pressed upon it in accordance with' public' 
pressure, and, hence the possibility of the introduction of, or, regulation by, norms 
which were independent from those which were generated within the criminal system 
itself. The criminal process, through the efforts of both Committees, maintained the 
autonomy of its practices from external control. Its identity and reproduction 
continued to be governed and steered by systemic imperatives. Any change within the 
criminal process was, therefore, to be shaped and determined by the internal, systemic 
task of securing the continued survival of and the avoidance of risks to the criminal 
system. The creation of the Court of Criminal Appeal was to be the result of this type 
of decision-making process. 
Thj C[f.q~n lS: the Court of Criminal Appeal i Formation According to 
Sys emlC eed 
The Court of Appeal was, formally, the creation of a new institution in the criminal 
process. The consideration of the interests of the individual accused, or, prisoner 
were not the prime, or, major basis upon which this new institution was constructed. 
Its structure and parameters of operation were determined by the institutional needs 
of the Home Office Criminal Department 
This change was generated by the perception of the Home Office Criminal 
Department that its present role in the criminal process, through the exercise of the 
perogative of mercy, was placing it in a position where it was overburdened and it') 
administrative activities were under strain. The Department felt that it was 
experiencing a situation in which 
" the permanent staff of the Home Office is constantly held up to public 
obloquy by persons who have been unsuccessful in petitions on behalf of prisoners. " 
265 
This wa') a constant tendency of the Department's work, but in the cases of Beck and 
Edalji this had produced both condemnation in the press and the demand, through the 
Committees of Inquiry, to articulate their administrative practices. Despite the 
construction placed upon their activities by both Committees, this had been the first 
time that their administrative action had been subject to scrutiny, or, the attempt to 
attribute responsibility to it for failings in the criminal process. 
This new level of public scrutiny of the administrative action of the 
Department was compounded by the workload which the existing parameters of the 
perogative of mercy produced. By 1905, the Department was having to deal with 
about 6000 applications for it') exercise 266. The pressures that both these demands 
created led to the desire, on the part of the Department to alter the criminal process in 
to relieve them and, thereby, to ensure the survival of the Department, albeit in a 
modified form. The establishment of the Court of Criminal Appeal exercising a 
judicial function was now perceived to be the necessary solution to these needs of the 
Home Office Criminal Department. 
265. Home Office comments on the 1906 Criminal Appeal Bill dated 31/3/1906 in H.O. 
45/103371139064/1 
266. Figure cont.1.ined in confidential st.'ltistics supplied to the Lord Chancellor by the Home Office 
det.1.iling the conviction by juries, appeals to the Home Office and release of prisoners by the Home 
Office in H.O. 451103371139064/3. 
The Court of Appeal was to deal with appeals arising from indictable offences, 
leaving the Home Office to deal with those arising from summary offences under 
Section I (I) 
to A person convicted on indictment may appeal within the time provided by 
this Act to the Court of Criminal Appeal against conviction on any ground, whether 
law or fact, or of mixed law and fact, and he may so appeal against the judgement 
(other than judgement of death) passed on his conviction, on the ground of illegality 
or undue severity" 267 
The Home Office viewed this as marking a substantial change in the Departments' 
practices and workload . 
.. The foregoing provisions for transferring to the Court of Appeal much of the 
work which the Home Office hitherto attempted to do will be an immense relief to 
Department C[Criminal Department of the Home Office]." 268 
The relief that the establishment of the Court of Appeal was to cause the 
Home Office is immediately countered by the fear that, unless the procedures for the 
new appellate body were carefully worked out, the system would risk becoming 
disorganised. The main source of this potential disorganisation was seen to arise from 
an unrestricted right of appeal by defendants convicted of indictable offences. For, it 
was considered to be 
.. practically certain that every prisoner will appeal whether he has any real or 
substantial grounds for appealing or not, seeing he may gain by the operation, while 
he is left in none the worse position if he fails ..... [Tlhe unrestricted right of appeal 
267. The Criminal Appeal Bill 1906 Section 1(1) in H.O. 45/10337/139064 
268. Home Office comments on the 1906 Criminal Appeal Bill in H.O. 45/103371139064112. 
would bring about such a condition of things as would result. .. in the complete 
disorganisation of the criminal business of the country. 11 269 
The risk posed by a free exercise of a right of appeal led to the introduction of 
various mechanisms in order to prevent this right from attaining this position. This 
potentially uncertain t environment' which confronted the Court of Appeal was to be 
rendered stable and certain by a combination of restrictive criteria for appeal within 
the Act itself, and, external devices. 
Before appeals, from those convicted of indictable offences, could even reach 
the Court of Appeal they were to be subject to two' filters '. Commenting on the 
provisions of the 1906 Bill, the Home Secretary, stressed the need, when the Bill 
became law, to send instructions to prisons to adopt a policy, towards those prisoners 
who sought to appeal, which would 
It prevent the accumulation of nugatory petitions and the consequent 
disappointment of petitioners" 270 
In tandem with the establishment of the Court of Appeal there was to be the 
installation of an external, administrative t filter t which was to be in permanent 
operation throughout the prison system. 
Appeals themselves were to be subject to a degree of limitation through the 
time that was to be allowed in which an appeal could be made and lodged. This was 
contained in Section 3 (1) 
269. Extract from the Report of the Parliament.'U)' Committee on the 1906 Bill in H.O. 
45/10337/139064/4 
270. The Secret.'U)' of State's comments on the 1906 Bill in H.O. 45/10337/139064/12 
" Where a convicted person desires to appeal under this Act he shall give 
notice of appeal ..... within 10 days of the date of conviction, or such further time as 
may be allowed by the Court of Criminal Appeal or any judge thereof." 271 
While an absolute and rigid time limitation was not placed upon appeals it was clear 
that the intention was that the 10 day limit would be the regulatory norm with only a 
small degree of flexibility to be exercised outside this. The extension of time for 
appeal was only to be exercised, stated the Home Office, if 
" through some oversight or ignorance, the ten days have been allowed to go 
by ....... Ajudge would not extend the time to appeal so as to allow an appeal, say a 
year or more after the time had elapsed. 11 272 
In comparison with the administrative action of the Home Office Criminal Department 
this Section was closing off the possibility of review far more quickly than had been 
characteristic of the Home Office. The Department had adopted a practice in which 
the 
" perogative of mercy had frequently been exercised on facts brought to our 
knowledge a long time after trial. " 273 
It was, therefore, the intention, despite the wording of the Section, that the Court of 
Appeal was to operate more restrictively than the Home Office had done, and, that 
appeals were to dismissed on the ground that they were outside the time limit. 
If the appellant managed to overcome these t filters t they were then able to 
present their case to the Court. Under Section 1 (1) The Court of Appeal was given 
271. Section 3 (I) of The Criminal Appeal Bill 1906 in H.O. 45/10337/139064. 
272. The Criminal Appeal Bill: Home Office points in L.e.o. 23211270/1 
273. Home Office comments on the 1906 Act in H.O. 45/10337/139064/1 
considerable discretion in dealing with an appeal case. If the judges of the appellate 
court decide that the appeal ought to be allowed then they can under Section 1 (1 )(a) 
" either quash the conviction and direct a judgement of acquittal to be entered, 
or quash the judgement passed at the trial, and pass such other judgement in 
substitution thereof as they think ought to have been passed. " 274 
Alternatively, if they are not of the opinion that the appeal ought to be allowed then 
they may dismiss the appeal under Section l(l)(b). The decision to dismiss the appeal 
is also one in which the appellate judges can exercise discretionary powers under 
Section 1 (l)(b)(a)-(e). The most important were those contained in (a)-(c) in which 
11 (a) the court may, notwithstanding that they are of the opinion that the point raised 
in the appeal ought to be decided in favour of the appellant, dismiss the appeal if they 
consider that no substantial miscarriage of justice has, in point of fact, occurred. 
(b) the court, if it appears to them that the appellant. though not properly convicted 
on some other count or part of indictment, may either afftrm the judgement passed on 
the appellant at the trial. or pass such judgement in substitution thereof as they think 
proper[Under section 1 (2). however it is expressly provided that the I Court of 
Appeal, shall not, by any substituted judgement passed by them under this section, 
inflict upon the appellant a severer punishment than that inflicted by the judgement 
passed at the trial. '] 
(c) where an appellant has been convicted of an offence and the jury would on the 
indictment have found him gUilty of some other offence, and on the ftnding of the jury 
it appears to the Court that the jury must have been satisfted of the facts which proved 
him gUilty of some other offence, the court may instead of allowing or dismissing the 
appeal. subsistute a verdict found by the jury a verdict of guilty of such other offence, 
274.Section J(l)(a) in The Criminal Appeal Bill 1906 in H.O. 451103371139064 
and pass judgement in substitution for the judgement passed at trial as they think 
proper. 11 275 
With these powers the Court of Appeal was given a potentially strong 
interventionist and regulatory role in the criminal process. The definition of 
miscarriage of justice, for indictable offences, was placed within its almost exclusive 
purview. This defmitional power meant that the notion was given a flexibility of 
content according to judicial assessment of the criminal process. This, in turn, meant 
that a particular case could be dealt with by a large degree of discretion in both the 
decision to grant or refuse appeal, and, the nature and character of the sentence as a 
result of that decision. The transfer of what the Home Office Criminal Department 
regarded at) the majority of its responsibilities, in regard to the criminal process, to the 
Court of Appeal still left the institutional relation between the two to be decided. 
Under Section 6 the perogative of mercy was still to remain applicable to both 
indictable offences and summary offences. 
" Nothing in this Act shall affect the perogative of mercy, but the Secretary of 
State to whom any petition to his Majesty for mercy, having reference to the 
conviction of a person on indictment to the judgement (other than judgement of 
death) passed on a person so convicted, is referred may, if he thinks fit, at any time 
refer the case to the Court of Criminal Appeal, and the ca<::e shall be heard and 
determined by the Court of Appeal, and the case shall be heard and determined by the 
Court of Appeal as if notice of appeal had been given by the person convicted within 
the time allowed by this Act. 11 276 
The maintenance of the perogative of mercy by the Home Office created the 
possibility of overlapping jurisdictions and institutional conflict between the Home 
Office and the new Court of Appeal. For, appellants could still be dealt with solely by 
275.'Section 1 (l)(b), subparagraphs (a)-(c) in The Criminal Appeal Bill 1906 in ibid 
276.Section 6 in The Criminal Appeal Bill 1906 in H.O. 45110337/139064. 
the Home Office since they had a discretion, rather than a duty, to refer the matter to 
the Court of Appeal; and; there was nothing to prevent an unsuccessful appellant in 
the Court of Appeal subsequently applying to the Home Office. 
The Home Office was, however, aware of this possibility and was intent upon 
altering its administrative action in accordance with a self-imposed ta'ik of functioning 
in a much reduced role in the new criminal process. Some alteration in its role was 
necessary, otherwise 
11 great difficulties would arise if the new court should be established as 
proposed in it [The Court of Appeal Bill] without corresponding adjustment at the 
Home Office. 11 277 
These adjustments were to take the form of 
11 (i) clear instruction as to the general prinCiples on which we will now 
exercise the perogative of mercy after the establishment of the new Court, and, (ii) 
fonnal provision for keeping the Home Office acquainted with the applications made 
to the Court and decisions arrived at. 11 278 
The principles that were to govern the future administrative practice of the Home 
Office was to consist of referring cases to the Court of Appeal only if fresh evidence 
was brought forward by the appellant that was not available at the time of the appeal. 
In cases where the prisoner has exercised her/his right to appeal and been refused, 
and, then applies to the Home Office the Department recognised that it would either 
277. Home Office comments on The Criminal Appeal Bill 1906 in H.O. 45/10337/139064/12 
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" have to incur the odium of refusing the prisoner what will be represented alj 
his only chance to getting justice, or the censure of the Court for compelling it to hear 
an appeal on what the Court regards as frivolous or insufficient grounds. " 279 
This dilemma which faced the Home Office between the choice of one of the two 
options was to be contradiction that was to continually confront the Department as a 
result of its altered role in the criminal process with the creation of the Court of 
Appeal. Action or inaction on the part of the Home Office was now placed in a 
position where it determined the extent to which the Court of Appeal was to act as 
the institutional pinnacle of the criminal process. 
The reduction in the perogative of mercy, and, the establishment of the Court 
of Appeal had been driven by the internal needs of the Home Office Criminal 
Department. These needs too pointed towards the maintenance of the Court of 
Appeal as the appellate body of the criminal process. For, the diminution of the 
visibility of, and, risks to the Home Office role in the criminal process had been 
exactly what the creation of the Court of Appeal had been intended to produce. 
Home Office control over the creation of the Court of Appeal, and, the new 
institutional pattern of the criminal process that it engendered meant that 
consideration of the position of the individual appellant was only considered in so far 
as it directly affected the implementation of this systemic alteration in the criminal 
process. The needs of the individual accused were not the foundation of this change. 
It was the continued survival of the criminal process, of which the Home Office was 
an element, that underlay the change. As a result, the legitimacy of the criminal 
process was considered to reside in the maintenance of public confidence in the 
criminal process. This was based merely upon the number of people who supported 
the criminal process. It was, therefore, a matter of continuing to produce the 
conditions in which people were motivated to do this. The administrative pressure 
279. Home Office memorandum on the Court of Appeal Bill 1906 in L.C.O. 2123211270/1 
that the Home Office felt ite;elf subject to, was also considered to be endangering this 
public consent The Court of Appeal was to be the institutional device which would 
overcome this potential threat to legitimacy. 
The dominance of these systemic needs were reflected in the Court of Appeal 
being confined to deal with only indictable offences. These were regarded by the 
Home Office as the most demanding element of its existent workload, and, therefore 
transferred to be the sole workload of the Court of Appeal. However, this left those 
convicted of summary offences, without recourse to the new Court. Under section 
31 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879 those convicted of summary offences had 
been able to appeal to Courts of Quarter Sessions. It was clear, by the time of the 
Court of Appeal Bill, that it was a flawed process. The defendant could initiate 
proceedings under this section by informing the magistrates, at time of the trial, that 
he/she wanted to appeal, or, by lodging an appeal from prison. They had to give 
written notice of appeal with grounds to the prosecutor and the clerk of the justices, 
and, enter into recognisances usually with sureties. It was also practically necessary 
for the appellant to instruct a solicitor and/or counsel if they were to have a chance of 
success. The costs of representation had to be borne by the appellant themselves as 
the Poor Prisoner's Defence Act 1903 did not apply to summary cases. Therefore, 
even if successful the appellant still had to pay a solicitor's bill; and; sou Id they have 
their appeal dismissed then they were also liable to pay the prosecutor's coste;. To 
undertake this procedure for appeal was an expensive prospect for any potential 
appellant, and, by the time of the Court of Appeal Bill it had become obvious that in 
practice 
" the right of appeal to Quarter Sessions against summary conviction is 
absolutely useless to a poor man. " 280 
280. Sir H. Poland and H. Cohen, The Criminal Appeal Bill Examined (London:Sweet and Maxwell, 
1906), p.53. 
Most appellants convicted of summary offences were, as a result, using their ability to 
apply to the Home Office for the exercise of the perogative of mercy because this 
procedure did not involve any expense or formalities. Applications by those convicted 
of summary offences were not treated with the same degree of seriousness or 
attention by the Home Office. Despite their practice of obtaining the evidence from 
the magistrate and his opinion on the case, and, occasionally a report from the police 
where there was a prima facie plea the decision-making process in regard to these 
offences was one which lacked much further inquiry. This was the result of the Home 
Office view that since the sentences for these offences was short then there was 
11 rarely time for elaborate inquiry. 11 281 
The relative lack of attention that had characterised Home Office practice 
towards summary offences was not altered by the establishment of the Court of 
Appeal. The restriction of the Court of Appeal to indictable offences reinforced the 
institutional separation of indictable and summary offences. Furthermore, the ability 
to use the Court of Appeal was a symbol and constant affirmation of the seriousness 
of indictable offences. All appellants unable to utilise the Court of Appeal were left 
with a separate appellate procedure which either presented them with substantial 
financial risks(appeal to Courts of Quarter Sessions), or, dealt with their case in a 
cursory manner(the Home Office Criminal Department). This, in turn, could only but 
reinforce the definition of these offences as non-serious, trivial and of little 
consequence. 
Both the decision to establish the Court of Appeal, and, the determination its 
institutional form were guided by the values and norms of the Home Office Criminal 
Department. This process of establishment and formation was constantly informed by 
the systemic need to ensure the survival of the criminal process which, in turn, 
281. Evidence of Sir Kennelm Digby to the Committee of Inquiry into the Case of Adolf Beck, ParI. 
Papers 1905, Vol. LXII, p.333. 
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produced a perceptual context in which the creation of the Court of Appeal was 
conceived as the solution to this practical problem. However, this produced only the 
legislative demarcation of the parameters of its operation. It was to be left to judicial 
practice to provide the concrete, practical continuity between desired legislative 
intentions and the actual institutional operation of the Court of Appeal. 
The case of (R v Gowlett)282 was decided by the Court of Appeal in the first year of 
its operation. It shows the way in which the new Court of Appeal and the Home 
Office responded to an application which challenged the validity of the prosecution 
case, and, since this rested, in the main, on police identification, the nature of police 
practice. 
OThe facts of the case 
Two police detective constables, D.C. Hubbard and D.C. Powell, were engaged in the 
observation of a jewellers, in North London, where it was suspected by the police that 
the jeweller was receiving stolen property. Both policemen were operating I 
undercover I with D.C. Hubbard employed m; a pawnbrokers assistant in nearby 
premises and D.C. Powell ' lounging' on a nearby bridge. 
At 12.00, on the morning of 5th October 1908, during this operation, two 
men, Gowlett and Haers, come out of a lodging house(where they were both staying), 
located in the same street, and walked up the street. A few minutes later, a man 
known to D.C. Powell as I Jack I passed by him on the bridge and told him that there 
were two telescopes in the lodgins house which might be stolen. D.C. Powell 
infoffiled D.C. Hubbard of this, and, that he had seen Gowlett and Haers whom he 
knew were ex-convicts under police supervision. They agreed that it might be worth 
282. Criminal Appeal Reports, Vol.l 1909, pp.204-5,238-40 
keeping an eye on them. At around 12.30 the same morning Gowlett and Haers 
returned to the lodging house, and, twenty minutes later D.C. Hubbard gave a signal 
to D.C. Powell that' something was up '. 
D.C.s Hubbard and Powell then alleged that they saw two men, one of whom 
they recognised as Haers, and, the other whom they could not immediately recognise 
walking up a side street. They said that they saw the other man give Haers a sack. 
The detective constables then followed both Haers and the other man whom they still 
could not identify. They did not arrest them immediately, acting on the advice to the 
station superintend ant, but waited. On the 8th October the detective constables 
arrested Haers who was found to have the sack which contained the stolen telescopes. 
Also, on the 8th one of the detective constables alleged that he saw Gowlett in the 
road in which the lodging house where Haers was staying, but he was not arrested 
until the 9th when he was coming out of the lodging house. 
Both men were charged jointly on indictment with stealing, and, receiving 
stolen property. Haers pleaded guilty to both charges. Gowlett pleaded not guilty 
and put forward an alibi that he was in bed on the evening of the robbery, and, at the 
time that he was alleged to have been seen with Haers on the morning of the 5th 
October, when the sack was exchanged, he was actually at Covent Garden. However, 
some of Gowlett's witnesses who had been summoned to appear did not come to the 
trial. The evidence of D.C.s Powell and Hubbard was the only content of the 
prosecution case. D.e. Hubbard stated that he had seen Gowlett ,on the 8th October, 
in the road on which the lodging house wa~ on. D.C. Powell stated that he had 
known Gowlett for 5 years and that he was then under police supervision, and, that he 
had no doubt that Gowlett was the man with Haers that day. The Deputy-Chairman 
of Quarter Sessions directed the jury only to convict of receiving. He was sentenced 
to three and a half years penal servitude with two years police supervision. Gowlett 
then lodged as appeal against his conviction. Leave to appeal was subsequently 
granted to call further witnesses to confirm the night and day alibis. 
WThe case on Appeal.' (R v E. Gowleu> 
Haers and two other witnesses called Chaffin and Betjeman gave evidence. Haers 
said that Gowlett had nothing to do with the offence. Chaffin and Betjemen gave 
evidence confmning Gowlett's alibi that on the morning of 5th October he had been 
with them at Co vent Garden, and, had stayed with them until 2 o'clock in the 
afternoon. This evidence, and, the subsequent explanation by Chaffin that he had been 
unable to attend the initial committal proceedings as his father had been taken ill, and, 
had not come to the trial because his mother was dying when the case wal) being 
heard, was not sufficient to convince the court that the conviction should be quashed. 
The Lord Chief Justice dismissed the appeal saying that 
" The Court is not satisfied with the the explanation given for not calling at the 
trial the evidence produced on appeal. These was no dispute as to the identity of the 
man, as the police knew the appellant very well. [The a]ppellant had to account for 
his movements on the day in question, and, though he sought to prove an alibi, at the 
trial he did not go into the [witness] box to establish it. The jury had the question of 
the alibi before them. " 283 
With the dismissal of his appeal Gowlett then applied to the Home Office for the 
exercise of the perogative of mercy on his behalf to quash the conviction. 
iWThe Deliberations of the Home Q(fice: Revealing and Affirming the Hidden 
Rationale of the Court of Appeal in the Case. 
The Home Office Criminal Department, as a result of Gowlett's application, 
undertook their own examination of the case to establish whether, in their new, 
283. Lord Chief Justice Alverstone in CB v Gowlettl Criminal Appeal Reports, Vol. 1 1909, p.240. 
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reduced role in the criminal process, they should intervene in his cal)e. They first . 
turned their attention to an analysis of the way in which the Court of Appeal dealt 
with the appeal. 
The conviction of Gowlett was based, in their view, 
284 
" entirely upon his identification by the two detectives Hubbard and Powell. " 
Gowlett's cal)e on appeal was viewed favourably. His alibi that he was at Covent 
Garden on the morning of the alleged sighting of himself and Haers exchanging the 
sack was seen as being about 
" as good a one as any man casually employed at Covent Garden can be 
expected to produce. The witnesses have good reason to remember that day [5th 
October was a Jewish holiday with most places closed in Covent Garden]. They gave 
their evidence well and were unshaken in cross-examination by Counsel or the Court. 
" 285 
They then come to the Court's judgement it')elf and the reasons that led them to 
dismiss Gowlett's appeal. As the result of consultation between the Home Office and 
the Court of Appeal, it becomes clear that the judgement given by Lord Chief Justice 
Alverstone did not contain the real reasons for the decision. It was the understanding 
of the Home Office that 
" the Court were inclined to quash the conviction but refrained from doing 
so because it would, in their opinion, have involved finding the detective guilty of 
petjury. The detective's evidence is not entirely satisfactory. It is curious that at that 
moment[Le. the morning of 5th October]they made no attempt to catch Haers 
284. The Case of Edward Gowlett alias Wood ford under the beading entitled' The Home Office 
analysis of the appeal in the Court of Appeal' in H.O. 4511689/105768. 
285. Ibid. 
companion. Gowlett says he slept at 180 Caledonian Road[the address of the lodging 
house]every night from 5th to 8th and is corroborated by the deputy and yet no 
inquiry wal) made by the detective at the lodging house. The Court was not satisfied 
with the detectives' explanation of this. " 286 
It is unclear from the Home Office me, whether there wal) a finding that the 
detectives had lied; or; whether it was simply the feeling, on the part of the Court of 
Appeal, that this would be the inference drawn from if the conviction wac; overturned. 
However, what is clear is that there was a willingness to validate a conviction, 
and the original trial process which produced it, which was recognised, by the Court 
of Appeal, from the evidence adduced by the appellant, and, the flaws in the 
prosecution case as defective. 
This points to the continuing immunity of the trial process and the police case 
from subsequent challenge. It, therefore, indicates the degree to which, even in the 
fIrst year of its operation, systemic values - here the avoidance of risk to the criminal 
process - had embedded themselves within the judicial practice of the Court of 
Appeal. Furthermore, it demonstrates the extent to which the new Court was 
prepared to go to satisfy these systemic needs, namely, effectively reversing the 
position of legal reasoning and the decision was supposed to flow from it. In this 
process, the nonnative foundation of the Court of Appeal contained in the legil)lation 
which established it, which was supposed to determine and guide the practice of 
judicial decision-making was transfonned into a resource which was assist them to 
achieve their purpose - the concrete task of maintaining the legitimacy of the criminal 
process. 
The Home Office too opt~ not to intervene, despite itl) misgivings. The 
rationale for non-intervention consists of the need to play a reduced role in the 
286. Ibid. 
criminal process by not challenging decisions of the Court of Appeal without 
substantial grounds for intervention, that is, something more than was presented at the 
trial. 
" the Court of Criminal Appeal has had the whole case before it, has heard all 
the evidence which the prisoner failed to call at his trial and has decided not to 
interfere. This being so, I do not see how it is possible for the Home Office, whatever 
doubts we may feel, to revise the findings of the Court of Criminal Appeal. If any 
new evidence were available since the Court had decided the case, there ought to be 
an opening; but there is no suggestion that we have anything before us except the 
evidence given at the trial before the Court of Appeal. " 287 
The possibility of institutional conflict with the Court of Appeal, and, the 
potential risks to the legitimacy of the decision-making practices of both the Home 
Office and the Court of Appeal that this might cause was the dominant consideration 
for the Home Office Criminal Department. It was the same logic, though expresssed 
in a different institutional context, which had governed the operation of the 
Department in the period prior to the Court of Appeal - the task of satisfying the 
expectatiom; of the judiciary as propounded before the Beck Committee. This 
rationale was at the same time one that maintained the immunity of the case from 
interference in the higher levels of the criminal process. By maintaining this immunity 
it also furthered the reproduction of the systemic logic of the Court of Appeal. 
The Home Office, under the reduced perogative of mercy, was engaging in an 
adminstrative practice which would not challenge the decision-making of the Court of 
Appeal in order not to undermine the appearance of the independence and 
depoliticisation of the criminal process which was effected by its creation. 
Institutional inaction, on the part of the Home Office, was to be the basis for the 
287. Memorandum on the front of the file in, ibid. 
maintenance of the legitimacy of the other institutional elements of the criminal 
process. 
Conclusion 
By the 1920s the Court of Appeal had been set within a discourse which stressed the 
necessity of its creation, and, the concomitant diminution of the powers of the Home 
Office under the previous, unreformed system. The Home Office was incapable of 
dealing with the task and the Court of Appeal was the inevitable result of this 
incapacity. 
" [T]he Home Office was forced into the position of a final court of 
appeaL.the Home Office possessed none of the ordinary powers of a court of law for 
this purpose. " 288 
The Court of Appeal was the institutional solution to this problem with the 
transference of power to the Court of Appeal marked by a profound change in the 
criminal process in which 
" The Home Secretary ws once and for all relieved of responsibility which 
ought not to have belonged to him. " 289 
The nature of this change was more than a simple transfer of function from 
one institution to another as projected by this characterisation. The establishment of 
the Court of Appeal wa~ a direct response to, and product of the Home Offices' 
increasing administrative workload and the visibility of its role in the criminal process 
produced by the inquiries of the Beck and Edalji Committees. Both of these element') 
were perceived in terms of the effect that they were having, or, could have upon the 
288. Sir E. Troup, The Home Office (London: Putnrun and Sons, 1926), p.58. 
289. Ibid, p.59. 
legitimacy of the criminal process. The need, on the part of the Home Office, to 
ensure the maintenance of the criminal process led to the creation, with the Court of 
Appeal, of a more flexible and complex criminal process. 
The re-legitimation of the criminal process which was begun with the analysis 
and construction of the Beck and Edalji Committees and ended with the 
im plementation of the Court of Criminal Appeal, in 1907, was a process in which 
consideration of the protection of the individual defendant found little place. This' 
project' of renewal of the criminal process traced in this chapter was specifically 
orientated towards the maintenance and reproduction of the efficiency and 
organisational coherence of the criminal process. This was the conceptual 
environment in which the Court of Appeal was shaped. 
The case of (R v Gowlett) points towards the appellate body's tendency to 
engage in the active reproduction of this institutional legitimacy even to the extent of 
the denial of evidence which they themselves knew cast doubt upon the voracity of an 
individual's conviction. This evinces the more general propensity to the reduction of 
the Court of Appeal's perceptual framework to the sole concentration upon the 
demands and interests of the other elements of the criminal process. Thi'i has the 
further consequence that the rationality of judicial decision-making becomes 
orientated by this goal, and, that the character and analytic content of Court of Appeal 
judgement') become incoherent and irratic. For, what is demanded of them is a 
flexibility borne of the syste~ic needs of the criminal process. This, in turn, hints at 
the conformity in theory and practice between the operation of the Home Office 
Criminal Department under the unreformed system, and, the new Court of Criminal 
Appeal in the more complex system. 
More fundamental than this potentiality for the decline of judicial reac;;on is the 
disappearance from view of the activities of the police. The Court of Criminal Appeal 
26J! 
and the Home Office, in its reduced role, can only recognise I mistakes I or I 
wrongdoings I that occur at the trial, that is, those of legal significance. This means 
that implicit within this is the view that the trial is the sole site of gUilt determination 
in which all external, pre-trial activities are without effect This, ignores, through the 
constitution of its irrelevance, the continuous process of selection which the police 
engage in from the charge to the collection of evidence and witnesses, and, hence the 
substantial dependence of the trial on the material with which it is provided by the 
police. The whole purpose of police practice is to construct a case that is immune 
from later challenge in order to ensure the conviction of the individual accused whom 
they have already arrested and charged. 
The rejection of the importance of the collective logic of police practice, 
ennunciated by both the Beck and Edalji Committees had as it.;; corollary the 
concentration upon the Home Office and the narrowing of the perceptual horizon to 
purely adminstrative-technical considerations. Securing the legitimacy of the Home 
Office, and with it the rest of the criminal process, led to the deliberate focus upon, 
and, exclusive stress upon the wrong part of the criminal process. The social 
conditions of both law enforcement and the production of evidence, namely, the 
context in which the ends of the criminal process were determined thereby evaporated 
into the unexamined presumptions of the dominant conception of the criminal process. 
CONCLUSION 
lA W, STATE, DEMOCRACY 
The development of the criminal process, during the nineteenth century, was one 
element in a more general transformation of society. It was an expression of the 
emergence of a modern state based upon law in which the legal system it ... elf was 
differentiated from society and claimed exclusive control over the definition of legality 
and illegality by reference to it') own autonomous system of legal norms and decisions. 
This transformation was not a ... sociated with a I bourgeois revolution I inspired by a 
revolutionary self-understanding of it ... character or purpose. Change was not 
interpreted as upheaval, rupture and emancipation but as the creation of the 
conditions for the regeneration and reformulation of the social system. It issued from 
a political strategy of systemic maintenance guided by the goal of the survival of the 
social system and a concomitant pragmatism in regard to the means by which to 
achieve it. This, in turn, produced an understanding of society in which institutional 
change was determined by an interest in technical control over society in order that 
the reproduction of the social system and it ... social structure could be maintained. 
The legitimacy of societal institutions was, therefore, ba ... ed upon their efficiency and 
effectiveness in ensuring this systemic survival with the parameters of institutional and 
governmental reflection composed of the promulgation and solution of technical 
tasks. As a reSUlt, state control, centralisation or institutional adjustment were 
introduced incrementally and intermittently in response to the perception of the 
ineffecti veness of the tradi tional element ... of the social system. The foundation and 
structure of this wider societal and institutional transformation were intimately 
connected with changes in the nature, distribution and exercise of social power and, 
with this, the definition of the political and legal subject. It is these elements in both 
their singularity and interrelation that form the basis for the reproduction, through the 
transmission of these element') of the past, of a social system (in which the modern 
criminal process is an element) founded upon an asymmetrial distribution of social 
power and the generation of the grounds for the ' validity' of this domination. 
That this transformation was effected, and continued to be guided, from within 
was a~ a result of the differentiation of the state apparatus(between the executive and 
Parliament), during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century 290, from which 
emerged the relative autonomy of the state in regard to the class structure. The state 
moved, from being a form in which the executive and the legislature, dominated by 
the landed elite, exercised political authority to the exclusive satisfaction of the landed 
interest, to a form in which in the executive differentiated itlleIf from this identity with 
the concerns of the landed interest producing a higher degree of internal flexibility in 
the social order and enabling an increa~ed capacity to be reformed from within. 
This differentiation was expressed in the redefintion by the executive of the 
nature of society and it~ inseparability from unconditional support for the maintenance 
of the Anglican constitution of the landed interest. Society was now conceived to be 
mechanistic rather than organic. It was a machine composed of discernable elementll 
not an undifferentiated sacred whole. Nature, while still held to be divine, was now 
intelligible in terms of a modified, Christian political economy and it') , natural laws '. 
This knowledge of society undermined the indispensibility of the Anglican constitution 
and the protection of the agricultural profit') of the landed interest. For, they now 
became contingent and hence alterable in the face of these' natural laws ' of society. 
Societal transformation wa~ not the outcome of the implementation of a 
radically new conception of the social order. It was not linked to a democratic 
revolution recognising it'\elf in the French Revolution of 1789 with the power of the 
people as the sole foundation of political authority and the source of norms which are 
290. See, for more detail on this development PJ. Jupp, , The L:Ulded Elite and Political AutllOrity in 
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to be govern society in which previous fonus of the social relations were characterised 
as oppressive and unnatural and to be removed. The creation of a society composed 
of juridical subjects/citizens ennunciating, through universal democratic procedures, a 
clearly human, positive law was not the object of this' project '. This reordering of 
society was a detenuined effort to avoid the possibity of such change by the 
imposition of new fonus of subordination to ensure continued obedience and 
submission. Fonus of inequality and social domination, therefore, became illegitimate 
not through their recognition as ' unnatural' in the sense of oppressive, but through 
their failure and incapacity to secure the maintenance of these relations of domination 
embedded within the social system. 
This societal transformation in accordance with this technical self-
understanding of the purpose of state intervention in society was not tied to the simple 
replacement of local, parochial structures of governance with centralised, state 
control. For, it retained a continuing willingness to adjust and vary the existant locally 
based system rather than characterise it apriori as irredemably flawed and seek its 
complete replacement with a system emanating from the state. This related to the fact 
that the bourgeoisie were incorporated into the existing state (The Reform Actl832) 
and the local structure of governance (The Municipal Reform ActI 835), and 
accomodated to the general configuration of the social and institutional system of 
which they were now to be a part. They were no longer to be external to the 
governance of society thereby removing the possibility that a link would be generated 
between them and the lower clac;ses which could find expression in the people/ancien 
regime split, similar to that of French Revolution 1789, in which two radically 
different forms of society were counterposed to each other with the political 
realisation and institutionalisation of the ' people' predicated upon the overthrow of 
the ancil'n regime. The bourgeoisie were to be neutralised by their co-option into a 
widened power bloc whose unity was to be generated by the process of Parliamentary 
and local politics. This was not, however,~ merely a clac;s alliance in which the landed 
elite and the bourgeoisie retained their separate identity with their unity being a purely 
formal one generated through these political forms. It was consitituted at a the deeper 
level of a framework of shared I ideas I and I values I embedded in institutions and 
apparatuses which were both their material expression and condition for the continued 
reproduction of this particular configuration of the social system. 
Anglian supremacy was the ftrst p'art of the social order to be dismantled with 
the Repeal of both the Test and Corporation Acts and legislation against Roman 
Catholics. By these means religion was privatized and the State was no longer 
projected a'i divine. The Anglican Church was no longer to be at the centre of the 
social order a'i the religion of the State with the attendant disqualification of those 
who practiced other forms of Christianity., !,t wa'i now placed as one entity within 
private sphere composed of a plurality of Christian beliefs which was it'ielf part of an 
emergent civil society separated from the State. 
This I emancipation' of the State from religion was at the same time the 
removal of the divine character of the whole social order and with it the capacity of 
the authority of the landed interest to be represented as the pinnacle of a divinely 
ordained static hierachical system of social relations. The continued existence of the 
authority, social position and institutions of the landed interest now came to rest 
transparently upon it'i ability to maintain the conditions for reproduction of society, 
that is, their conformity to the' natural laws I which political economy had discovered 
ensured that the parts of the societal machine operated in conformity with each other. 
This reconstitution of the identity of the internal structure of the state, 
produced by the differentiation between executive and legislature, entailed the wider 
differentiation of state and society. The state had to present itself as dissociated from 
direct causal interconnection with society in order for action, will and law to be solely 
and exclusively attributable to it This dissociation had also to be an externalisation of 
the state from society with the state defmed as a legal person or collective actor in 
contradistinction to a society composed of' private' needs and interests. This new 
self-representation of the state flowed from the secularisation of the state and the 
privatisation of religion. The state itself was now sovereign and this increasing unity 
and self-identity of the state led to its projection as representing the unity of society 
with the ability of the state to make law an expression of its co-ordination of social 
action in accordance with universal rules which generated the context of meaning for 
the actions of individuals within the' private' realm of civil society. 
This process and character of change, during the early nineteenth century, 
directly affected the criminal system. It was reflected, at the most general level, in 
the alterations made to the Common Law foundation of the criminal law. Cla'isical 
Common Law theory, which represented self-consciousness of the ancien regime legal 
system, viewed the implementation of law by the state a'i merely the articulation and 
symbolisation of a deeper entity which both preceded and exceded the existence of the 
state - God. The state was the representative of God and sought to govern society in 
accordance with the dictates of divine justice and reason thereby making both society 
and the state the object~ of divine will. It was God, not the state which represented 
the unity of society and this found expression in the notions of a hierachically ordered 
social body and of common and immemorial custom. Within this context of a lack of 
clear differentiation between state and society, the judiciary and magistracy were 
regarded, under Common Law theory, a') of at least equal importance to the state in 
that they too were engaged in the practice of the expression and symbolisation of 
God's will and it') transmi'ision, through tradition, within the hierachically ordered 
social body. 
The substantive criminal law was, therefore, simply the expression of the 
commonly shared values and conceptions of the common good in confonnity with the 
divine will. Each cac;e that entered the criminal trial processes of the ancien regime, 
called upon the judiciary and the magistracy to act not in the creation of law but in the 
articulation of something that was immanent within the larger process by which 
society was shaped and altered. Decision-making was characterised as cyclical and 
repetitive in which judicial action was always the reenactment and reafftrmation of 
these hierachical relations. It was not governed by the formulation of rules in 
accordance with specific legal norms and principles as it was a legal form in which 
adjudication followed a regularity produced immanently by practice. Its authority and 
existence were predicated upon a flexibility of interpretation in which previous ca<;e-
law and statutes were only utilised for purposes of clariftcation and guidance. This 
interpretative approach was the only form of reason which Common Law theory 
recognised as subsisting in the Common Law and this too was not an external process 
of ordering the law in conformity with a set of principles established by a 
methodological framework, but a mode by which the reason intrinsic to the Common 
law would be discovered. 
This flexibility was tied to t~e view of each case as a singular, particular entity 
with which the various sources of the Common Law were to be interpretatively 
applied in order to provide a solution to it. "The degree of interpretative freedom was 
constrained, however, by the fact that the character of this decision-making was 
always guided by the notions of the truth and coherence of the ancient structure of the 
Common Law within which each cao;;e was always set. The flexibility of the law was 
not an expression of the contingency of the rest of society for a legal system 
operating in accordance with it') own norms and procedures, but of the lack of 
differentiation of the legal system from the rest of society. For the Common Law was 
merely one institutional form among others which constantly articulates and 
symbolises the values ofthe community in which there was no sharply demarcated 
conceptual boundary between law and other societal forms, values and institutions. 
The lack of sharp differentiation of legal norms and rules from the rest of 
society wa'i reflected in the definition of substantive criminal offences. Since members 
of society were bound together within a divine social hierachy in which interaction 
took place in accordance with the dictates of common and immemorial custom then 
the designation of criminal offences could only be forms with the content to be filled 
in with reference not to the criminal law it'ielf but to this wider' community 'and its 
. 
practices. The criminal law, under this Common Law foundation, operated with a 
system of remedies and wrongs in which the courts were engaged in the articulation 
of law through a process of interpretation in which the alleged wrong was placed in 
the context of this I community I since this was the only context for the meaning of 
society and social interaction. 
This' community I had a double existence in that it was composed of 
individuals who were seen a'i transitory elements and the divine social hierachy which 
remained unchanged over time. This dualiIty wa'i replicated in the the subject 
positions of the dominant in that hierachy with these positions representing both the 
concrete individual and an existence which exceeded that since the social order as a 
whole was regulated by and eminanted from a higher causality - God. The legitimacy 
of political authority flowed from a source that wa'i always beyond and outside the 
social order and was never capable of being totally and transparently articulable in a 
series of formal rules. For, authority wa'i not founded in and organised by society but 
was only based upon it'ielf since it was only expressed through society with the result 
that the individual placed in a dominant social position wa'i without formal constraint 
. 
in the sense of an externally imposed system of rules. 
The authority and actions of the trial judge and magistrate were expressions of 
this sovereign will with the result that the substance of this authority rested in their 
person alone. The only regularity which formal procedures obeyed was that 
imminently produced by each incumbant's particular practice with the result that there 
remained a high degree of flexibility and indeterminacy in the sphere of procedural 
and substantive criminal law in the cla~sical Common law system. This wa~ also 
reflected in the lack of differentiation in the role of the justice of the peace who could 
initiate, prosecute and decide a criminal case making the summary jurisdiction the 
most malleable institutional element of the criminal process of the ancien regime. 
This flexibility of the criminal process as a whole made it potentially highly adaptable 
and attentive to changing perceptions of crime and disorder in the' community' and in 
terms of procedure facilitated rather than hindered the potential prosecutor 291. 
The position of the defendant was not one which wa~ ftxed and deftned 
independently of the authority of the trial judge or magistrate. Individuals within 
ancien regime society were not subjects of the law but subject to the law with an 
identity posited between the freedom and subjection of the individual. God, not the 
individual, is the foundation of society and law an emanation of this sovereign will 
with the individual already subject to and created by this other power. The individual 
act'; in accordance with a will which is free to the extent that it coincides with God's 
will which means, in turn, obedience and submission to the social hierarchy of unequal 
power relations. A crime wa~ conceived as an act which always overflowed the 
individual prosecutor and accused as it wa~ also a direct challenge to the divinity of 
the social order - an attack upon the absolute power and authority of both the 
monarch and God. It wa'i this absolute and personal power without limit which was 
at the bac;is of the criminal system of the ancien regime 292. This was projected not 
only in the nature of punishment but also in the trial process it'ielf with the 
establishment of truth being vested to a high degree in th~ trial judge or magistrate 
demonstrating that the determination of gUilt, and with it the right to punish, was part 
of this absolute power. This demonstration wa'i at the same time the simultaneous 
demonstration and reaffirmation of the existence of the subject a'i one who wa'i 
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without power and identity except as an effect and emanation of this absolute power. 
The subject's position was not only intimately connected to the institutional dynamics 
of the criminal process under the ancien regime it was directly produced by and 
dependent upon it. 
The increasing secularisation of the state prompted the reform of this criminal 
system, and, with it, the alteration of clal)sical Common Law theory. The state, 
separated from religion, was no longer divine and part of a hierarchical social order. 
The content of law ceased to be the expression of God's will, becoming instead a 
purely secular matter produced solely in accordance with institutional procedures -
the separation and differentiation of law from society. This differentiation meant the 
severance of a direct, causal and expressive link between common and immemorial 
custom and the unity and coherence of the legal system. The foundation and 
coherence of the legal system had, therefore, to be articulated in an autonomous, 
internally consistent form which ceased to be dependent upon itl) position within an 
organic social whole regulated by the implementation of God's will through the 
various institutional forms which composed it 
This change in the self-identity of the state and its consequences for the legal 
system did not produce a thoroughgoing critique and replacement of the system of 
Common law in conformity with a project aimed at the generation of a legal system 
constructed exclusively upon the principles of human reason. This is apparent in the 
deliberations of the Criminal Law Commissioners whose Reports, between the 1830s 
and 1840s, established the parameters of the new self-understanding of the operation 
of the criminal process for the rest of the nineteenth century. Their approach to the 
Common Law balOis of the criminal law was to attempt reform in accordance with a 
recognition of the validity of this Common Law' tradition', It did not aim at the 
radical alteration or transformation of the criminal process, but merely the simple 
transposition of the Common Law into a new rule-based form. This was, in turn, the 
2~1 
reflection of the wider reinterpretation and de-radicalio;;ation of Bentham's 
philosophical project in which Bentham's construction of a fOlmally coherent, rule-
bao;;ed, legal system was appropriated, but its necessary link to a complete 
transformation of the Common Law through the creation of a Code, the supremacy of 
statutory law and diminution of the role of the judiciary was rejected 293. Bentham's 
theory wao;; thereby dissociated from ito;; re~ation to a transformative social project in 
which the legal system was a prominent element and turned to the technical-practical 
tao;;k of the reinterpretation and reformulation of the foundation and identity of the 
Common Law. 
This new configuration of the legal system, produced by the Commio;;sioner's 
conceptual schema, although it placed the state at the centre of the legal system, did 
not accord it absolute authority. For, without the codification of the law and its 
reduction of the judiciary to a purely cognitive role the creation of law and legislation 
were not identical a'i judicial decision-making still represented a source of law. This 
schema merely readjusted the relation between the state and the judiciary which had 
developed under the previous Common Law system. This was an expression of the 
wider position of the state which while, split away from a ' private' realm of civil 
society, now represented the unity of society based upon the retention of system in 
which it'i position was not overtly dominant 
This separation of the realms of civil society and the state entailed not the 
disappearance but rather the continuance of a dual system in which the local system of 
governance and the central state were equally important parts of the political structure 
of society. The removal of the divine foundation of the social order did not lead to 
the removal of the existing institutional structure of the ancien regime. The co-option 
of the bourgeoisie into an enlarged power-bloc allowed this structure to remain and 
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merely for it to be adjusted and reconfigured in order to conform to this new power-
bloc. The position of the state as both an creator of the background conditions for the 
existence of the market was thereby extended from this realm to include the local 
structure of governance. 
i 
The societal changes of the early nineteenth century produced a social system 
in which the state was placed in the background with a minimal presence and limited 
possibilities for action and manoeuvre. This was not the product of the operation of 
the notion of the rule of law, but of a limited capacity to secure the transmission of its 
decision-making premises to the elements of the local structure of governance and 
other societal institutions coupled with anincreasing acceptance and observance of 
this situation during the nineteenth century. 
The nature of the state's position and the lack of a profound transformation of 
the institutions of the ancien regime was also tied to the exclusion of the working 
clalis from participation in the structure of governance. The I people I were now 
equated with those who owned property in'limited 'democracy' which sought, 
through a technical understanding of democracy as a means to secure the unity and 
stability of the power-bloc, the reproduction of this social order. This unity of the 
power-bloc balied upon property was founded upon a I public' of electors, at both 
local and national level, for whom class interest - the protection of the stability of the 
private property order - was the at bac;is of both the selection of representatives and 
the implementation of policies within the structures of local and national governance. 
The ' public I were separated and demarcated from the working-class who were 
without property and, therefore, without the necessary link to the foundation of the 
social system in private property. They were out5ide the terms necessary for 
admittance to the I public I and its selection of the norms and representatives through 
which the social system wac; to be governed. 
This constitution of the working-class as outside the' public' was not merely 
an exclusion from the realm of recognised politics but also a characterisation which 
presented them as an essential negative and destructive force. The stability of the 
property order, and, with it, the social system as a whole, rested on the continuous 
maintenance of this separation and exclusion of the working-class with the subsequent 
., 
extensions of the Franchise in 1868 and 1885 premised upon the admission of those 
who, though owning less or very little property, were still committed to the private 
property system. The working cla"ls, without property, were equated with nature, 
barbarity and immorality as opposed to the culture, civilisation and morality of the 
institutions and private property system of existing social order 294. 
This threat of the working cIa"ls represented a"l a threat to society as a whole 
meant that the notions of democracy and liberalism, projected as the guiding 
conceptual framework within which society could be understood, were always 
unstable with this revocation of their universal content. It was the universalisation of 
democracy that was seen to represent the collapse of liberalism by its rationalisation of 
authority through mac;s participation in the processes of the formation of public 
opinion, nonns and the structure of governance. This split between democracy and 
libera1ism entailed the separation of the state and local structures of governance from 
the universal determination of state and local policy. The repositioning of the state at 
the centre of the social order was the substitution of God's will for the rule of law, but 
this law was an expression of will, that of the property order, and not of reason - the 
immanent relation between law and truth based upon the former's claim to validity 
tested and criticised through universal, participatory democracy. 
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The concept of the autonomy of the person did not reside at the centre of this 
understanding of society since it was predicated upon the recognition of the authority 
of the given structure of society. The freedom of the individual and the capacity for 
human autonomy was split away from the individual themselves and located outside 
the individual in the explicit laws of the state, and to a lesser extent the judiciary; and; 
in the implicit laws of the market explicable through the theory and methods of 
political economy. Society was not recognised as a creation of these individuals 
themselves, but as the result of the. submission to these extrasociallaws. The 
recognition of their authority was united with the 
" surrender of autonomy( of thought, will, action), the tying of the subject's 
reason and will to pre-established contente;, in such a way that these contente; do not 
fDIm the' material' to be changed by the will of the individual but are taken over as 
they stand as the obligatory norms for this reason and will. " 295 
The foundation of the authority of the liberal state on the voluntary commitment or 
self-assumed' obligation' of individuals is rejected and turned into a requirement to 
obey. By this denial of the source of the state's authority in the active consent of 
individuals the social order is presented as a natural order and the state as a reified 
entity in which the political relationship between the state and the individual ie; 
premised upon the passive acceptance of the structure of the social system as an 
essential and unproblematic condition for the maintenance of their form of life. The 
equal participation of all in power wall not the object of this change in the 
configuration of the political form of society thus producing the consequent sundering 
of the relation between freedom and equality and the generation of a 
" degraded concept of freedom all restrained, defensive, and pae;sive freedom. 
In this conception it ... presupposes that one has already accepted alienation or political 
heteronomy, that one is resigned in the face of the existence of a statist sphere 
295. H. Marcuse, From Luther to Popper trans. J. De Bres (London:Verso, 1988), p.5t. 
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separated from the collectivity, that, ultimately, one had adopted a view of power(and 
even of society) as a ' necessary evil', " 296 
The alteration of the foundation of the social order did not produce or 
articulate a new understanding of the relation between subjects and the state in 
accordance with the redefinition of all individuals as a citizens and the vesting of the 
organisation of society in the absolute power of the ' people' composed of these 
citizens. The individual still existed in society a~ an essentially subordinated subject it 
was merely the source of this subordination that was altered. The individual was no 
longer subject to God but to the social system composed of the state, the local 
structure of governance and the market. Societal transformation wa') merely the 
alteration of the form of subordination. 
This was reflected in the criminal process with the relation between the 
criminal law, subject and state adjusted to account for the removal of the divine 
foundation of the criminal law. This' programme' of adjustment, which continued 
throughout the nineteenth century, was a systemically governed process of 
refonuulating the institutions and practices of the Common Law to conform to this 
new societal self-understanding. It was also the expression of the collapse of the 
notion of common and immemorial custom, or, community binding the fonus and 
institutions of social regulation that were embedded within it 297. This structure 
which ensured the reproduction of the social system was altered by the combination of 
a reformulation of these institutions 298 and a new' sensibility' towards the activities 
of those placed outside the realm of society which was increasingly to be enforced by 
the " New Police", 
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Personal authority exercised within a hierarchical social order was replaced by 
an increasing separation between office and person in the form of rule-bound 
authority of those who now occupied institutional positions within this altered social 
order. This was coupled with the increasing predominance of law and the market as 
the sole elements which ensured the regulation and continuance of this social system. 
The growing predominance of the criminal law in the maintenance of society 
was the product of the separation of the enforcement of law from the production of 
law. This expansion of the parameters of criminal law in the regulation of social 
interaction was created by the reconfiguration of the position the judiciary through the 
reduction (but not subordination) of their role and authority in accordance with the 
projection of the state as the source of unity of society; and; the clear delineation of 
their new position as simply that of trying cases that came before them. The 
magistracy who had been at the centre of the local system of governance of the ancien 
regime were now placed in a purely judicial role whose parameters were defined by 
rules under lervis' Acts of 1848. They lost their capacity to enforce the law directly 
by prosecuting cases,or, indirectly by putting pressure on other elements of the ancien 
regime criminal process who also enforced the law. 
This contraction in the position of the judiciary, particularly that of the 
magistracy, effected a fmner, rule-based differentiation between and substantive and 
procedural law since the authority of the judiciary no longer rested solely in the 
person of the incumbent, but in their conformity to the rules which now governed and 
defined their institutional actions and decision-making. It is at this point that the legal 
system becomes increasingly differentiated from the rest of society with the generation 
of separate structure of operation and an internal identity between its element\). This 
differentiation of the legal system is, in turn, predicated upon the dependence of the 
trial upon the rest of society for it~ , inputl\ ' that is there is a split between the choice 
or freedom to invoke the law, and, the application of law to the particular situation 
which has been subsumed under the law. Therefore the trial subsists in a position in 
which the 
11 actual occurrence of the ca<;e is regarded as sheer accident. It is in no way 
regulated by the underlying structures of the law or the legal system. This il) a mirror 
image within the legal system of the sovereignty to invoke or not to invoke the law in 
situations of daily life. 11 299 
This I passive I position of the trial in regard to the surrounding societal environment is 
the precondition for the presentation of itl) independence from society and with it the 
projection of specifically juristic mode of decision-making which is radically divorced 
from politics - the institutional expression of the separation of law and morality. With 
the splintering of the I community I of the ancien regime, in which law and morality 
were undifferentiated and intimately entwined, meaning cea'ied to be an intrinsic part 
of the social whole. Meaning, in a society in which legality and morality were split 
apart into two separate and distinct entities, could now only be imposed and 
generated externally through the twin mechanisms of the' laws' of the market and the 
law generated by the legal system and the state. The differentiation of the legal 
system was, therefore, also tied to its centrality in the maintenance the conditions of 
possibility of society. 
The central institutional position of the legal system was connoted in the 
criminal law by the position of the criminal trial as the centre of criminal process 
bestowing' meaning' through the resolution of individual disputes which are juridified 
by the choice of the individuals themselves. Relations between them were governed by 
the rules of evidence which, as a medium outside the control of the parties into which 
all the information which they sought to present had to be transposed, ensured the 
determination of the ca<;e in accordance with the search for the truth and the 
299. N. Luhmann, The Differentiation of Society (Columbia:Columbia University Press, 1982), 
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consequent neutralisation of the nature of the parties individual identities, social 
position and capacities. 
The capacity of the criminal trial to act in this manner became problematic 
with the development of the" New Police" during the nineteenth century and their 
control over the enforcement of law, the decision to prosecute and the determination 
of the content of the case against the accused. For, once the enforcement of law 
ceases to be vested in the actions of private prosecutors and transferred to the" New 
Police" the relation between prosecutor and defendant becomes one between an 
individual and a social system. The development of the" New Police" represents the 
emergence of a concentration of collective, institutionalised social power within civil 
society which was supposed to be a realm free from accumulations of power with the 
concentration of sovereignty and authority.~ the state. The enforcement of law by 
the " New Police" were interventions in social life which were at variance with the 
recognition of individuals as subjects defined according to universal norms. These 
norms were enforced with the purpose of disciplining certain sections of the working 
class in society and the exercise of this practice was predicated upon the maintenance 
and reintroduction of ao;ymmetry into the relation between the police constable and 
the individual 300. The task of law enforcement was the implementation of a principle 
of classification founded upon an essentially arbitrary will - the demonstration of 
ao;ymmetry. 
This position of the 11 New Police 11 was not presented in the dominant 
perspective as itc;elf problematic or worthy of attention. Their role in the enforcement 
of criminal law only became a matter of consideration when it began to interfere with 
the material representation of the independence and centrality of the trial by their 
appearance as prosecutors in criminal trials. Attempts were made in the later 
300. See on this M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish:The Binh of the Prison trans. A. Sherid,m 
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nineteenth century to remove the" New Police" from this role by the introduction of 
a system of public prosecution into the crirriinal process which would confine the" 
New Police" to the collection of evidence and the gathering of witnesses. These 
attempts failed and the" New Police" were accepted as prosecutors in criminal cases 
with their replacement, at the discretion of the " New Police", by a legal 
representative where the case proved to be of difficulty or particularly serious. 
Acceptance of the" New Police" was not to be based upon their exclusion from the 
trial process due to the acknowledgement their efficiency and effectiveness in the 
enforcement of law by the magistracy and the Chairmen of Quarter Sessions in the 
1870s 301. This acceptance was coupled with the simultaneous denial of the 
collective character and autonomy of the" New Police" in relation to the rest of 
society. They were simply a collection of individuals within an organised framework 
undertaking on a pennanent basis, and with exactly the same powers, the nonnal 
preoccupations and concerns of the private individual with the maintenance of law and 
social order. 
The only remote possibility of problems with the " New Police" as agents of 
law enforcement were provided for by the independence of the trial from the pre-trial 
activities of the " New Police" through the rules of evidence; and; the legal-
bureaucratic character of the" New Police" themselves with the generation of their 
normative framework of operation dissociated from their practices of implementation 
by their subordinacy to the Watch ~ommittees in the boroughs and the magistrates in 
the counties. In this way, the" New Police" were projected as an unproblematic 
social entity accepted into the criminal pr~ess under the terms of an effective 
regulatory framework of control. 
This validity of this projection collapses once these mechanisms are actually 
examined ;and; it becomes clear that the later nineteenth century, rather than being a 
period of accommodation and regulation of the 11 New Police", was one in which they 
301. See chapter on tlle System of Prosecution fot more detail on this. 
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developed into an increasingly autonomous social system acting independently, in 
accordance with a purely internal definition of its purposes and practices, in which not 
legality but politics was the functional mode of its institutional legitimacy. 
The trial was from the out\}et incapable of effecting the type of regulation over 
the practices of the" New Police" which was projected. For, the capacity of the rules 
of evidence to act as a effective control was predicated upon the assumption of a 
society composed of private prosecutors undertaking the processes of collection of 
infonnation and witnesses in an essentially disinterested manner. Only then could the 
rules of evidence as an independent entity act as limit upon the activities of the parties 
in the case through a process of translation in which two radically distinct paradigms -
the parties processes of the collection of information and the rules of evidence - were 
brought into correspondence by the sUbsumption of opinion under rules aimed at 
establishing the truth. Once the" New Police" assumed control over the totality of 
the process of law enforcement then they had complete discretion in its enforcement 
and this was driven by the desire to secure the conviction of the individual accused. 
The suspicion of the individual policeman pushed the individual into a process in 
which the investigation, collection of evidence and building of the case against them 
was tied to the substantiation of these original suspicions of the individual's guilt 
Investigation was an interested process undertaken with the purpose of ensuring the 
conviction of the accused. 
Since the trial was dependant upon the " New Police" for it\} , input\} , of cases 
it was necessarily dependant upon them for the character, type and quantity of the 
information which composed the prosecution case. This infonnation which was 
presented to the court was geared to the conviction of the accused through its active 
and prior' construction' by the " New Police" before the trial. It was, therefore, 
filtered to take account of the possibility of challenge by these very rules along with 
the 'holding back' or rejection of information which pointed to the accused's 
innocence. Police practice constantly sought to turn the trial, as the mechanism 
through which the accused's innocence or guilt was detennined, into a realm that was 
functional to its pre-trial practices so that cases passed easily and without incident 
from arrest to conviction. 
The ineffectiveness of the trial as a control over the " New Police" was 
coupled with the increasing evasion, by the" New Police ", of a legal-bureaucratic 
.' 
institutional characterisation. This characterisation rested upon the maintenance of a 
flnn separation between the realms of politics and administration in which the 
generation of nonns, as the basis of institutional action premises, was completely 
distinct from the process of their implementation. This separation was one in which 
there was a direct transmission of decision-making premises from the realm of politics 
to that of administration with no possibility for interpretation or modification of these 
premises by the administrative agency. The administrative agency through its fidelity 
to its premises obeys these positive rules of law and this means that legality is the 
function mode of the operation of the administration. 
The local structure of governance in which the" New Police" were placed 
initally operated with this understanding of their role in relation to the source of norm 
creation in the Watch Committees in the boroughs and the magistracy in the counties. 
However, later in the nineteenth century this began to break down with the result that 
the " New Police 11 were no longer constrained externally by the system of local 
governance, or, internally by their own institutional self-understanding by this legal-
bureaucratic type of authority. 
This process began earlier, and was more clearly visible, in the counties where 
the Chief Constable started with a considerably larger amount of authority and 
discretion under the County Police Acts 1839/40. This enabled them to develop a 
distinct and independent institutional self-understanding of their own role more 
282.. . 
quickly and become capable of avoiding or modifying the normative framework which 
supplied their action premises. The borough forces started under a tighter system of 
control and their process of evasion was slower, developing through the interaction 
between Watch Committee and the Head Constable. However, despite these 
differences in the pace and transparency of this process most police forces had by the 
end of the nineteenth century come to base their actions on an understanding of a goal 
- the maintenance of law and order. 
This self-definition of a task meant that administrative action was now geared 
to the production of concrete results in which the normative framework was rendered 
contingent. It was now utilised or rejected in conformity with its capacity to achieve 
this institutional goal of the maintenance of law and order. This produced a flexibility 
or instrumental relation to rules and led to a decline in the capacity of legality to act as 
mode of legitimacy for its operations and was increasingly replaced with the capacity 
for the successful or acceptable realisation of it., task by the causing of concrete 
effect'). This, in turn, transferred the mode of legitimacy to an extra-legal source -
politics. It was through the active generation of consensus around the capacity of the 
11 New Police 11 to effect a substantive realisation of the values of law and order that 
was now the basis for the abstract trust in the legitimacy of the police which protected 
its activities from refutation by everyday encounters. 
These transformations in the police were a part of the wider process of the 
separation of the criminal system from external normative control and the guidance of 
, 
it') actions, coherence, identity and self-understanding by internal system imperatives. 
This process of guidance becomes self-reflexive and,therefore, more deeply embedded 
with the establisment of the Court of Criminal Appeal which was an institution totally 
shaped in conformity with systemic considerations of the wider efficiency and capacity 
of existing institutions of the criminal process. With the establishment of the Court of 
Appeal the institutional framework of the criminal process wa'\ provided with 
2g~ " 
mechanism which provided greater flexibility to it~ overall operation and allowed the 
Home Office to take up a reduced role in the criminal process. Despite this seemingly 
major alteration of the institutional structure of the criminal process the perceptual 
framework with which the new court operated were in substance essentially the same 
as that which had been exercised at the Home Office prior to its creation - the 
maintenance of the legitimacy and survival of the criminal process as a whole even 
when confronted with events which challenge this. 
By the end of the nineteenth century the criminal process had become 
increasingly sundered from any claim to authority and legitimacy which rested upon 
an embeddedness in an independent system of norms. It was freed from a fIrm link 
between legitimacy and truth. It~ legitimacy was now simply a.l\sociated with a belief 
in the reaching of a decision in accordance with the criminal process' own procedures. 
There was no need to search behind them as they themselves were merely of 
regulative status providing the system'sformal coherence. This fonnalism and purely 
procedural legitimacy was the result of the decreasing external restrictions upon the 
criminal process and the concomitant generation of internal systemic values which 
detennined the selection of actions and experiences. This led to the possibility both of 
a growing autonomy of decision-making processes and the treatment of individuals 
who entered the criminal process as objec.t~ or things to be processed. This generated 
a view of the rest of society, by the criminal process, as one composed of element~ 
which were a constant threat to the survival of the institutions of society in which 
there was a constant struggle to secure the habit of obedience among the individuals 
who resided within it. This behaviourist measure of the legitimacy and rationality of 
societal institutions was predicated upon the denial of the possibility of equal 
participation by all individuals, through a restrictive electoral franchise, in the 
detennination of the norms and goals of society. The operation of society was to be 
governed externally by this societal institutional and individuals were rendered 
politically passive with the consequent equation between society and nature in which 
----------_._-_._- .~.-
individuals, particularly those seen as a threat to the basis of the social system, were 
subject to the necessity of the absolute force of systemic maintenance - coercion 
stripped of any restriction apart from that of the logic of the system's own practice. 
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